GAZETTEER OF SELECTED SCOTTISH BATTLEFIELDS

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INTRODUCTION

This gazetteer is intended as a starting point for assessment of the importance, potential and management needs of the battlefields of Scotland. It has been prepared as a rapid overview and is based almost wholly upon secondary sources. It will require further enhancement based on detailed examination of primary sources for both the military history and the historic terrain. For selected battlefields this will also need to be complemented by limited investigation of the battle archaeology. The document should be used in conjunction with the UKFOC database. Battlefields listed in lower case are unlocated.

References / Bibliography

For each battle the references specified in section 3 are only those used in compiling the database & report. A more extensive bibliographic listing is provided in section 4, though this does not claim to be comprehensive, and in general these other secondary sources have not been consulted in preparing the present report. Only those primary source identified incidentally in web based searches are specifically listed. No attempt has been made to define a comprehensive catalogue of primary sources. Primary sources have not normally been consulted for either battle or terrain. Nor has there been systematic search of all records in the battlefield search.

Archaeological & Designation references

Detailed information on SAMs, listed Buildings, Conservation Areas etc are accessible via Pastmap and so details on each are not duplicated here. Similarly the NMRS data for each battlefield is accessible online via Canmore, for which the relevant NMRS reference numbers are given in the UKFOC database for each battle, so again this data is not normally repeated in the gazetteer. NMRS and SMR searches have been restricted to specifically battle related records on the SMR, rather than all records for the battlefield ‘search areas’ defined on the battlefield plans.

Mapping sources

For each battlefield the modern state of development has been assessed from the digital Ordnance Survey Explorer mapping (2004). Geological evidence, where presented, has been derived from the British Geological Survey 1:50,000 drift geology mapping.

Battlefield Plans

The detail presented on the plans is highly stylised and intended only for illustrative purposes, providing a broad guide to deployments and action. Far more detailed research is required on most battlefields to enable more secure and accurate frontages, positioning etc. In addition only the most minimal attention has been possible to the recovery of the historic terrain.
ABERDEEN II

1 SUMMARY

1.1 CONTEXT

The Covenanter government of Scotland had entered into alliance with the English parliament and had entered the war in England in early 1644, the Scottish army having a dramatic impact in the campaign for the north of England. In response, following the royalists’ dramatic defeat at Marston Moor (Yorkshire, July 1644), the King appointed the Marquis of Montrose as his military commander in Scotland. On 28th August 1644 Montrose raised the royal standard and with little more than 2000 troops fought a campaign in which he had won a series of dramatic successes in the Highlands against the Covenanter forces.

Montrose began a campaign intended to present such a threat to the Covenanter government that they would have to recall Leven’s army from England and thus swing the balance of the war there back in the royalist favour. In Scotland he might even, in the long run, manage to topple the government and install a regime favourable to the king. Montrose’s first objective was to establish a secure territorial base upon which he could sustain a long campaign. Though outnumbered, his forces achieved their first victory at Tippermuir. This forces the government to recall some but not the bulk of the army from England, and other troops from Ireland.

From Tippermuir the royalists marched east towards Dundee. There they were rebuffed and so pressed on towards the government controlled city of Aberdeen. (1)

1.2 ACTION

Various local forces had been called to Aberdeen in early September to counter the threat from Montrose. Though not all turned out, the government army was substantially stronger than the royalists. They held the Bridge of Dee, forcing Montrose on the 11th September to ford the river near the Mills of Drum (7). First he called the government forces to surrender but they would not. Instead they deployed south west of the city, in a strong location adjacent to Justice Mills. The troops deployed astride the main road (the Hard Gate) approaching from the south west, along the top of a steep scarp overlooking the point at which the main road crossed the the How Burn or Justice Mills Burn.

The government deployment is not clear from the documentary sources (7) but Raid suggests Balfour deployed the bulk of his cavalry on the left flank where the scarp was far less steep, with the remainder on the right flank, adjacent to Justice Mills, with musketeers holding the Justice Mills itself (1). They also placed several light artillery pieces in front of the infantry and held several buildings and walled yards on the sloping ground. The royalist deployed to the west of the burn with infantry in the centre and cavalry on the wings, each supported by about 100 musketeers. A few light artillery pieces were placed to the fore (7).
After an artillery exchange the government cavalry made ineffective, poorly coordinated attacks on either flank. An outflanking infantry move by the covenanters, via a sunken lane, on the royalist left was effectively countered. The well drilled royalist infantry used good tactics to defeat the right wing covenantanter cavalry attack. In the centre the royalist infantry attack now cleared the buildings held against them and after a hard fight for some time, they followed up the firefight with a charge that in hand to hand fighting soon broke the inexperienced Covenantant infantry in the centre. The Covenantanter reserve was also then broken. In all the action had lasted less than two hours (7).

While the covenantanter cavalry escaped, in the rout a significant number from the broken infantry regiments were killed. There was then extensive plundering and far worse atrocities by the royalist troops in the town itself.

But the royalist forces soon had to retreat north westward towards the Highlands because the Marquis of Argyll with substantial forces was advancing to counter the royalist threat. (1)

Figure 1: Aberdeen II (1644) - battlefield plan

1.3 TROOPS

Numbers:
The royalist army under Montrose comprised mainly Irish troops for following Tippermuir many of the Highland forces had dispersed. But they were more experienced and under a very capable commander. The Covenanters under Lord Balfour, who had limited experience, combined two regiments of regular troops with a substantial number of local levies, the latter lacking battle experience.

Royalist: less than 1600 foot; up to 80 horse (1); 1500 foot; 70 horse; several light artillery pieces (7).
Covenantanter: up to 2000 foot (of which 1100 were local levies); about 300 horse (1); 2000 foot and about 500 horse; several light artillery pieces (7)

Losses:
There is limited evidence of the losses both on the battlefield and in the town but Marren suggests that the losses on the covenantanter side tend to be overemphasised while the royalist losses are underplayed (7)
Covenantanter: 520 killed (1)
Royalists: light (1)

1.4 COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION
There is no memorial to the battle.

2 ASSESSMENT

2.1 LOCATION
The battle was otherwise known as Justice Mills or Crabstane Rout.(7)
2.2 PRIMARY SOURCES
There are several contemporary accounts of the battle. Spalding provides little detail. Wishart is unreliable in some details. Gordon gives the most useful and detailed account. Extracts of all three are given in Brown (8). The sources are assessed briefly by Marren, making clear that none is sympathetic to the Covenanter cause (7).

2.3 SECONDARY WORKS
The discussion by Gardiner provides a good brief overview, including a plan which uses in large part Milne’s 1789 map for its topographical base, although Gardiner shows the royalist deployment on the rising ground to the north east of the burn whereas all others show their initial deployment to the south west of the burn (9).

Reid gives an order of battle with troop numbers and shows deployments against a very small scale and basic plan of terrain. His depiction of the initial deployment is the most detailed graphic representation, and the general location appears likely to be broadly correct, based on the relief and the line of the Hardgate, though the detail of the order of battle is conjectural. However the frontages shown may be somewhat too great for the numbers of troop specified, perhaps by as much as 40% if one assumes for the infantry a 6 deep deployment at order. (1).

The discussion by Marren is short but more detailed, making fuller use of the primary sources for the action. He also provides a useful discussion of the primary sources and the landscape as it is today. His plan is however very generalised (7).

Brown is the only modern book devoted solely to the battle of Aberdeen. He provides a useful background to the war and the campaign, and describes the character of Civil War armies in Scotland.

2.4 BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY
A substantial fire-fight appears to have taken place in the infantry centre and so substantial quantities of lead bullets may be expected. Case shot might also be expected from the artillery pieces. It seems highly improbable in this urban context that anything structural will survive with shot impact scars, but the potential for any walling surviving from the yards and buildings held during the action should be considered.

2.5 BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN
The action was fought along the line of the Hardgate, the main road from the SW into Aberdeen. It was fought across mainly arable fields, partly in oats, where the road crossed the How Burn and climbed Clay Hill towards the Crabstane. However Mareen suggest the slopes to the east of the burn may have been partly gardens even in 1644. On the sloping ground there were several buildings with walled yards which were held as strong points by the government pikemen (7). Unfortunately Gordson’s map of 1661 shows very little detail of the area concerned, other than a prospect from the Crabstane towards the town, which shows a very open landscape (5).

2.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE
Aberdeen was one of a series of victories that Montrose’s heavily outnumbered army won over government forces, but, as with most of the others, it did not have a significant long term outcome. They failed to secure any substantial territory or major...
towns upon which to base a sustained campaign. What it did do was to add to the reputation of Montrose as a commander and strengthen the pressure on the government to withdraw forces from England. The greatest effect of the battle was the way on which the atrocities perpetrated in the sack of Aberdeen ensured that Montrose would gain few recruits and little support from the region for the rest of his campaign.

2.7 CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT
Most of the battlefield is intensively developed. However a transect across what is probably the centre of the infantry action, which probably encompassed the main action, is preserved as a public park, most of which has never been developed.

2.8 CURRENT DESIGNATIONS
There are a number of listed buildings in proximity to the battlefield, but none of direct relevance.

2.9 POTENTIAL
According to Reid it is still relatively easy to read the terrain, despite the level of development. (1) What is possibly the Craibstone still survives built into a wall within the developed area, with a plaque affixed and may lie close to the centre of the covenanters infantry position (7). Further work on the documentary sources would also be useful as it may enable the exact location of the buildings and yards held by the covenanters to be established.

At first sight it might be concluded that the whole of the battlefield is destroyed and that no useful archaeological evidence might exist. However, a small area of parkland (circa 1.7 ha) lies undeveloped immediately to the east of the old Hardgate straddling the former course of the Justice Mills Burn. This land was garden and field land in 1789 & 1828, was still undeveloped in 1869, apart from some allotments or gardens at the north eastern side and it was still undeveloped in 1912 (2-6). It seems likely that archaeological evidence for the battle could survive in this area relatively undisturbed. Though such evidence is unlikely to convey a great deal about the action, it could be sufficient to confirm the location of the central infantry action, thus enabling a more secure interpretation of the documentary accounts.

2.10 THREATS
None identified.

3 REFERENCES
(2) Ordnance Survey 1st edition 6” mapping, 1869
(3) Milne, 1789, Map of Aberdeen
(4) Wood, 1828, Map of Aberdeen
(5) Gordon, 1661, Map of Aberdeen
(6) Bartholomew, 1912, Map of Aberdeen


4 BIBLIOGRAPHY

4.1 PRIMARY SOURCES


4.1 SECONDARY SOURCES


ALFORD

1 SUMMARY

1.1 CONTEXT
The Covenanter government of Scotland negotiated an alliance with the English parliament and entered the war in England in early 1644. The Scottish army had a significant impact in the campaign for the north of England, culminating in the royalists’ dramatic defeat at Marston Moor (Yorkshire, July 1644). In response, Charles I appointed the Marquis of Montrose as his military commander in Scotland. On 28th August 1644 Montrose raised the royal standard and, with little more than 2000 troops, fought a campaign in which he had won a series of dramatic successes in the Highlands against the Covenanter government forces. Heavily outnumbered, he effectively exploited the terrain to outmanoeuvre his enemy, defeating the government forces at Tippermuir, Aberdeen, Fyvie, Inverlochy, and in the major action at Auldearn.

But there were still significant government forces in the field, under the experienced commander General Baillie. He played a game of cat and mouse with Montrose in the weeks after Auldearn, marching across Moray and Aberdeenshire. Finally, at the end of June, finding Montrose’s army as depleted as his own, Baillie considered he could face the royalists in open battle. But Baillie’s actions were heavily constrained by government interference. Not only did they interfere in tactical matters, they transferred 1000 of his best troops to a separate army under Lindsay, which then acted independently instead of combining against the royalists. Montrose now marched south, towards the Lowlands, leaving Baillie no option but to follow in pursuit (8).

1.2 ACTION
On the 1st July, having crossed the river Don, Montrose chose very strong ground on which to fight, and then quartered his army for the night, according to tradition possibly at Asloun, 2 miles south west of the crossing at the Boat of Forbes (12).

On the morning of the 2nd July, Montrose deployed his army to engage Baillie as soon as he had crossed the river. Montrose placed most of his forces on the reverse slope of a hill, out of sight so as to encourage Baillie to advance. He deployed in standard formation with cavalry on both wings, each supported by small bodies of infantry, a common tactic for a force whose cavalry were outnumbered. Most authors, following Simpson, now identify the hill as Gallows Hill, with Leochel Burn and Alford Muir providing protection from outflanking on the left (west) (3) (12).

It is suggested that Baillie believed Montrose to be retreating and so he intended an outflanking move beyond the royalists, sending his vanguard of cavalry forward to cut of Montrose’s potential for retreat. But Montrose countered this, advancing all his forces to the crest of the hill. This forced Baillie to deploy close to the Don in an area of
marshy ground, using hedgerows and wet ditches to strengthen his position. He too deployed in standard form with two cavalry wings and with his infantry in the centre.

Montrose’s right wing cavalry opened the engagement, although after initial success the numbers of Covenanter horse proved decisive and the royalists were forced back. But the royalist horse were then seconded by their infantry and under this combined attack the Covenanter cavalry broke and fled. The royalist left wing of cavalry had even more rapid success, driving off Baillie’s right wing of horse.

Meanwhile the royalist infantry had advanced and began slowly Baillie’s infantry back towards the river, the ill trained levies being no match for the Highland charge. Baillie reports that to receive the charge he advanced the half ranks so that his infantry were only 3 deep, compared to Montrose’s 6 deep, to ensure he was not overwinged - the one detail that might suggest that Baillie’s claim of being outnumbered in infantry was in fact correct. When the royalist cavalry then hit the infantry in the rear, as they were already pressed to the fore by the royalist foot, the Covenanter infantry were soon routed. With their formations broken, they suffered heavy casualties as the royalist horse pursued them in the rout, which became a bloody execution. While the main action probably lasted no more than an hours, the pursuit and execution continued into the early evening. The only royalist setback was the death of Lord Gordon, in the cavalry attack on the infantry (3) (8).

Figure 2: Alford (1645) - battlefield plan

1.3 TROOPS

Baillie’s army had been significantly depleted by the transfer of 1000 experienced troops to Lindsay’s army immediately before Alford, a loss far from made up for by the addition of 400 - 1000 inexperienced local levies. Indeed Baillie considered his army significantly outnumbered when the action finally took place, though this may represents justification by a defeated commander (8). In contrast Montrose, although still lacking Macdonald’s forces, had been re-joined by Lord Gordon and he considered his army strong enough to engage Baillie on favourable terms. Gardiner suggest that the two forces were perhaps equal in foot but the Covenanters slightly stronger in horse but some more recent authors suggest a significant Covenanter advantage.

Numbers:

Covenanter: 1800 foot, 800 horse (1); 2400 foot, 380 horse (3); but Baillie reckoned himself outnumbered 2:1 in foot and very slightly in horse (10); 2000 including 600 horse (11)

Royalist: 1800 foot, 400 horse (1); 1800 foot, 500 horse (3); 2000 including 250 horse (11).

Losses:

Covenanter: The figure of 1600 killed (2) seems too high a percentage of the total 2600 on the field. A figure of 700 is suggested in some modern accounts (12)

Royalist: light.
1.4 COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION

According to Martin there is a battlefield memorial on the hillside beside the cemetery, which is called the Gordon Stone, on the site where the royalist cavalry commander Lord Gordon died in the battle (4). In fact this un-inscribed stone has been lost beneath a modern rubbish tip on the edge of Alford (12). The stone might in fact be a prehistoric standing stone of earlier date, for such associations are seen on other battlefields such as Homildon Hill, and there are certainly other prehistoric standing stones in the area (13).

2 ASSESSMENT

2.1 LOCATION

There is considerable uncertainty as to the exact location where the battle was fought. Two main alternative locations are given:

Traditional site

Already by 1869, presumably reflecting local tradition although possibly based on the analysis by Napier, the site of the battle was placed to the north of the present Alford village, in what is now Murray Park (10). Gardiner followed this interpretation, placing the hill on which Montrose deployed as lying immediately west of the modern A944, on and beneath what is now the northern edge of Alford village. Baillie is said to have crossed the Don via Mountgarrie ford immediately north of Alford (8). Gardiner, who visited the battlefield with a local guide, provides a map showing an area of wet ground with a causeway visible crossing it which he identified as he marshy ground where Baillie deployed. Gardner saw the problem for his interpretation of Wishart’s description of a second marsh behind Montrose. Subsequently and quite unreasonably, Lang (1903) claims, in support of the Gardiner site, that Wishart was wrong.

Gardiner’s location is followed in general terms by Reid, who places the action between Gardiner’s site and Gallows Hill (3). He is followed by Saddler (5).

Gallows Hill

In 1919 Simpson reviewed the topographical evidence and contradicted Gardiner, concluding that the battle was in fact fought on and to the north of Gallows Hill, between it and the Boat of Forbes. He has Baillie crossing the river Don at the Boat of Forbes. He also identifies the ‘village’ of Alford with the kirk of Alford, to the west of the Leochel. The steep hill overhanging Alford, mentioned by Wishart as where Montrose deployed, poses a problem for the Gardiner/traditional site, for the only hill in the area which overlooks the buildings around Alford kirk, is Gallows Hill. Moreover only this hill seems to provide sufficient of a back slope, in the headwaters of the Knowehead Burn, to have enabled Montrose to hide the majority of his deployment from Baillie’s view.

Montrose’s position was on rising ground with a ‘marsh, intersected by ditches and pools, which secured him in the rear from the cavalry. This was quite separate from the marshy area, including pools and ditches, which Baillie had to cross immediately south of the river and where he halted to deploy. The latter was clearly a strong position for with Baillie ‘intrenched among deep ditches and marshes’ Montrose was not willing to attack, while Baillie was equally unwilling to storm the hill. Simpson identifies the
former marsh with the Muir of Alford immediately west of Gallows Hill at the bottom of a steep slope. Thus Simpson places Montrose on the Gallows Hill and has Baillie crossing the Don at Forbes, following the Suie Road (9).

Simpson is followed broadly by Rogers, Brander, Seymour, Fairbairn, Marren, Guest & Guest, and Bennett. Today the Ordnance Survey map also shows a battlefield location on the Gallows Hill site. Though Gallows Hill has become associated with the battle in the 20th century, and is identified as an alternative name on the battlefield database, there is in fact no earlier use of the name in association with the battle.

Re-assessment
The mapping from Skinner and Taylor in 1776 shows the Suie Road, which both armies surely used in their march south, following a clear route across the Don via the Boat of Forbes, while there is no evidence of a significant road approaching the present Mountgarie crossing. This does not preclude Baillie having used a subsidiary crossing but it makes it far less likely. According to local information the river was not easily fordable, even in reasonable conditions, other than at a few fording places and so the potential crossing places are likely to be few (8).

Also, although it is true that modern Alford was a creation of the railway from the late 1850s, Alford on the 1776 road map is what is now known as Balfluig Castle (14), just to the south east of the modern settlement of Alford. This might in part resolve the problem with which Simpson undermines Gardner’s interpretation.

According to tradition, in the Feight Faulds many of the Covenanters were cut down, while the Buckie Burn is said to have flowed red with blood (9). There is also the Gordon Stone which is taken as representing the location where Lord Gordon fell. These locations, if they are to be accepted as genuine battle associations, pose some problems for the Gallows Hill site, unless the action is seen as flowing not northward but north eastward towards modern Alford, and this is where Raid places the action, with these features broadly in the area of the rout.

However, it is extremely difficult from the available geological mapping, to locate an area of potentially marshy ground on the Simpson site, which would accord with that described in the contemporary accounts of the action. The alluvial cover in this area appears extremely narrow, with rising ground reaching quite close towards the river. In contrast, although the geological mapping provides little support, there is the impression from the contours and the stream courses, that there may be a palaeochannels of the Don running east-west through Murray and Haughton Parks, which might provide the marshy ground of the traditional site, where Baillie would have deployed. It is here that, with local advice, Gardiner identified the marshland.

But in fact there are even greater uncertainties. A great deal actually hangs upon which of the two roads from the Bridge of Forbes the royalist army was marching, if the roads were the same in 1645 as are shown by Skinner & Taylor in 1776. Most accounts since Simpson have assumed that it was along the Suie road to Brechin. But a very different interpretation might be placed upon the accounts if it was actually to the south east along the Aberdeen road, which is where Montrose was to march immediately after the
victory and where Gordon’s funeral was held. If it was this route then Knowehead does provide a hill with a backslope facing north westward and cutting across to the Aberdeen road. Here Montrose could perhaps have deployed with most of his forces out of Baillie’s view. This hill overlooks the Alford location of 1776. This would place Baillie to the north of modern Alford with the Gordon Stone and Feight Faulds in the right place, within the potential marshland immediately north of Alford, where Gardiner identified it. With Montrose making the attack it would have been in just that area in and to the north of modern Alford, in the area of the Feight Faulds, that the engagement would have taken place. That is on the traditional site of the battle.

While the crude foregoing re-interpretation may prove wrong, it demonstrates that there are a number of different ways of interpreting the battle, in the absence of detailed reconstruction of the historic terrain and investigation of the battle archaeology.

2.2 PRIMARY SOURCES
Alford is a reasonably well documented action, with three main contemporary or near contemporary accounts. Wishart, although not present at the battle, was Montrose’s chaplain and so had access to detailed information on the battle and battlefield from the key combatants on the royalist side. He provides the most detailed description of the terrain of the battlefield and the way in which deployments and action fitted into that terrain. Baillie provides an important Covenanter perspective on the battle, though his account may inevitably be coloured by this need to justify his defeat. A third account providing detail is that by Gordon. A brief assessment of the primary sources is provided in Marren, 217-8 (12).

2.3 SECONDARY WORKS
Gardiner provides an unusually detailed account for Alford, having visited the battlefield, providing a map of the terrain with local information and discussing the reliability of troop numbers in the primary accounts. In 1919 Simpson reassessed the Gardiner interpretation, from both a detailed examination of the ground and a reworking of the primary sources. He moved the action to the west of the modern village of Alford, onto the northern slopes of Gallows Hill. Most authors follow Simpson, with the exception of Reid, who broadly follows Gardiner.

Marren’s analysis, which follows Simpson, is by far the most detailed and well referenced of the modern discussions of Alford, providing a good assessment of the primary evidence and of the problems of the Gardiner and Simpson interpretations, even if there is still far more doubt over the exactly location of the action than Marren allows.

The battle still needs a single modern account which reproduces in full all the primary accounts, reassesses all the secondary discussions, and places the events within the historic terrain.

2.4 BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY
There are no modern reports of archaeological evidence related to the battle. The only potential link is the report in the Statistical Account that a skeleton was discovered with a sword and an Elizabeth shilling bogged in a marsh at the foot of the Green Hill near Boglouster besude the Bloody Faulds (9). However Bloody Faulds lies four miles to the
south east of Alford (at 362470,813780), and although it could potentially be related to scattered action in the rout, it cannot with any security be related to the battle of Alford at all.

2.5 **BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN**

The battle was fought on the lower slopes of a hill in what appears to have been in part open ground but with the Covenanter army exploiting enclosures and ditches in a boggy area.

The Ordnance Survey 1st edition six inch mapping of 1869 provides clues as to various potentially boggy areas, to the north and north east of Gallows Hill, which are not clear from the geological mapping, but two broad areas of potentially boggy land are around Balfluig Castle and north of Alford village. It is likely that Roy’s mapping of the mid 18th century (not consulted in this assessment) would provide far more detail prior to more modern drainage.

In the present mapping, the location of Feight Faulds is taken from the Ordnance Survey first edition 6 inch mapping, while the Gordon Stone is very approximately located from a plan in Brander 1993.

2.6 **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE**

This was the first victory that Montrose achieved against an able, highly experienced Covenanter general. It brought the Highlands more securely within his power, and left the way was open for him to march south, recruiting a yet larger force to challenge the government in the lowlands. However the battle was also important for the loss of Lord Gordon. This was a substantial blow to Montrose’s campaign, as Gordon was a key supporter in both political and military terms - the one best able to rally the Gordons and other important forces to the royalist cause (12).

Another Montrose victory in Scotland was the only good news for an increasingly beleaguered king, as the royalist cause south of the border collapsed following the defeat at Naseby, followed soon after by the destruction of the last substantial royalist field army in England, at Langport. The victory encouraged Charles’s will to continue the fight, against the better guidance of Rupert and other of his close supporters, with the continued hope that he could somehow unite with Montrose to snatch victory against all the odds in England, on the back of Montrose’s success in Scotland.

2.7 **CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT**

The village of Alford has developed close to the battlefield since the arrival of the railway in the late 1850s. In the 20th century the settlement has expanded across a wide area and has encroached significantly upon the traditional site of the battlefield. The Gordon Stone has also been buried beneath a rubbish tip and part of the Feight Faulds has been built over.

In contrast the northern part of the traditional site lies within parkland and has not apparently been substantial affected by land use change. However no data on the extent of any mineral extraction has been collected for this assessment, a limitation that needs urgent resolution.
2.8 CURRENT DESIGNATIONS

There are no designed landscapes on the Scottish Natural Heritage data set. However a substantial part of the traditional site does lie within the what appears to be parkland associated with Haughton House, where parkland already existed by 1776.

There are no Conservation Areas or SSSIs on the battlefield, but one scheduled monument, a prehistoric stone circle, lies immediately north of Greystone. There are a number of listed buildings in the general area but none appears directly relevant to the battlefield.

Martin does not define an area for conservation suggesting the battlefield is poorly preserved (4). This is clearly not a valid assessment.

2.9 POTENTIAL

The uncertainties about the exact location of the action at Alford are substantial, yet the documentary record and the topographical detail they provide are exceptionally good. They should enable a resolution of many uncertainties and, when viewed within exactly the correct historic terrain they offer the potential for a detailed and clear understanding of the battle and battlefield.

What is required is detailed research to reconstruct the historic terrain, not only of marsh and enclosures but also the communication network of 1645. There will then be the need to place the detailed accounts of the action within that terrain, using the topographical clues in the accounts. There is also a need for reasonably accurate calculation of the frontages of the armies to facilitate such re-interpretation. The frontages shown by most authors on their plans are far greater than the figures suggested in the texts, with for example Marren suggesting 800 yards for Baillie’s frontage but his plan showing double that. Once this work has been carried out the resulting hypotheses can then be tested by systematic sampling of the battle archaeology, using the rapidly developing methodology for battlefield study.

If the Gallows Hill site is correct then the greater part of the battlefield is intact and it may be expected to have a very high archaeological potential, both in terms of battle archaeology and historic terrain. If however the traditional site is correct, in one form or other, then the potential will have been substantially compromised by the development of Alford in the later 19th and especially late 20th century. However, in those parts of the site which have not yet been developed, given there was a substantial firefight, there should be a great deal of well preserved battle archaeology in the form of unstratified lead bullet distribution, which can accurately position aspects of the fight and unlock much of the detail of the action. Exceptional survival of battle archaeology may also be expected in very restricted areas of the battlefield, assuming that modern destruction through development and 18th century and later drainage has not been too effective, for there must be high potential for waterlogged deposits as Baillie’s forces were deployed in and/or pushed back through boggy ground. To refine the potential of survival it will be important that all landfill, mineral extraction and other ground disturbance is mapped.
2.10 **THREATS**

The level of the threat to the battlefield is highly dependent upon which is the correct location of the battlefield. The traditional site is close to Alford village, where there has been substantial development and that pressure continues. If the action was concentrated on and to the north or north east of Gallows Hill then the development pressures are far more distant. Yet even in this scenario the rout is likely to have taken the action through the ‘Feight Faulds’ and the area of potential development around Alford.

There is therefore an urgent need to resolve the uncertainties, through detailed investigation using the developing methodology of battlefield archaeology. Until such work is done there is inadequate information available to enable the archaeological impact of any planning decisions in and around the village of Alford to be determined. Given the difficulties in battle archaeology of interpreting small, isolated areas of investigation in the absence of an overall study, it is essential that the battlefield is not lost through piecemeal development with small scale evaluation restricted to the development sites themselves.

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**ANCRUM MOOR**

1 SUMMARY

1.1 CONTEXT

In the period following the battle of Flodden (1513) an uneasy truce existed between Scotland and England, but in 1542 the tensions once more erupted into open conflict. Following its Reformation in 1534, England stood independent from Catholic Europe. In response Pope Paul III sought an alliance between Scotland, France and the Holy Roman Empire against England. This caused Henry VIII to pour huge sums of money into projects for England’s coastal and border fortification. Henry also considered an invasion of France, but his northern border would then be vulnerable to Scottish invasion in support of their ally. Henry therefore encouraged his barons in the north to raid into Scotland, to further undermine the Scottish king, James V, who was facing internal dissention. In October 1542 Henry sent an army some 20,000 into Scotland, where they burnt Kelso and Roxburgh. In reply, James raised an army of some 18,000 troops in the west and headed for Carlisle, being defeated in November at Solway Moss by a much smaller local English force.

After the death of James, with Queen Mary just one year old, Scotland was ruled by a regent, the Earl of Arran. This simply exacerbated the internal divisions. With Scotland thus weakened, Henry aimed to unify the two kingdoms by seeking the marriage of Queen Mary to his own son, Prince Edward. The situation was complicated by religious differences in Scotland, some Protestants being more sympathetic to the protestant English crown, while Catholic support was clearly for alliance with France. When negotiation failed, with the Regent pursuing a course of double dealing, Henry again pressed his case by force of arms – the so called ‘rough wooing’. In 1544 English troops sacked Leith and Edinburgh. Later in the year, under the leadership of Sir Ralph Euer, Warden of the English Middle March, and Sir Brian Laiton, governor of Norham, there followed further ravaging of the Borders. The destruction is detailed in the so called Bloody Ledger, leaving much of the border lands effectively under English control (5).

In February 1545 Euer and Laiton again crossed the border, this time with some 5000 troops, comprising 3000 foreign mercenaries, 1500 borderers and 700 Scots (border reivers from Teviotdale and Liddesdale who would change sides according to who was in the ascendancy). The army plundered Melrose town and abbey, then returned towards Jedburgh. In response the Earl of Angus raised local forces. At first outnumbered, he manoeuvred but would not engage the invaders. Once joined by other forces, including the Earl of Aran, he had more than 1200 troops. The Scots now considered their army strong enough to act.
1.2 ACTION
There are significant variations between the secondary accounts of the battle, with authors showing deployments and action orientated in three very different ways, though on broadly the same ground. The Scottish forces advanced to rising ground from which they then withdrew, drawing the English forces into an attack. The English cavalry vanguard pursued well in advance of the English foot, a mistake which would prove decisive. Once the cavalry reached the rise, blinded by the setting sun, they were attacked by the full Scottish force in battle formation. The main body of English infantry were men at arms in the centre, flanked by archers on one side and harquebusier on the other.

The English had to deal with a deep marsh, and also the Scots are said to have dug pits and covered them with vegetation to further disorder to the English cavalry, though whether they will have had sufficient time to prepare the ground in this way may be questioned.

The Scots had the advantage of the wind, which blew the arquebus smoke back into the faces of the English troops, while it is also said that the Scottish pikes were an ell (*a Scottish ell was 37 inches*) longer than the English pikes. As the Scottish forces attacked the English fell back: Latoun’s vanguard was repulsed and fell back on the main battle and these in turn upon Euer’s rearguard. Then the 700 Scottish borderers in the English army changed sides, seeing which way the battle was going. The English battalions then broke and there was then great execution in the pursuit, with both Evers and Latoun being killed.

Figure 3: Ancrum Moor (1545) - battlefield plan

1.3 TROOPS
The Scots were outnumbered 2:1 (1). The secondary works are consistent about the number of English troops, less so about the exact numbers of Scottish troops.

Numbers:

Scottish: no more than 2500, including 700 Fife lances as well as reivers under Scott (6);

English: 3000 foreign mercenaries; 1500 Borderers; 700 Scots, including some Highlanders (6);

Losses:

English: >600 killed and 1000 taken prisoner (1); 500 killed (Tytler)
Scottish: few

1.4 COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION
There is no monument on the battlefield, but the battle is commemorated in the ballad of Lilliard, a maiden who supposedly fought and died in the battle. Overlooking the battlefield is the ‘Maiden’s Tomb’, which is in effect a monument to the battle (1) (2). The location of Lilliard’s Stone is recorded on the map of 1863 (8). The monument was in a very poor state of repair in 1983 (3) but is now repaired. The battlefield and the
monument are accessible via the footpath along Dere Street Roman Road (part of St Cuthbert’s Way).

2 ASSESSMENT

2.1 LOCATION
The battle is generally agreed to have been fought about 1.5 miles north of the village of Ancrum (9). However the exact position and the orientation of the deployments and action is in dispute. Matthews and Warner show broadly comparable deployments with the action fought from north east to south west across Gersit Law. Logan-Home also has the English advancing towards the setting sun, with a south west wind in their faces. In contrast Fairbairn has the English returning from plundering Melrose, with Angus outmanoeuvring them and getting between them and the River Teviot, hence the English attack would have been south eastward along the main road. In complete contrast, Phillips has the English camped near Ancrum, with the Scots first advancing to Peniel Heugh Hill, overlooking Ancrum Moor, then withdrawing to the north west with the English in pursuit. He has the action fought from south east to north west along the line of Dere Street. This is essentially following Robson’s interpretation who places the English camp north of the river Teviot, below Ancrum village. He has the Scottish forces standing on Peniel Haugh and then withdrawing to deploy out of view on the lower ground to the north west, between this and Lilliard’s Edge, feigning retreat.

Despite the comment about the sun being in the eyes of the English, given the direction of the main route, position of the potential marshland and the trend of the hills, it seems most likely that the action was fought to the south west of Lilliard’s Stone across Lilliard’s Edge, either from south east to north west, or vice versa. It is here that the battlefield is located on the 1863 mapping, presumably reflecting the traditional site of the action (8). If the English did attack down hill, as Logan-Home suggests, then, as the likely marsh area is to the south east of Lilliard’s Edge, they would have to have attacked south eastward.

2.2 PRIMARY SOURCES
Logan-Home provides extracts from Haynes State Papers in British Library regarding the raids from 1 July 1544 to 17th Nov 1544, but not of accounts of the battle. None of the secondary works consulted provide extracts from the primary sources.

2.3 SECONDARY WORKS
Robson (1897) provides a very partisan account and, although he has clearly drawn upon a range of primary sources, he provides little direct referencing, even in the notes section. Logan-Home again works from various primary sources but most of his discussion is of the context of the action rather than the battle itself, and again referencing is largely absent.

Only Matthews and Warner hazard plans showing deployments and action, but neither is wholly convincing. Indeed none of the secondary works consulted provide an adequately referenced account to enable any of their slightly varying interpretations to be demonstrated as correct and none provide significant extracts from the primary
accounts of the battle.

2.4 **BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY**

Various stray finds of armour and equipment, suggested as being related to the battle, were found in the 19th century to the south west of Ancrum Moor, such as a ‘burgonet’, a 16th century helmet, found on the slopes near to the river Ale (6) (7).

2.5 **BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN**

There are three key elements to the terrain of the battlefield:

- the Roman road (Dere Street), the course of which is well known and which may still have been in use at the time of the battle, though had certainly been replaced before the early 19th century by the present road.
- Ancrum Moor
- marshland, which may be indicated by the two areas of alluvial deposits on either side of Dere Street, immediately south east of Lilliard’s Edge.

2.6 **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE**

Though a significant defeat, involving the death of two English commanders from the Marches, Ancrum Moor was not a major battle and it did not change the balance of power in the region. The English border regions were readied for a major Scottish incursion in the wake of Ancrum. The French dispatched 3500 troops to Scotland for such an initiative, but they only led some minor incursions because the Regent was unwilling to risk a major invasion. The only significant outcome of Ancrum was to force Henry VIII to escalate his military action against Scotland, which ultimately led, after Henry’s death, to the battle at Pinkie in 1547 (6).

In terms of battle archaeology Ancrum may be a significant action because it involved the use of both the harquebus and the bow, one of the earliest battles in the Britain to have seen the use of significant numbers of these weapons, though in no way comparable in scale and significance to their use at Pinkie.

2.7 **CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT**

A caravan park may lie across a small part of the battlefield, depending on the exact extent of the action. There has also been a significant degree of planting of belts of coniferous woodland, though the greater part of the presumed battlefield area remains as open land. The coniferous woodland is likely to have altered the soil chemistry creating far more acidic conditions, which may have caused far higher rates of decay, particularly in ferrous artefacts.

2.8 **CURRENT DESIGNATIONS**

The Monteath Mausoleum, a listed structure, lies in the general area of the battlefield, but it has no relationship to the battle. Woodhead Moss, the south-western of the two alluvial areas is an SSSI. A scheduled moated site lies adjacent to Muirhouselaw to the north east of the battlefield.
2.9 POTENTIAL

The battlefield may have a high potential for battle archaeology, particularly important because of the combined use of firearms and archery. In this sense it is comparable to Pinkie, but the Ancrum battlefield will be much smaller than Pinkie and appears to have suffered little of no destruction. Given the lack of modern development and disturbance, Ancrum may provide well preserved unstratified battle archaeology. However, the underlying geology appears to be sandstone, so acidic soil conditions may be expected and this will have been exacerbated in places by the conifer plantations. However the history of land use may also be a significant factor, and if it has been a largely pastoral land use then this will have resulted in minimal mechanical damage to artefacts.

The scale of the action should mean that the site could be relatively easily surveyed, to provide a good guide as to what may be achieved on sites of this transitional period in the history of warfare. In particular there should be the potential for the recovery of a lead bullet distribution pattern through a metal detecting survey in discrimination mode. This should give a good indication of the location and extent of the action. With this information it would be possible to undertake an intensive all metal search for iron arrows in the heart of the action, to determine whether arrowheads survive and, if they do, whether the distribution pattern correlates in any way with the pattern provided by the bullets. If arrowheads are to be used on medieval battlefields to examine the detail of battle action then such control evidence from a transitional battle could prove critical to enabling the understanding of the taphonomy of iron arrowheads and the interpretation of the distribution patterns they provide. There is also the existence of a remnant of the marshy ground, which was relevant to the action, and might contain some exceptionally well preserved waterlogged deposits from the battle.

In order to resolve the differences of view over the exact location, extent and direction of the action further research is essential, for without such information it will be impossible to define appropriate management. Firstly there should be a search for secondary local historical works, which may provide information on the battle and the battlefield. Most importantly, copies of the primary sources for the action must be collected, so that the events can be more accurately reconsidered. This could then be supported by a basic historic terrain reconstruction, to enable the events to be placed more securely within the landscape. In this process the location of the marsh will be a key topographical guide.

2.10 THREATS

None identified.

3 REFERENCES


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1 SUMMARY

1.1 CONTEXT

The Covenanter government of Scotland had entered into alliance with the English parliament and had entered the war in England in early 1644, the Scottish army having a dramatic impact in the campaign for the north of England. In response, following the royalists’ dramatic defeat at Marston Moor (Yorkshire, July 1644), the King appointed the Marquis of Montrose as his military commander in Scotland. On 28th August 1644 Montrose raised the royal standard and with little more than 2000 troops fought a campaign in which he had won a series of dramatic successes in the Highlands against the Covenanter forces. Heavily outnumbered, he effectively exploited the terrain to outmanoeuvre his enemy defeating them at Tippermuir, Aberdeen, Fyvie and Inverlochy. When in April he attempted an assault on Dundee a Covenanter army under Baillie responded. Montrose retreated north and an army under Hurry was dispatched in pursuit, getting between the royalists and Inverness. As the royalists advanced across the river Spey, Hurry fought a rearguard action as he moved closer to Inverness to unite with local Covenanter troops before engaging Montrose. The royalist forces withdrew to quarters in and to the east of Auldearn on the night of the 8th May, with scouts out to the west. Hurry, having united with the local forces now advanced against Montrose on the morning of the 9th May 1645.

1.2 ACTION

When news arrived from the scouts of the Covenanter approach MacColla, who had the most advanced royalist position, in Auldearn village itself, led his troops westward. They took up a strong position west of Auldearn, probably on Garlic Hill, protected from cavalry attack by a marsh and an area of bushes.

The action, relatively unusually for a battle of this period, probably lasted much of the day, but in the form of periods of intense fighting interspersed by lulls. It began with a Covenanter attack in which, after an intense fire-fight, they drove MacColla’s heavily outnumbered troops back close to Auldearn village. Here, from the village enclosures the royalists maintained musket fire to hold back the Covenanters, aided by the difficult, marshy ground. MacColla then made a counter attack, it too becoming bogged down in the marshy ground and, after intense fighting including Covenanter cavalry as well as foot, was forced back to the village. The fighting apparently continued house to house through Auldearn.

Having finally mustered the main body of his army to the east of the village Montrose now moved into a counter attack. Contrary to other secondary works, Reid interprets Montrose’s account to suggest that there were outflanking attacks to north and south of Auldearn village by the royalists. A flank attack by cavalry drove the Covenanter cavalry, with the royalists in pursuit, through some Covenanter infantry units and provided some relief for MacColla’s hard pressed men in the village. A cavalry attack
on the Covenanter left then dealt with their left flank cavalry, exposing both infantry flanks to attack. A combined attack of horse and foot on the Covenanter infantry saw many killed in intense fighting, but a substantial number may have kept order to retreat south westward, retreating over the River Nairn at How Ford. The next day Montrose’s army retreated eastward across the Spey.

Figure 4: Auldearn (1645) - battlefield plan

Figure 5: Auldearn conservation boundary suggested by Martin (red line)

1.3 TROOPS

Numbers:
The troops on both sides seem to have been largely equipped, trained and to have fought according to contemporary European practice, rather than with the Highlanders’ equipment and tactics seen in some later battles, except that some troops apparently carried bows rather than muskets. There is some dispute over the numbers with primary and secondary sources giving significantly different numbers for each side but the following are based broadly on Reid’s discussion.

Royalist (Montrose): possibly c. 2000: c.1440 foot; c.600 horse: a mixture of experienced Highland and Irish troops with raw recruits.

Covenanter (Hurry): possibly c. 3000: c.1700 regular & c.1300 local foot; c.300 horse.

Losses:
Reid provides some figures on casualties but there are considerable uncertainties. The order of scale may be:

Royalist: c.200
Covenanter: c.500

1.4 COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION

The battlefield is signposted and there is a car park. An interpretation panel has been erected on the motte near the dovecote on the NW edge of the village, maintained by the National Trust for Scotland. This was a vantage point used during the battle itself and is said to be the best vantage point on the battlefield to appreciate the terrain and its influence on the outcome. There is also a memorial to fallen Covenanter troops in the old church at Auldearn.(1)

2 ASSESSMENT

2.1 LOCATION

The general location of the battlefield is well known and this is supported by the discovery of possibly battle related burials on or near Garlic Hill. The Ordnance Survey modern mapping does place the battle to the south of Aldearn, but no other secondary source examined supports such an interpretation.

For the present purposes two broad areas have been defined as the first stage of definition of the battlefield:
• an inner search area likely to encompass the main action
• an extended search area required for terrain reconstruction and to encompass manoeuvres etc
• a wider area to the west to encompass any skirmishing associated with the flight / retreat towards Inverness has not be included due the substantial uncertainties, but this remains an issue to be tackled

The exact deployment of the forces and detail of the action is open to dispute. Thus the exact extent of the battlefield is difficult to define without further documentary and archaeological investigation of both the battlefield terrain and the battle archaeology. Resolution of the variation in location of the detail of the action is critical if there is to be implementation of any effective management of the battlefield as an historic landscape or an archaeological monument.

The extent of deployment and thus the action north westward of the village is in dispute between Reid and others secondary works, though the potential extent of marsh would tend to support Reid’s interpretation. However with the detail of cavalry action shown by Reid the potential extent of marsh may raise difficulties, as may the fact that primary sources show action continued as far south as Brightmony, with Covenanter troops being killed there and near Kinsteary. Other troops retreated westward but the extent of action both during the battle, when the troops were in battle array, and in subsequent skirmishing, once they had been disordered, is undefined in this direction. It does appear fairly certain that the action did not extend to the north east of Auldearn village.

These uncertainties make defining the extent of the battlefield difficult, particularly on the south east and on the west. The lack of secure terrain reconstruction for 1645, including the location and extent of the marsh and the exact extent of Auldearn village and its enclosures, also means that even in the central area of the battlefield there remains substantial uncertainty as to the interpretation and placing of the fine detail and extent of action.

2.2 PRIMARY SOURCES

There is one detailed Covenanter report and several royalist reports on the battle. They are not presented in full in any of the sources consulted for this assessment and need to be made easily available.

2.3 SECONDARY WORKS

The most substantial discussion of the battle is by Reid (2003), who makes good use of the primary accounts, though unfortunately he does not reproduce them in full. The use of ‘3D’ perspective depictions makes the accurate mapping of his suggested deployments very difficult. The terrain features shown on his plans are not sourced and seem to be as spurious as similar terrain detail provided in other books in the Osprey campaign series, such as Edgehill. Some of the detail appears to be direct reproduction of modern colour aerial photography, for it includes cropmarks. All the terrain features depicted must therefore be taken as spurious until proved otherwise.

Guest & Guest’s review is highly derivative and the plan very stylised, however they show the infantry action focussed further north across what is now the A96.(2) Both they and Bennett broadly follow Seymour’s depiction of the deployments.(4) This
interpretation may be seriously compromised by the possible extent of marsh as suggested by the extent of alluvium.

2.4 **BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY**

The only battle archaeology identified during the research for this report is the report of human remains noted on the 1st edition 6" Ordnance Survey mapping (1871) as having been found on Garlic Hill and recorded on the NMRS.

The geology of the battlefield is largely sands and gravels and as such the site is likely to have a low pH, which will have been aggressive towards preservation of ferrous artefacts in the topsoil. There are however several areas of alluvium which are likely to relate to the area of marsh reported in the accounts of the battle which could have preserved artefacts from mechanical damage from cultivation. The past land use history, if largely one of pasture, may also show whether there is an increased potential for good preservation of ferrous artefacts. There may also be potential here for exceptional preservation of waterlogged deposits. It should however be noted that most bullets recovered from a battlefield are probably retrieved from within the top 10cm and almost all from within the top 30cm, thus alluvial burial would make metal detecting survey work difficult in these areas, with negative results not necessarily reflecting lack of action. Where masked in this way by alluvium there is however the potential for exceptional preservation. Thus a key survey strategy should be to sample any intensive battle archaeology following the distributions from the sands & gravels into the alluvial area.

Some of the Highland levies in the Covenanter army are said to have been armed with bows and so the potential for iron arrowheads should be taken into account. There would appear to have been no study of a 17th century battlefield which has so far recovered significant evidence of archery, as the bow was largely obsolete by the 1640s in Western Europe. If the bow was actually used in any significant numbers at Auldearn in conjunction with musketry then this site might offer unusual potential for investigation of the issue of ferrous arrowhead survival and distributional patterning on the battlefield. The issues regarding potential for preservation of ferrous artefacts discussed above may be relevant here.

2.5 **BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN**

Research is required into the major road network in 1645 as there appear to have been significant changes. In 1776 the main route from Aberdeen to Nairn apparently ran along the coastal route, now just a minor road, but in 1830 a second route also seems to be shown running south of Auldearn, through ‘Peniclar Park’. If the latter is not on the course of the 20th century A91, the course of the roads may modify our understanding of the exact approach of Hurry’s forces to the field and thus the likely location of deployment and direction of attack and retreat/flight.

The 5m contours on the OS Explorer mapping appear to give an adequate impression of the relief which will have provided one of the key factors determining the tactical potential in the area. However lesser scale features than Garlic hill that still have significant military importance may only be visible from ground inspection and by use of a high resolution digital terrain model (NEXTMap Britain).
The marshy area that MacColla used to protect his initial position and which will have influenced the distribution of later action is likely to be broadly defined by one or both of the alluvial deposits immediately north west and south west of Auldearn village depicted on BGS mapping. The geological mapping taken together with the accounts mentioning the marsh obstructing the left wing of the MacColla’s counter attack might indicate that the marsh lay in the alluvial area to the south east of Garlic Hill. Determining the extent of settlement and of ancient enclosures around the village of Auldearn in 1645 will be important in pinpointing the action in the middle phase of the battle.

2.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE

At Auldearn Montrose defeated a significantly stronger force, even if at a substantial cost. Though the numbers involved were relatively small, the battle was another important element in the development of Montrose’s reputation as a highly skilled commander. It set the scene for a series of new royalist victories, as the campaign moved south towards the Lowlands, and Montrose’s campaign was the one significant royalist success story in the later stages of the First Civil War.

2.7 CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT

Auldearn village has expanded significantly, to the south, south east and north west, and a bypass has been constructed skirting the village to the north. However the vast majority of the probable battlefield remains open ground. A key area of the early action adjacent to the village, where MacColla held off the early attack, has probably been largely lost under the modern housing, though the mapping of the ancient enclosures may lead to some revision of this conclusion. There is a small area of surviving open ground around the Doocot, which may prove to be an archaeologically critical area for the understanding of this phase of the action if it enables the character and density of action close to the village to be assessed. Other than this, the battlefield seems to be fairly complete, with no obvious evidence on modern or late 19th century mapping for significant mineral extraction or other such destruction.

2.8 CURRENT DESIGNATIONS

Martin claims the site is already well covered in the Local Plan, but this has not been assessed here.(3) There are several listed buildings within the village and, immediately to the north west, a listed dovecote on the scheduled motte. The site of the church in the village is also scheduled. Martin claims that the battlefield has been designated as a Conservation Area, but none is shown on the Conservation Areas digital data set provided for the project by Historic Scotland. No other designations have been identified.

2.9 POTENTIAL

The battlefield appears to have high potential both for investigation and interpretation. It is clear from Montrose’s own account that the terrain severely restricted the room for manoeuvre, allowing him only to deploy in two wings in his critical counter-attack. Given this and the terrain information in the primary accounts, it seems likely that a far clearer picture of the location and extent of the initial deployments and of the various phases of the action could be established by a detailed reconstruction of the historic
terrain as a context for the re-interpretation of the primary accounts. This applies equally to the wider context of the battlefield as to the battlefield core. For example, there were probably two major roads leading east from Nairn past Auldearn towards Aberdeen, one running north and the other south of Auldearn. Knowledge of the exact course of these roads in 1645 would assist in the understanding the likely approach of Hurry’s Covenanter army to the battlefield and thus the reconstruction of the initial manoeuvres and even the exact location of the initial deployments. Reconstruction may also assist in resolving the conflict between the interpretations in the secondary works, as for example where Reid interprets Montrose’s account to suggest that there were outflanking royalist attacks around either side of Auldearn village.

Any interpretation would need to be tested by sampling the battle archaeology. Given the frequent reference in the primary accounts to intense fire-fights, there should be extensive evidence of battle archaeology in the form of lead bullets of varying calibre, which should be very amenable to systematic survey. One problem with the interpretation of the battle archaeology is that there were apparently three separate stages when attack and counter-attack flowed across Garlic Hill and the area up to the village, and distinguishing the evidence from each is likely to be impossible, unless there is some distinctive attribute of calibre or firing marks to the different phases. First however an assessment needs to be made to establish what metal detecting, if any, has been undertaken on the battlefield, if it has then whether any of the finds have been recorded and thus what damage is likely to have been done to the distribution patterns. In addition, given part of the action was through the village then, if there are any surviving buildings or other structures from the period, they should be examined for evidence of shot impacts.

2.11 THREATS

The high probability of survival of extensive non ferrous battle archaeology renders the site particularly vulnerable to treasure hunting and unrecorded/poorly recorded metal detecting surveys.

Further housing development, including infilling in remaining paddocks around the village, especially to the west and south would be very destructive of the battle archaeology.

If potential exist for the survival of waterlogged deposits from the former marsh then any intention for further lowering of the water table could prove destructive.

If past land use has been predominantly pastoral then conversion to arable now or in the recent past may represent a threat of rapid destruction of otherwise well preserved unstratified ferrous battle archaeology.

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BANNOCKBURN

1 SUMMARY

1.1 CONTEXT

Robert Bruce had been elected guardian of Scotland in 1298, replacing William Wallace as the leader of the long campaign against the English King Edward I’s attempt to conquer Scotland. The War of Independence dragged on after Edward’s death in 1306, but the incompetent reign of his son Edward II, was a disastrous period of division in England and this weakness was very effectively exploited by Bruce. After the devastating defeat of Wallace at Falkirk (Falkirk, 1298) and then Bruce’s own defeat at Methven (Perth & Kinross, 1306) by English forces spearheaded by cavalry, much of Bruce’s campaign took the form of guerrilla warfare, avoiding as far as possible major set piece battles. He completely changed the balance of power in Scotland through the progressive reduction of English garrisons, even beginning to harry the north of England. Through the application of tactics to effectively counter the English heavy cavalry, he also began to have success in open battle, most notably at Loudon Hill. This all bolstered his credibility as a military commander and prepared the ground for the Bannockburn campaign.

Edward II fought several abortive campaigns in Scotland but by 1314 just two major strategic fortresses remained in English hands: that on the border Berwick at that controlling the crossing of the Forth at Stirling. In 1313 the Stirling garrison finally agreed to surrender if the English king did not arrive with a relieving force by 24th June 1314. In response, in early summer Edward II summoned some 26,000 troops for a new campaign although, as in 1319, the greater part of these troops were probably not mustered. His final strength in the forthcoming battle may have been no more than 12-13,000. He marshalled his forces at Berwick and marched north in May, reaching Falkirk on the 22nd June.

Bruce had originally marshalled his forces at Torwood, the forest straddling the major road from Falkirk to Stirling, some 6 km to the south east of the English objective. This was the only logical route of approach for Edward’s army, because with a major army with an extensive baggage train it was normally only practicable to travel by major roads with substantial bridges or well established fords. Bruce withdrew his forces to the woodland of the New Park 2km south west of Stirling, through which the major road approached Stirling. While Bruce carefully prepared his chosen ground for the coming fight, the approaching English army was suffering from the inabilities of Edward II as a military commander and the resulting divisions and disputes over tactics and over position within his senior command.
1.2 **ACTION**

Day 1:

The English army arrived near Torwood after dinner (Lanercost), 6 km from the New Park. The army, led by the vanguard under the Earl of Gloucester, continued along the main road, the only major route to Stirling from the south east.

Bruce had carefully chosen his ground where the road passed through the woodland of the New Park as it gave the Scots a substantial advantage of terrain. His forces were in the wood (Lanercost), although the English did have intelligence that their enemy had blocked the narrow roads there (Scalacronica). If the English went beneath the New Park, across the marshes, then Bruce would have advantage, just as he would if the enemy went via the wooded area, for in either location the English cavalry would be at a disadvantage (Barbour). To strengthen their position further, the previous night they had dug ditches (pits) 3ft deep and broad in front of their army from right to left flank (Baker) in the ‘plain field’ beside the way along which the English had to pass. These were ‘a contrivance full of evils… formed for the feet of horses/holes with stakes, so that they may not pass without disasters…’ (Baston). Thus in the one place where the English heavy cavalry might feel themselves secure in attack Bruce had prepared an invisible trap for them. Bruce had learned important lessons from the defeats at Falkirk and Methven and had applied very effective anti-cavalry tactics, probably learned in part from the Flemish success at Courtrai, in his victory at Loudon Hill. Here he was applying these tactics on a grand scale, combining the use of highly organised schiltrons of densely packed ‘pikes’ with the careful defensive preparation of the ground to enhance the natural defensive features of the site. While Bruce held the entrance to the woodland, the Earl of Moray with the vanguard, which would be on the Scottish right wing, was instructed to defend ‘The Way’ to stop up that pass to the castle (Barbour).

The English vanguard, under the Earl of Gloucester, were far ahead of the main body (Lanercost) and as they passed by a certain wood the Scots were seen straggling under the trees as if in flight (Vita). It is possible that the feigned flight of the Scots forces at this time was actually an attempt to draw the English vanguard away from an approach to the ‘pits’, the discovery of which in an initial skirmish would remove their key tactical advantage in any subsequent main engagement. The main body of the English vanguard entered the road within the park and was engaged by the Scots (Scalacronica). The Earl of Bohun in advance of the main body pursued to the entrance of the wood, but this was in effect an ambush and Bohun was killed (Vita) and the Scots cut off the vanguard from the main and the rear columns (Lanercost). It was quite normal for the vanguard of a major army, which would be expected to comprise a full battle formation in its own right, to be some distance to the fore in the march, especially if all mounted, and to engage the enemy in advance of the arrival of the main body and rearguard. This was the case at Stoke Field (Nottinghamshire, 1487), but was even more likely if the enemy troops involved were or were believed to be merely a detachment of the main army, as at on the first day at Towton (Yorkshire, 1461). If comprising at least a third

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1 This wood Duncan interprets as Torwood but almost all authors agree lay within the New Park just to the south of Stirling.
of the English army, at perhaps 4500 the vanguard will not have been dramatically smaller than Bruce’s whole force.

Figure 6: Bannockburn (1314) - battlefield plan: day 1

Probably at the same time and as part of a combined action, Clifford and Beaumont with a detachment of 300 mounted men at arms skirted the wood ‘on the other side’, keeping to the open ground (Scalacronica), making a circuit of the wood to prevent the Scots escaping (Lanercost). This would have been a logical move, for Scottish forces had often before (and would in following centuries) avoid open battle when outnumbered by English armies. The Scots typically followed a campaign strategy and specific tactics of ‘hit and run’, avoiding open battle except when they believed they had a substantial advantage or, in extremis, when the English army had cut off their opportunity for retreat. Clifford went ‘below’ the New Park and ‘well below the kirk’ [agreed by all as St Ninians church], taking the plain and following ‘The Way’, which Morray had been ordered to guard. In response Moray took to the level field (Barbour), issuing out of the wood and crossing the open ground (Scalacronica). These skirmishes on the first day are described as a sharp action in which Gloucester was unhorsed and Clifford routed (Vita).

Some of the English fled to Stirling Castle and some to the King’s army, which had left the road through the wood and gone onto a plain near the Forth ‘beyond the Bannockburn’, 2 into an evil, deep wet marsh. There they remained in arms all night (Scalacronica), expecting the Scots to attack (Vita). Their camp was down in the Carse, where there were streams or pools (Barbour), while the Scots remained in the wood overnight (Scalacronica).

Day 2:

In the morning the English appear to have taken the field, apparently crossing a ‘great ditch’ called Bannock, into which the tide flows (Lanercost) advancing towards the battlefield from the west (Baker). 3 At sunrise, when Bruce learned that the English battle array had occupied the field he led his whole army from the wood. The Scots deployed in three schiltrons or battles, 4 tightly formed with their shields locked (Trokelowe) and possibly with two battles to the fore and one in reserve under Bruce himself (Lanercost), although other accounts say all three were in a single line. They were all fighting on foot (Vita) (Scalacronica) although it is suggested that, as was typical in earlier and later centuries for a dismounted army, they had as small light cavalry reserve (5). The Scottish army took the plain openly, leaving the baggage train in the wood.

2 The description of the army passing over the Bannock Burn into the Carse is taken by most authors to place the camp on the north west side of the burn. However, if that description is taken to represent the direction in relation to the retreating vanguard forces, which had already crossed the burn, then it may be possible to support Miller’s interpretation of an English camp on the south east side of the burn in Skeoch Carse.

3 This direction of approach is only possible if the battle was fought close to the traditional site with the English army crossing the Bannock Burn by the same route taken on the first day.

4 Just one source specifies four battles.
The battlefield is variously described as a great broad field and plain hard field (Barbour). Perhaps most significantly Baston describes it as the dry ground, which some authors contend means very specifically the ‘Dryfield’ of Balquhidderock. The English are said to have been surprised that the Scottish army chose to take the open ground, for this should have been ideal cavalry country. This would have been a very strange tactic for the Scots, for in open ground the cavalry was master, even against schiltrons of pike. At key battle of Courtrai (Belgium, 1302) the Flemings’ pike formations had only won because they had defensive ditches to their fore to break up the cavalry charge of the French knights. However, if one sees the action as being fought on the traditional site, close to the action of the first day, then this makes perfect sense, for it would be Bruce exploiting the prepared position behind the pits, of which the English were still wholly unaware. By taking such an open position he could draw on the English into the pits, placed in the plain field beside the way. This would blunt the cavalry charge enough to enable the schiltrons to hold and destroy what survived of the English cavalry.

Clifford’s failure on day 1 had shown the vulnerability of heavy cavalry fighting against a well drilled schiltron of ‘pikes’ when lacking the support of their own infantry. This may have caused some of the dispute within the English high command as to whether and if so then how to fight on the second day. But the English deployment on day 2 saw no such problem of deployment, with infantry, including large numbers of archers in close support of the cavalry. The English still had confidence in the superiority in cavalry when combined with archery.

Figure 7: Bannockburn (1314) – battlefield plan: day 2

Battle was joined about the 3rd hour (Trokelowe), i.e. at 9:00am. The Scots had chosen the ground well because the English were jammed together and could not operate effectively (Scalacronica), the field being too narrow for the English (Barbour). Using the terrain Bruce had it seems achieved a similar funnelling of the English forces as he had managed at Loudon Hill. There are some differences between the primary accounts as to the exact English formation and the sequence of action and it is important therefore to take the earliest accounts, not that by Barbour. Other than in Baker’s account, the English infantry are said to have been in the first line, with bows and lances, with the cavalry behind in two wings (Trokelowe). These archers seem to have been placed to the fore as the engagement began, with the English having the better of the archery exchange with the smaller number of Scottish archers (Lanercost). Though some accounts suggest all the Scottish forces were dismounted, several do indicate that what may have been a small detachment of Scottish light cavalry engaged the English archers and suppressed their threat to the schiltrons. It seems likely that it was now that the English cavalry charged.

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5 Vegetius Renatus, circa 400, bk III, 13.
6 The ecclesiastical day began with prime, being 6:00am, then terce, the third hour, being 9:00am.
7 DeVries, p.80, n.70, translates the wording as the Scots schiltron being jammed together, i.e. tightly formed in battle array.
According to Baker, in a critical statement which most authors now suggest is a conflation of the events of the first day or simply invention, the English charge is said to have foundered in the hidden pits prepared by the Scottish forces. This can only be true if the battle was fought in the same broad area as the action on the first day, which almost all authors deny. The combined effects of the pits and the strong schiltrons of pikes was that the English cavalry charge was broken and then defeated in dramatic fashion. Baker says the archers tried to support the fallen and stalled cavalry by firing over their heads at the schiltrons, but with little effect. As the Scottish schiltrons advanced the English began to falter. Due to the narrowness of the ground the English rearguard could not engage to support the vanguard and main battle and instead, as the whole army was driven back, they were driven back on the ditch of Bannockburn (Scalacronica).

It is said that it was now that the ‘small folk’, the less well equipped and trained local forces, marched up from the wood and were mistaken for a substantial Scottish reinforcement. This was the final blow. Now the English King quitted the field and rode first towards Stirling Castle, though he later fled south via Torwood (Vita). The English troops, now in retreat or rout, needed to re-cross the Bannockburn and it was there it seems that the English army was effectively destroyed. Many fell in this great ditch and others only escaped it with difficulty (Lanercost), and there a great part of the army perished (Vita), with the Bannockburn between the hills being stuck full of men and horses (Barbour). Others had been drowned or were done to death in pits (Fordun) while a great party are also said to have fled towards the Forth and were drowned (Barbour). The English army as an organised fighting force has ceased to exist.

### 1.3 TROOPS

The English force was large and very well equipped force with a substantial body of heavy cavalry, but they were operating at a great distance from their base, thus providing significant logistical problems. In addition Edward II lacked the military prowess of his father. In contrast the smaller Scottish force was battle hardened from years of warfare and very ably commanded by Bruce, who had built up a significant military reputation.

#### Numbers:

**English:** A large and well equipped army of up to 18,000 including up to 1000 heavy cavalry (1) Absurdly large troop numbers running into the hundreds of thousands are claimed by some contemporary chronicles, with Barbour stating 100,000. Most modern accounts consider 17,000 - 20,000 likely (2). The muster records have not survived but current best estimates give 11,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry (5).

**Scottish:** probably circa 6000 reinforced by circa 3000 poorly trained and equipped local forces; possibly up to 500 cavalry (1). 7000 - 10,000 but lack good evidence (2). Recent estimates suggest 5-6000, plus a detachment of light cavalry (5).

#### Losses:

**English:** heavy; Barbour gives an impossible 30,000; totals of nobles killed range from 154 (Walsingham); 300 (Eulogium); 700 Barbour (2).

**Scottish:** probably few (2)
1.4 COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION

On the edge of the New Park a block of land was acquired in the late 19th century, on what was then believed to be the battlefield of both the first and the second days, to commemorate this most iconic of Scottish victories. This is now managed by the National Trust for Scotland. A monument to Bruce was unveiled at the Borestone site in 1964, and nearby the Trust now maintains a visitor centre.

In the absence of a new detailed study of the battlefield, as defined in 2.9 below, then it will remain impossible to develop an adequate interpretation of the battlefield of what is arguably the most important battle in Scottish history.

2 ASSESSMENT

2.1 LOCATION

Bannockburn is the most disputed of Scottish battlefields with at least five main alternative sites which have at one time or other been proposed as the battlefield.

The battle is normally named in primary sources as the battle of Bannockburn, though to Baston it was the battle of Stirling. It is variously described as having been fought on Bannock Moor (Trokelowe); near a stream called Bannock (Bower); in the field of Bannock (Melsa Chronicle); beside Skeoch mill (Habbakkuk 1626). These names give only a very general location for the action.

Day 1

Surprisingly there is almost unanimous agreement among secondary works as to the location of the wood and thus the action between the English vanguard and the main Scottish forces on the first day. Only Duncan places this action at Torwood, some 6km to the south of Bannockburn, but Miller has already provided a clear explanation for such misidentification, a result of conflation within just one account, the detail in other accounts making it clear that Torwood is not meant (7). Almost all other authors identify the wood as lying within the New Park, 2km to the south of Stirling. The action was fought, immediately to the north of the area where the Roman road crosses the Bannockburn, near to the Borestone, where Miller identifies and area of open ground lying between park boundary and the burn. In this area were two small tracts of marshland, identified on various historic maps, such as Roy’s of circa 1750, and confirmed by the extent of isolated alluvial deposits identified on the BGS mapping. If the woodland broadly corresponded to the New Park then this left a relatively small area for the English advance, with these two small marshes, Milton’s Bog and Halbert’s Bog, bordering the road to the west. To further strengthen their position the Scots had constructed covered pits in the open ground to protect themselves from English cavalry attack.

The site of the other action that day, between the Scottish vanguard and a large cavalry detachment from the English vanguard, under Clifford, is not agreed. Almost all authors place it on one or other area of dryfield between Stirling and the Bannock Burn, but

8 though there are primary sources which suggest the settlement of Bannockburn was formerly named Skeoch (Scott, p.92).
sites vary from the periphery of the Old Park in the north, close to Stirling town (Miller, 1933), through an area immediately north of St Ninians (National Trust, 1999), but DeVries interestingly places it well to the west of St Ninians and off the dryfield. The route for Clifford’s advance, along ‘The Way’, favoured by most current authors is along the edge of the Carse, immediately below the Balquhidderock scarp, although there is no road running all the way through the Carse here to St Ninians on Roy’s map of c.1750, due to the very wet nature of the ground with various streams and drains crossing the suggested line. Indeed it is also surprising that Barbour did not refer to the Carse in this context as he otherwise provides detailed reference to the terrain, and he instead defines the area of the advance as across a plain, although Scalacronica does describe the land near the Forth as a plain. More importantly the Carse edge is more than 1.5 km from the main route into the Park and this seems dangerously distant for a concerted flanking move, as is implied by the Lanercost Chronicle. It would also place the action well beyond the view of Bruce, on the south side of the wood in the New Park. Moreover, Clifford is said to have skirted the wood, which seems to require the advance to be far closer than the Carse edge.

In complete contrast, DeVries places Clifford’s advance to the west, within the New Park but west of the main action. The Roman Road does appear likely to cross the Bannock Burn to the west of the post mediaeval and probable medieval route, and could be considered to run below the park, as one account implies ‘The Way’ ran. In addition the reference to the difficulty of the marshy grounds below the wood (Barbour), could then be related to the adjacent Milton and Halbert’s bogs. Equally such a western course would resolve the problem posed by Morray’s command of the Scottish vanguard, which one would expect to be placed n the right wing of the Scottish deployment. Only a westerly advance by Clifford would place Morray on the Scottish right and also still in close proximity to the other two battles. However, only if a fairly restricted area of woodland could be demonstrated within the New Park, lying towards its eastern perimeter, could such an interpretation stand.

Figure 8: Bannockburn: Alternative sites & conservation boundary suggested by Martin (red line)

The location of the English camp on the night of the 23rd is also disputed. Barbour specifies that the marshy area was on the Carse. Most authors consider that the English crossed the Bannock Burn immediately downstream of the gorge, where Roy in c.1750 shows a crossing of the burn, to camp on the Carse of Balquhidderock. This is what the Scalachronicon seems to indicate. However Lanercost implies that it was on the following day, just before the armies engaged, that the English crossed the Bannock Burn. Miller took this to mean that the English camp was on the Carse on the south east side of the burn, perhaps a far more sensible location if the ground was being chosen for its defensive capabilities, using the burn itself as part of that defence.

Day 2

For the main battle, on the second day, there is wild variation between secondary works, the five main alternative sites being separated by more than 4km.

Bannockburn Muir: site 5
This location to the south east of the Bannock Burn and derives solely from Trokelowe’s description of the battle being fought on Bannock Moor, which lies south of Bannockburn. In all other respects this location is contradicted by key statements the other primary accounts of the battle and is not treated as a serious contender for the battlefield.

Carse: site 3
In the early 20th century Mackenzie moved the battle down onto the Carse with the English camp lying right out on the Carse at or beyond Kerse Mills. He brought the New Park boundary east to encompass Balqhidderock Wood in order to make the terrain fit the primary accounts. This was countered by Miller, with a well researched contribution to the reconstruction of the historic terrain broadly in support of the traditional site. However most subsequent authors have supported the Carse interpretation. Mackenzie’s interpretation is broadly followed by Matthews’ recent account.

Carse: site: 4
The Carse interpretation was modified by Christison in 1960 who moved the action to the middle of the Carse, bounded on the south east by the Bannock Burn and the north west by the Pelstream. This has been followed by most subsequent authors, such as Reid, Nusbacher, and Scott. Others show a more extensive spread of the deployments to the north west across the Carse, as for example Young and Adair, but these completely ignore the intervening streams such as the Pelstream and give far to large a frontage for the armies (see below).

Miller provided arguments as to why the English army were unlikely to have camped right out in the heart of the Carse and why they would not have deployed to fight there, based on his interpretation of the very wet character of that part of the Carse in the medieval and post medieval. Whether the ‘moss’ character he proposed for most of that land can be sustained is unclear, but requires detailed consideration. He claims that no part of the Carse could have been a dry plain on which the accounts say the battle was fought. It also seems improbable, as Watson and Anderson argue, that an army strong in cavalry would seek to fight a major engagement in a landscape so unsuitable to cavalry action. Miller also argues that the eastern boundary of the New Park and the woodland it encompassed was much further to the west than Balqhidderock Wood, again causing a major problem for the Carse interpretation.

Eastern Dryfield: Site 1
An intermediate placing has also now developed between the Carse and the traditional site, with some authors, including Barrow as well as Watson and Anderson, arguing for action on the south eastern side of the Dryfield.

Eastern Dryfield: Site 6
However it should be noted that there were only two locations where the English army could take so many troops, including thousands of cavalry, across the burn with sufficient speed. One lay immediately below the gorge, leading out onto the Carse, the other immediately above the gorge, where the main road ran and the vanguard had crossed on the first day. Any action on the eastern side of the Dryfield raises the
problem of the English force scaling the high scarp in Balquhidderock Wood from a
camp down on the Carse, posing a substantial problem for the south eastern location.
This in part explains why Armstrong suggests a further variation, placing the action on
the north east corner of the Dryfield, to the east of St Ninians and south of the gorge of
the adjacent burn, where the ground rises far less steeply from Carse to Dryfield.

Traditional site: site 2:
From the late medieval through to the 19th century the interpretation of the battle was
that it was fought near to the Roman road, close to the area where the action was fought
on the first day. Both Edgar’s map of 1745 in Nimmo, and Arrowsmith’s map of
Scotland of 1807 show this location.

Traditional site: site 8
On the 1st edition 6” Ordnance Survey mapping the battlefield is placed a little further to
the north west within the New Park, to the north west of the Borestone. This
corresponds to the deployment of the Scottish army given by Nimmo in 1817 and is
merely a variation of the traditional site.

Traditional site: site 7
Miller re-assessed the documentary evidence for the historic landscape and found this in
broad support of the traditional site, but moved the action slightly to the east on to the
south western edge of the Dryfield. The site of the battle is described as dry ground
(Baston) and the English army deploys in battle array on the hard field (Barbour). Miller
took this to mean the Dryfield. However, since the proposal of the Carse site there has
been little support for the traditional site and of modern authors only DeVries takes the
main battle as being fought on this same site as the action on the first day.

There are a number of cases where one finds that traditional sites of battles have been
disputed by authors from the late 18th century to 20th century and new sites proposed.
Often one finds that the traditional site has been later vindicated by more detailed
research on the documentary or the archaeological record. Examples include Cheriton
(Hampshire, 1644), Barnet (Hertfordshire, 1471), Naseby (Northamptonshire, 1645),
while the reinterpretation of Bosworth (Leicestershire, 1485) appears to be following
the same pattern.9

There is limited additional support for a modified form of Miller’s interpretation and the
traditional site of the battle. Trokelowe describes the battle as being fought on Bannock
moor. This has been dismissed as Bannockburn Muir which lies to the south of the burn
(site 5). However it should be noted that the large triangle of land defined on Miller’s
map of 1931 between the Dryfield, the New Park and the Bannock Burn, is named as
the Whins of Milton on Grassom’s map of 1817. This area of furze is identified on
Roy’s map of c.1750 as moor, compared to the surrounding cultivated land on the
Dryfield and in the New Park. According to Miller this tongue of land, associated with
Milton, lay in Bannockburn Barony. Thus it might conceivably have been described as
Bannock moor. This ground would provide an open plain bounded on the west by the
marshy ground of Milton and Halberts bogs and the pale and woods of the park, with

9 Foard, in preparation.
the gorge of the Bannock Burn to on the east, thus representing the sort of constrained site that prevented the English reserve from engaging.

In addition, Baker’s account describes the English army advancing from the west. Most secondary sources treat this as being in error. However if the English army did approach the battlefield along the main road into the Park then this would indeed have resulted in them approaching the Scottish army from the south west if the latter had deployed on the Dryfield. Such a deployment would make a great deal of sense in terms of the tactics that Bruce had applied at Loudon Hill and seems to have been planning for Bannockburn, with his construction of the pits. It would also help to explain how Bannockburn could be such a dramatic victory, something that is difficult to explain by the effectiveness of the schiltron of pikes alone, for even with the perfected pike formations of much later centuries infantry in open country was always at a severe disadvantage. But on this site the Scots would be deployment facing south west on the slightly higher ground with the wood of the New park protecting their right flank and the steep scarp of the Bannock Burn gorge protecting their left flank. Before their army would be the concealed pits, which had been dug across the whole frontage on the dry field to trap the English cavalry. Such a combination of terrain and hidden defence not only would have funnelled the English forces, as at Loudon Hill, but the appearance of the Scottish army out on the plain in an apparently highly vulnerable location would have encouraged the English to attack with a false sense of confidence. Lastly, as Watson and Anderson point out in support of a Dryfield location, only the gorge through which the Bannock Burn flows immediately to the south east of the Dryfield answers to the description of a great ditch of the burn between the hills in which the primary sources say the English army was destroyed in the rout.

The area available at the traditional location is sufficient for the estimated size of the Scottish army. One can use the calculation of frontages provided by Vegetius, in use during the medieval period as a guide to military practice, as a very rough guide to the likely frontages of the armies. At very most the Scots had 10,000 troops almost all fighting on foot. With the troops deployed with two battles to the fore followed by a rearguard, with the troops 10 deep, a width of 3ft per man and a maximum of 250ft between battles this would give a frontage of some 2250ft, or 3500ft if deployed in a single line. This gives a maximum possible frontage of some 700-1000m. But as Bruce probably had no more than 7000 troops this reduces further to 500-780m. Though the detail may be disputed, this calculation does provide an order of scale for the frontage of the Scottish army.

2.2 PRIMARY SOURCES
There are, for a medieval battle, a significant number of accounts of the battle of Bannockburn, although all those written within a reasonable time of the action are from an English perspective. Several of these, most notably the Lanercost Chronicle and Gray’s Scalachronica (which is particularly valuable for the first day as his father fought in that action) were written by people who had close access to veterans of the battle. There is no contemporary Scottish account of the battle, the earliest Scottish source being Barbour’s late 14th century poem, then the Scoticronicon of c.1384, and finally

10 Vegetius Renatus, circa 400, bk III, 15.
several early to mid 15th century accounts. Barbour’s account, although detailed, should be treated with great care because of the distance of its connection, much if not all deriving from other written accounts. However it must be acknowledged that Barbour had good local knowledge of the site.

DeVries provides a brief summary and listing of the primary sources. A more extensive but somewhat dubious assessment and reprinting is provided by Scott.

### 2.3 SECONDARY WORKS

There is a vast array of secondary works on the battle and its context and more continue to appear. It has been possible to examine only a very few of these in the present assessment. These works are extremely variable in their quality and content and provide a widely varying range of interpretations of the battle. The greater bulk of the works are however very largely if not wholly derivative and add little or nothing to the debate over the actual location and nature of the events. A number of key works can be identified which include:

- Miller’s various papers, in 1913, 1931 and 1933, which provide key information on the historic terrain based on primary research on medieval sources for the landscape. His interpretation is well argued and both reinforces and defends the traditional placing of the battle.

- Mackenzie was responsible for the transfer of the battlefield to the Carse. The detail of his placing is now largely abandoned by most authors in favour of that by Christison, with his positioning between the Pelstream and the Bannock Burn on the Carse. This has started to become the standard modern interpretation, followed by many derivative works.

- The compilation by Scott is long and confused but does provide access to a wide range of material, including map sources of the 18th and 19th century as well as fragmented translations of all the main primary sources. Valuable reviews of the evidence are provided by both Duncan and by Barrow, also of interest because they provide some more novel interpretations of the battlefield location. Duncan puts the action of the first day 6 km to the south at Torwood. Barrow places the main battle on the south east part of the Dryfield of Balqhidderock, just to the east of the traditional site.

- For a short overview which is valuable in placing the events in a very effective context of the evolution of warfare and tactics of the period, there is Strickland and Hardy. For a fuller and more popular recent account there is Armstrong’s short and essentially derivative book.

The discussion by DeVries is of particular value because he goes back to the primary accounts and provides a discussion wholly independent of all the previous secondary works. This leads to a number of interesting observations as to the placing of events, which demand a reconsideration of both the traditional site of the battle and the exact direction of the advances. However, given his concern to work from the best, primary evidence, it is surprising he gives greatest weight to the account by Barbour, because of the greater intricacy of his discussion of the battle, even though it is late and derivative,
in preference to the earlier sources such as Scalacronica and Treklowe, which most authors consider more reliable.

For a review of the key issues surrounding the location and future management of the battlefield Watson and Anderson is essential reading, while the Stirling Green Belt Appraisal is a key planning document which will contribute to the critical planning decisions over the site.

2.4 **BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY**

There is as yet no secure battle archaeology relating to Bannockburn. There were a number of finds, including pits and stakes, reported in the 19th century on the traditional site, but none has been substantiated. Investigations by Pollard and Oliver on site 1 and site 4 failed to produce any evidence of the battle.

The enormous difficulty of recovering battle archaeology of the medieval period must be accepted, but work at Towton (Yorkshire, 1461) has shown that battle archaeology does survive on suitable sites. Metal detecting survey has proved effective there in locating unstratified artefact scatters indicative of the main area of action and also possibly the line of retreat/rout. It is clear that, as at Towton, large numbers of iron arrowheads were deposited during the battle at Bannockburn. Until an assessment of the soil pH is conducted here, on all the various geological situations, then it will remain unclear as to whether survival of iron arrowheads is to be expected. However it should be noted that the scatter of unstratified non ferrous items, also recovered at Towton through metal detecting survey, ought to be repeated at Bannockburn in metal detecting survey if the correct location of the battlefield is identified, as even aggressive soil pH should not have destroyed all trace of such objects.

Also from Bannockburn there should be the evidence of the pits dug by the Scots. The failure of Pollard and Oliver to locate these pits in the trial excavations is probably because they were looking to the south of the burn, where DeVries also places them. This location makes little sense in terms of the tactics of the period and the descriptions in the primary accounts. The pits should be expected immediately to the fore of the Scottish deployment and probably on the Dryfield on the north west side of the Bannock Burn.

The other major element of battle archaeology should be the presence of mass graves, especially somewhere in the valley of the Bannock Burn. However locating such burials is likely to be a very difficult challenge, unless the search can be clearly focussed by the presence of a distribution of potentially battle related artefacts from metal detecting survey, possibly in association with or close to a contemporary road crossing of the burn.

2.5 **BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN**

A key element in the resolution of the problems of locating the Bannockburn battlefield will be the reconstruction of the historic landscape between Stirling, the Forth, Gillies Hill and the Bannock Burn. This landscape is divided into three main zones, trending south east to north west, determined largely by the underlying geological and
geomorphological formations, to which the boundaries of early modern tenurial units identified by Miller correspond closely:

- **CARSE**: On the lower, post glacial raised beach deposits and associated marine and estuarine alluvium was an area known as the Carse which was poorly drained with areas of bog and ‘moss’ (particularly to the east of Bannock Burn, where the Wester Moss is an extensive area defined by peat deposits) as well as wet low lying moor. This area was progressively drained and improved in the post medieval and early modern periods.

- **DRYFIELD**: On the upper, post glacial raised beach deposits etc, separated from the lower deposits by a steep scarp, was an area know as the Dryfield. This is identified by Miller as the main area of cultivated field in the medieval. In the post medieval and early modern period this scarp was in part wooded, most notably in Balqhiderock Wood.

- **PARKS & WOODLAND**: Finally to the south west was a zone of largely boulder clay where most of the woodland appears to have been located. It was here that the Kings Park and the New Park were established in the medieval period. But Watson and Anderson suggest that west of the Park there was open cultivated ground between it and the ground rising steeply up onto the moorland to the west. They also suggest a substantial part of the park itself will have been open, as lawns and ridings. According to Miller the great road ran across the eastern part of this area, running north west to Stirling with St Ninians church on the east side and the New Park on the west.

The landscape has been transformed between 1314 and today, and even by the time of the first detailed mapping, in circa 1750 by Roy. By then for example all the woodland in the New Park had gone.

Elements of the terrain can be reconstructed from detailed documentary research, continuing the work of Miller, but this can also be supported through archaeological investigation. For example, the exact course of the Roman road has been identified to the west of St Ninians but its exact alignment across the Bannock Burn has yet to be established (6).

The position of the communications routes is critical to the interpretation of the battle. The westerly route of both the great road, beside St Ninians, discussed by Miller, and the Roman road, avoiding the Dryfield must surely be because of the deep gorges through which the Bannock Burn and the burn below St Ninians both cross these raised beach deposits. Similarly the problems of the very wet ground of the lower raised beach depots of the Carse also seem to explain why no major route crossed that area towards Stirling.

The exact character of the relevant areas of the Carse in 1314 has never been established. It seems unlikely from the geological mapping that extensive areas of peat existed across that part to the north west of the Bannock Burn, unlike the area to the south east of it, but this needs to be determined. But even if not a moss, this is likely to have been very wet with numerous stream. However these streams had certainly been
altered in the medieval and post medieval, for several mill lets had been constructed by the time of the Roy map (c.1750).

Also critical to the understanding of the battle is the detail of land use, particularly the extent of wooded ground. Reconstructions showing woodland running across the Dryfield to the Carse edge are clearly wrong. But the exact extent of woodland, as well as of marsh and moor will greatly assist in the resolution of the problems of the battlefield identification.

2.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE

Bannockburn was one of the greatest defeats of a major English army in the medieval period. It was a decisive victory where infantry fought in open ground using the schiltrons of ‘pikes’ to defeat a superior force including a substantial body of heavy cavalry. Together with the victory of the Flemings over the French at Courtrai (Belgium, 1302), as well as the minor action at Loudon Hill, it demanded a fundamental tactical rethink in which English armies returned to the use of dismounted cavalry, a way of fighting that had been abandoned in the mid 12th century. This was a tactical change which would in following decades rebound dramatically upon Scottish as well as continental armies, in battles such as Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill, Crecy and Agincourt.

Bannockburn shows the effectiveness of a well trained force under a highly competent commander with military skills honed by years of warfare, fighting on their chosen ground. Bruce had built up these skills and developed and learned tactics suitable to the conditions and the balance of military power, in the long period of the War of Independence. At Loudon Hill similar tactics had allowed him to beat a smaller English force, but it was at Bannockburn that it reached its crowning success. This was built in part on Bruce’s careful selection and, most importantly, preparation of the ground on which the English would be forced to fight if they wished to secure the relief of Stirling Castle. Unfortunately the true nature and brilliance of Bruce’s tactics cannot be properly understood until the exact site of the battle is securely identified and the detail of the battle revealed.

Edward II’s army suffered very heavy losses, was effectively destroyed as a fighting force and driven back into England. The victory secured Scotland, enabling Bruce to take not only Stirling but also the fortress of Berwick, and thus the whole of Scotland was regained. It also opened up much of the north of England to major Scottish raids. It did not end the war, which continued for a long period, with Bruce carrying the campaign into England in defence of his gains, with victories at Myton (Yorkshire, 1319) and Byland (Yorkshire, 1322). The war was finally ended with the Treaty of Northampton in 1328.

2.7 CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT

Substantial areas of the main contending sites have already been developed during the 20th century, with some other limited areas having been buried under coal mine waste. In each case there are however still significant areas which remain undeveloped. Even within the urban areas there are a few small windows of open ground that could be of great potential in terms of the investigation of the battle archaeology.
2.8 CURRENT DESIGNATIONS

There are a handful of listed buildings in both Bannockburn and in St Ninians but none have any relevance for the management of the battlefield. The site of St Ninians church is a scheduled Ancient Monument, though its association with the battle is only very peripheral and so again on no substantial relevance to battlefield management. Of potential relevance is the Conservation Area which encompasses part of Bannockburn and most importantly crosses over the Burn itself, including the line of the pre-modern main road across the gorge. Of most direct relevance is the National Trust ownership of land around and immediately adjacent to the Borestone.

The area defined for conservation by Martin encompasses the greater part of the traditional (site 2) and the Carse sites (site 4), but inexplicably excludes key areas on the Dryfield (sites 1 and 6), particularly around Balquhidderock Wood and Broomridge, as well as part of site 3. In contrast it encompasses a vast area to the south of the Bannock Burn, though excluding site 5, where at best there may be evidence the destruction of routed troops in the pursuit. Some land identified by Martin has subsequently been built over.

2.9 POTENTIAL

There are several statement and principles defined in the Watson & Anderson important discussion that cannot be supported:\footnote{Watson and Anderson, 2001}

- ‘it has always been envisaged [for their review] that no definitive statement on the exact location of the battle either could or should be given.’
- ‘If there has been no agreement on the location of the second day of the battle to date, it is highly unlikely that there ever will be…’
- ‘Given the strength of feeling in support of two sites in particular… it is just as important to seek to conserve and interpret what is generally held to be true, rather than squabbling about what might be the one and only truth.’
- ‘It is firmly asserted that no definitive statement can now ever be made, or at least not one that will find wholesale agreement.’

If the site of a battle is not securely located then interpretation of the events within the landscape is severely devalued. This is because, apart from the issue of commemoration, the central purpose of visiting a battlefield is to appreciate the influence of terrain upon the nature of the action. If one is not visiting the correct location then it will confuse rather than enhance understanding of the event, both in terms of academic research and popular appreciation.

The rapid advances that are being made in battlefield studies, through the integration of the techniques and evidence of military history, historical geography and landscape archaeology, do offer the very real possibility that the events of 1314 can be securely located and placed within a reasonably detailed reconstruction of the terrain as it was on the day of the battle.\footnote{Foard et al., 2003; Foard, forthcoming; Fiorato et al., 2000.} However the potential to achieve such a resolution of this long standing debate grows ever more difficult to realise with the construction of every new building, road or other destructive changes in the landscape.
Watson & Anderson claim the problems arise partly from the wide ranging nature of medieval battle and also the lack of primary evidence for Bannockburn. In fact medieval battle was typically well ordered and with tight battle formations, which the primary accounts certainly confirm at Bannockburn. Moreover, Bannockburn is one of the better documented of high medieval battles. There are a series of primary accounts, some written reasonably close to the event by individuals who had access to correspondents who were present, and which provide a significant range of topographical detail for individual elements of the action on the two days of fighting. In addition the battle did generate well documented defensive features which should have left major archaeological deposits, while the fighting itself should have left substantial unstratified battle archaeology.

The absence to date of any substantiated physical evidence for the battle, in the form of battle archaeology, is probably as much a result of the failure to look in the correct location as to the absence of such evidence. One thing that might indicate that the battlefield has not been wholly lost beneath 19th and 20th century housing is the apparent absence of any record of mass graves, which must exist on the battlefield and in the areas of the rout and pursuit across the Bannock Burn.

If this matter is to be resolved, thus enabling the relevant areas of the battlefield and its immediate context that have not yet been lost, to be secured for their historic value in the face of development or other destructive land use change, then there is the urgent need for a detailed, adequately funded interdisciplinary project to apply current best practice and to further push the boundaries of battlefield studies.\(^{13}\) Of all the battles of the medieval period in Scotland, the combination of major threat to the sites and the international significance and impact of the event itself on the nature of warfare in succeeding centuries, justifies such urgent and substantial investigation.

A clear methodology for such a study can be proposed. It is essential when reviewing any battle, but especially one as contentious as Bannockburn, to go back to the primary evidence, as DeVries argues. But one must do this with all evidence, not just the primary accounts of the battle. All the secondary works need to be initially ignored, other than for references to primary sources for terrain and battle. In this way it is possible to remove the many years of accretion of interpretation which are currently confusing our understanding of the battle.

**Task 1: the primary documentary sources for the battle:**

- Bring together in digital form all the primary accounts in parallel texts of transcription as well as translation, with annotation and commentary regarding specific important elements of interpretation of the terminology, such as for aspects of deployment and of terrain.
- These then need to be processed to produce a concordance of the events and of the terrain and related locational evidence in those accounts.

\(^{13}\) The principles as defined for England in Foard, forthcoming, are equally applicable to Scottish battlefields.
• Define deployments of the two armies as if in a flat plain, using the evidence in the primary accounts and evidence of contemporary military practice.
• Using this a bald narrative of the events should be produced, with alternatives as necessary for particular elements, and these events then reconstructed as if on a flat plain with only the locational elements provided by the primary accounts themselves being represented. The primary accounts of the battle provide a whole series of pieces topographical evidence which appear to clearly define the terrain within which the action was fought and these need to be isolated and carefully analysed for meaning.

Task 2: reconstruction of the historic terrain as it was at the time of the battle:
Miller’s work shows the presence and relevance of primary sources for the medieval and post medieval to enable map regression enhanced with written documentary sources. But Miller did not have access to the techniques of landscape archaeology and historical geography, which have been dramatically developed in the last 50 years.
• Define the element of the physical geography, including geology/soils, relief and drainage, to provide the natural skeleton on which to drape the evolving human geography.
• Examine the human geography using primarily documentary evidence but supported by key existing archaeological data and, where essential, through the testing of key elements of terrain through new archaeological investigation. This should define the evolving patterns of enclosed or open fields, roads and settlement an also including the modifications of elements such as moor, marsh and wood.14

Task 3: place the deployments and action within the historic terrain
In digital form use the topographical clues in the primary accounts to link to the historic terrain features to create one or more detailed hypotheses as to the location of the principal deployments and of the action.

Task 4: test the hypotheses through investigation of battle archaeology
The various hypotheses can then be assessed in detail through new archaeological work to explore the battle archaeology, which alone can provide wholly independent evidence as to the exact location and character of the events.

2.10 THREATS

Given the difficulties so far encountered in accurately locating the battlefield, it is particularly important that any potential threats on any of alternative sites are seriously assessed. The alternatives for the expansion of Stirling on the south west and south east have been considered in the Stirling Green Belt Appraisal. In the absence of an adequate battlefield investigation, as defined above, it will be impossible for a sufficiently informed planning decision to be taken, either at this wide strategic level or over individual planning applications. What is clear is that the development pressure on the remaining undeveloped areas is in most cases very high and so there is urgent need for a

14 See Foard, 2003
substantial battlefield study to resolve the fundamental issues over the location of both days action of the battle of Bannockburn.

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(2) DeVries, 1996, 66-85.
(4) Scott, 2000
(5) Strickland and Hardy, 2005
(6) NMRS
(7) Miller, 1931
(8) Armstrong and Turner, 2002

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- Bower’s continuation of the Scotichronicon, containing new material: early-mid C15th
- Brevis cronica: early C15th

English:
- Trokelowe’s Annales, c.1330
- Baker’s Chronicon, started 1341
- Lanercost Chronicle, c1346; claiming access to a veteran of the battle.
- Vita Edvardi Secundi: c.1348
- Gray’s Scalachronica, c 1355; his father fought on the first day, while Gray himself was a soldier.
- Melsa Chronicle, late 14th century
- Walsingham’s Historia Anglicana, early 15th century

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- Baston, pre 1352
- Minot
- Anon

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**BOTHWELL BRIDGE**

1 **SUMMARY**

1.1 **CONTEXT**

As his reign progressed Charles II imposed increasingly extreme controls on non-conformity throughout his kingdoms. In 1679 this led to open revolt by Covenanters in south west Scotland. Following the rebel success at Drumclog (see UKFOC 276), a government army of about 5000, comprising both regular and militia forces, was sent north under the command of the Duke of Monmouth to engage the rebels at Bothwell Bridge.(1)

1.2 **ACTION**

The rebels lacked an effective commander, were poorly equipped and lacked training or significant military expertise. On the morning of the 22nd June one of the few rebel leaders with any military experience, Hackston, took the handful of experienced troops and briefly held the bridge across the river Clyde. But their ammunition soon ran out and they were forced to retreat, allowing Monmouths’ royal forces to cross the bridge and deploy on the south bank unopposed. The royal forces then surrounded the rebels with little armed opposition and thus the rebellion was easily suppressed.(1)

Figure 9: Bothwell Bridge (1679) - battlefield plan

Figure 10: Bothwell Bridge conservation boundary suggested by Martin (red line)

1.3 **TROOPS**

Numbers:

- **Covenanter**: c.6000 ‘ill organised rabble’(1)
- **Government**: 5000;(2) 15,000 claimed(1)

Losses:

- **Covenanter**: 6-700 killed; 1200 prisoners.(2)

1.4 **COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION**

An obelisk commemorating the Covenanters who fell in the action stands just to the north of the bridge.
2 ASSESSMENT

2.1 LOCATION
The action is accurately located as the initial phase centred around the bridge itself, while the final action took place immediately to the south of the bridge. Due to the considerable uncertainties and poor state of preservation of the battlefield no core area of search has been defined. However, a broader area for potential search has been given which could be refined by future research.

2.2 PRIMARY SOURCES

2.3 SECONDARY WORKS
No modern work has been identified which deals in detail with this action. It is discussed only briefly in the few 20th century works on military history in which it is mentioned. There are a handful of 19th century publications which discuss the ‘battle’ but these have not been consulted given the apparent very limited potential of the battlefield itself.

2.4 BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY
No evidence of battle archaeology has been identified in the current work. It is possible that the bridge may retain shot impact scars from the action as some of the 17th century structure still survives, but extensively rebuilding in the 19th century may have removed all trace of the action. A scatter of bullets from the initial action might survive on the open ground immediately north east of the bridge, if this has not been disturbed, but little of significance other then for interpretive purposes is likely to be recovered.

2.5 BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN
No work has been undertaken here on the reconstruction of the historic terrain. The surviving Bothwell Bridge was in existence at the time of the battle but was extensively altered in the 19th century.\(^\text{15}\)

2.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE
This action suppressed the Covenanter rebellion of 1679 and is thus of some political and social significance in historical terms. The perceived cultural significance of the event is however far greater than its military significance and, despite being typically described as such, it can hardly be called a battle. It is likely to have very limited interest in terms of military history.

2.7 CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT
A bridge remains on the site but there is extensive modern development on either side of the river (the settlements of Bothwell and Hamilton) while the A725 crosses the Clyde just 100m upstream of the old bridge and skirts the southern bank of the Clyde. Immediately east of the A725 on the north side of the Clyde there is a small area of open water suggestive of quarrying. There are small areas of open ground remaining

\(^\text{15}\) http://hsewsf.sedsh.gov.uk/hslive/portal.hsstart?P_HBNUM=5138
mainly to the north east of the bridge and a very narrow strip of steeply falling ground immediately adjacent to the Clyde.

2.8 CURRENT DESIGNATIONS
Both the bridge itself and the Covenanters memorial are listed. The bridge and the area of settlement along the road to the north is part of a Conservation Area for Bothwell. The land to the south of the bridge, though substantially built on is defined as a designed landscape, associated with Hamilton Palace. The eastern periphery of the area, on both sides of the Clyde is also an SSSI.

2.9 POTENTIAL
There are limited areas of land, particularly on the north side of the Clyde which may contain battle archaeology. However, given the apparent limited military significance of the action and the very poor state of survival of the battlefield, as a result of modern development, there would appear to be very little potential for the investigation of the archaeology of the battlefield terrain or of the battle archaeology. Only if the main action took place at some distance from the bridge itself is there significant open ground, to the south west (in Black Muir plantation) and south east (in the former Hamilton Park), which might preserve battle archaeology.

However, given the survival of the bridge and the political and social importance of the event, the site does have significant commemoratory and interpretive potential which may justify conservation and interpretive action. In that context an attempt to reconstruct the historic terrain in order to better place the documented events and to thus better understand the action and particularly to place the final events on the south side of the Clyde more accurately may be worthwhile. The bridge should also be examined to determine if there are any shot impact scars and the potential of the land immediately north east of the bridge assessed on the ground to determine if bullets might survive in the area, if this has not already been done.

2.10 THREATS
Given the poor condition of the site it is unlikely that any changes, other than to the bridge itself and its setting, would be of relevance.

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**BRUNANBURH**

**1 SUMMARY**

Athelstan, having created a united kingdom of England by completing the re-conquest from the Danes, attempted to extend his authority over the northernmost territories of Britain. In response an alliance of British, Scots and Norse under Olaf Guthfrithson invaded England by ship via the Humber. In late 937 Athelstan responded, meeting the invaders in battle at Brunanburh. The joint Mercian and West Saxon army broke, pursued and destroyed the allied forces.

**2 ASSESSMENT**

**2.1 LOCATION**

The site of the battle has not been established and a number of alternatives have been suggested. One of these lies in southern Scotland, close to the hillfort at Burnswark, south east of Lockerbie. However, according to Smurthwaite ‘it seems inconceivable that the battle was fought north of the border, particularly if we accept that Olaf landed on the Humber.’ (1)

**2.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE**

This was a major battle of great military significance and also political importance, for it reinforced the sense of English national unity.

**2.9 POTENTIAL**

Given that the location in Scotland is highly speculative and that significant battle archaeology (other than burials) has yet to be demonstrated on battlefields in Britain before the late medieval, the potential of the site would seem to be very low. This assessment should however be reviewed if new information comes to light on the location of the battle, and especially once investigation has been undertaken on one or more well located early medieval battles with good preservation conditions, where the primary issues of battle archaeology for this period can be resolved.

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**4 BIBLIOGRAPHY**

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**4.2 SECONDARY SOURCES**


1 SUMMARY

1.1 CONTEXT

As his reign progressed Charles II imposed increasingly extreme controls on non-conformity throughout his kingdoms. In 1679 this led to open revolt by Covenanters in south west Scotland, following the murder of Archbishop Sharp on 3rd May 1679. The assassins were pursued by John Graham of Claverhouse with a small detachment of horse and dragoons. Claverhouse marched south from Glasgow but, warned of his intention to intercept them at Loudon Hill, the rebels deployed near to the farm of Drumclog, 2km NE of Loudon Hill. (1)

1.2 ACTION

Although described as a battle, given the numbers involved, particularly on the government side, this can be considered little more than a skirmish, despite the significance of its repercussions. According to Smurthwaite the rebels deployed behind a marsh. According to Black, and supported by the limited terrain evidence collected for this report, they were behind a ditch and with marshes all around. (1) This effective selection of terrain by the rebels precluded a cavalry attack and so Claverhouse’s dragoons dismounted and advanced on foot to within pistol shot. In response the rebels charged against the centre and left flank of the government deployment. Heavily outnumbered, the government forces broke and fled. (2)

In the pursuit there was apparently further fighting. At least two sites are associated with the action: a skirmish at Drumclog bridge, 1.5km north east of the main action, and the claimed graves of government soldiers 4km to the north east at Caldermill. Both these sites lie on the road leading north east from the battlefield towards Glasgow. (3)

Figure 11: Drumclog (1679) - battlefield plan

1.3 TROOPS

Numbers:

Rebel: possibly 1500; (2) 4 battalions of foot & 3 squadrons of horse: possibly 1000. (1)

Government: 150. (2)

Losses:

Government: c.40; (2) 36 killed. (1)
1.4 **COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION**
A battle monument stands immediately to the east of Drumclog.

2 **ASSESSMENT**

2.1 **LOCATION**
The general area of the action is known but the exact deployment of the troops is less clear. The marsh provides a clear boundary to the north, while it appears likely that the government forces advanced along the road from the north east via Low Drumclog. What is uncertain is where the ditch lay, behind which the rebel forces deployed. There are also several small areas of marsh to the east as well as to the south, so determining the position of the deployments from the available terrain evidence is difficult. The presence of burials near to the monument may assist in the interpretation, but it is not certain that they do derive from the conflict. From map based assessment of the relief and geology the ditch mentioned by Black may prove to be the stream, lying in a small valley, draining south west from Coldwakning marsh, this would appear the most likely location behind which the rebels might have deployed, with the marsh providing flank protection. However the 1000m frontage this would represent seems inconceivable with the small numbers of troops involved. Without a reconstruction of the pattern of fields in the late 17th century it is impossible to determine with confidence behind which hedges or ditches the rebels deployed.

2.2 **PRIMARY SOURCES**

2.3 **SECONDARY WORKS**
No modern work has been identified which deals in detail with this action. It is discussed only briefly in the few 20th century works on military history in which it is mentioned. There are however a handful of 19th century publications which discuss the battle. There are differences between both Black and Smurthwaite as to the terrain and how the events played out within it. There is therefore need for reference back to the primary accounts.

2.4 **BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY**
The battle archaeology is likely to be very limited in extent and density, given the small scale of the action. Human bones are recorded close the centre of the battlefield on the 1st edition Ordnance Survey mapping (1860s) and a potential site of a mass grave of government soldiers is reported 4km to the north east at Caldermill.

2.5 **BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN**
Peat deposits encompass Drumclog on the north side. The modern road, possibly still on the same course as in the 17th century, runs from the north east and skirts around to the south east of the Coldwakning marsh. 800m to the south another area of peat appears to define another marsh while another small area lies a shorter distance to the east.

2.6 **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE**
The individual bibliographic scoring appears to give this ‘battle’ a far higher priority than it deserves in military terms, probably because the political and social importance of the action is far greater than its military significance. Given the small number of
troops engaged, particularly on the government side, this can be considered no more than a skirmish. It was however significant in terms of the events of the rebellion, for it emboldened the rebel forces and led them to attempt to face a far stronger force at Bothwell Bridge (UKFOC 275) later in the month.

2.7 CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT
There has been some degree of disturbance of the landscape by mineral extraction as there are several shafts of coal mines recorded on the south western side and a tile works and gravel pit on the south east, on the 1st edition 6 inch Ordnance Survey mapping. However these may be fairly restricted in impact and the landscape as no extensive areas of made ground are recorded on the geological mapping. The area appears little affected by any other form of development.

2.8 CURRENT DESIGNATIONS
The battle monument is listed. There are no other designations.

2.9 POTENTIAL
The battle archaeology is likely to be very limited in extent and density given the small scale of the action. There is also some evidence which would seem to locate action within the pursuit and there may be battle archaeology associated with these skirmishes as well as with the main action.

Given the relative clarity of the terrain and its apparent good state of preservation it may be that the archaeology of both the terrain and battle represent a good example of a skirmish between regular and essentially civilian forces. The reported human remains were located a short distance to the south of the marsh, but if any of the action did take place within the marsh area then there may be the potential for exceptional preservation of military equipment etc of the period, both in terms of organic material which would normally have decayed on dry sites and as military assemblages of exactly known date. Any such remains are likely to be of high importance in their own right.

Reconstruction of the historic terrain from documentary and archaeological evidence, complemented by a review of the primary documentary sources for the action should enable the more accurate placing of the events in the landscape. This could then be tested by the systematic investigation for battle archaeology. Investigation of the battle archaeology might be of some value in giving an indication of the scale and nature of the pursuit. Although such study may add little substantially to our understanding of the events, only with such investigation would it be possible to identify features in the modern landscape which should be conserved because they were significant terrain features in the action. Also, study of the pursuit in such a relatively undisturbed landscape might enable some more general lessons to be drawn about such small scale actions and the battle archaeology associated with them, which may be quite different in scale and character to that of large scale actions.

2.10 THREATS
The presence of non ferrous battle archaeology renders the site particularly vulnerable to treasure hunting and unrecorded/poorly recorded metal detecting.
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DUNBAR II

1 SUMMARY

1.1 CONTEXT
Charles I had been executed in January 1649 and a Commonwealth declared in England. In June 1650 his son landed in Scotland where he was proclaimed King Charles II. In July the English Parliament, expecting Charles to initiate a Scottish led campaign for the English crown, launched a pre-emptive invasion of Scotland. A largely veteran force of 10,000 foot & 5000 horse from the New Model Army was sent north under the command of Oliver Cromwell. Scottish forces numbering some 25,000 were raised in response, under the highly experienced David Leslie, though the army was weakened by the exclusion of non-Presbyterians. Leslie fought a defensive campaign about Edinburgh, denying Cromwell the opportunity to fight a pitched battle. The New Model Army was supplied by sea via the port of Dunbar. Having failed to bring Leslie to battle they were forced by the weather, sickness and supply problems, to retire to Dunbar, first in early August and then again in late August. Leslie, outnumbering the New Model 2:1, saw his opportunity and marched around Dunbar to cut Cromwell’s road connection to Berwick. Cromwell now finally had Leslie offering battle but he was at a severe disadvantage. Rather than evacuate by sea Cromwell met the challenge.(1)

1.2 ACTION
The heavily outnumbered but experienced and well equipped professional soldiers of the New Model were pitted against a much larger number of Scots, but although the latter had a substantial core of experienced professional soldiers and a very capable commander, much of the army comprised raw recruits. The Scots had secured a strong position along the south side of the Brox Burn, on a narrow strip of land between it and Doon Hill to the south. In front of their left divisions the burn passed through a ‘ravine’ but further east the ground was more level and could be more easily crossed. Cromwell saw a major tactical flaw in the Scottish deployment: on this constricted ground the Scots could not turn their centre and left in support if he attacked their right flank. He therefore mounted a surprise early morning attack, taking the main road crossing of the burn, with supporting divisions also crossing both downstream and others, later, upstream (the exact locations of these attacks are not accurately identified, thus the arrows on the accompanying plan are only indicative. Action could have occurred at almost any point along this section of the burn). After fierce action, the New Model defeated the Scottish right wing of horse and then rolled up the whole army westward. The New Model infantry pushed the Scottish infantry back at least ¾ mile before its battle formation disintegrated. Finally, after breaking the Scottish left wing of horse, Cromwell then pursued for some 8 miles, effectively destroying the Scottish army.

Figure 12: Dunbar II (1650) - battlefield plan
1.3 TROOPS

Numbers:
*English*: 7500 foot, 3500 horse: total 11,000.\(^{(2)}\)
*Scottish*: 16000 foot, 6000 horse; total: 22,000.\(^{(2)}\)

Losses:
Captured: Scottish: 10,000
Killed: Scottish: 3000; English: 30.\(^{(3)}\)

1.4 COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION

Beside the former main road, in the area close to the main cavalry action, there is a monument to the battle. A funerary monument to Sir William Douglas lies in the gardens of Broxmouth House.

2 ASSESSMENT

2.1 LOCATION

There is agreement between all authors as to the general location of the action, although oddly Thomson’s Atlas of Scotland (1832) shows the battle being fought on the south side of Doon Hill. Young & Adair, followed by various authors, show slightly more extensive action on the north east by Cromwell, than that shown by Reid. They also show four crossings of the stream by parliament forces, on either side of the main road.\(^{(3)}\) Seymour gives idiosyncratic English deployment and shows attacks across a wide front, apparently contrary to the evidence of the primary accounts.\(^{(4)}\)

Martin suggests an area for conservation that is extensive, encompassing probably more land, especially on the south, than may be necessary. It also combines on the west with the battlefield of Dunbar I, which ought to be assessed separately.\(^{(5)}\)

2.2 PRIMARY SOURCES

There is a substantial number of written sources, including eye witness accounts. There is also a contemporary prospect or battle ‘plan’ showing the general deployments and distribution of the action in relation to limited terrain detail. Unfortunately there is no secondary work which makes these accounts readily available although a copy of the battle ‘plan’ is reprinted by Ashley.\(^{(6)}\)

2.3 SECONDARY WORKS

The battle is dealt with in most of the main national battlefield books and various Civil War studies. However the first book devoted solely to this battle, by Reid, was not published until 2004. It is a useful study but its value is seriously compromised by the lack of referencing and its two battle plans are also difficult to use because of their 3D presentation, all typical of Osprey publications. Thanks to its specific referencing
therefore Robbins’ single chapter is, in some respects, of greater use. However there is still the need for a major study of the battle which meets the standards set in works on other major civil war battles. 16

2.4 **BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY**

No battle archaeology has been identified in the current assessment. An extensive distribution pattern of unstratified artefacts, mainly lead bullets is to be expected.

2.5 **BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN**

The physical topography provides the major elements of the battlefield terrain. The course of the main road crossing the Brox burn, though now bypassed, is probably still on the line of the 17th century route. No reconstruction of the man-made elements of the terrain appears to have been undertaken from either documentary or archaeological evidence, but this is essential to determine whether any features such enclosures are likely to have had a significant influence on the detail of the action.

The loss of the eastern part of the battlefield to mineral extraction before the production of the modern high resolution dtm (NEXTMap Britain) means that any fine detail of relief, which could not be revealed from the lower resolution Ordnance Survey contouring data, yet which may have had considerable military significance, will have been lost. There is a slight possibility that this may be reconstructable from pre mineral extraction stereo vertical photography, if adequate surviving control data can be retrieved.

2.6 **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE**

Dunbar was one of Cromwell’s greatest victories. It played an important role in completing his rise to political power and, together with Inverkiething (UKFOC 407) and then most importantly Worcester in 1651 (UKFOC 6), resulted in the conquest of Scotland and destruction of any serious potential for the restoration of Charles II, who had been forced into exile, by force of arms. Dunbar was an action where tactical flair, exploiting key elements of the terrain with an army of highly experienced professional troops, was central to the victory against odds of about 2:1.

2.7 **CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT**

Extensive quarrying in very recent times, and which still continues today, has completely destroyed a substantial area on the critical eastern side of the battlefield, without apparently any form of archaeological recording of this important resource before destruction. This will also have affected the evidence for the historic terrain, even resulting in the diversion of the original main road. It also represents a remarkable destruction of the physical form of the land which is so critical to both the understanding of and interpretation to the public of any historic battle. The remaining part of the eastern end of the battlefield has also been damaged by the mainline railway and by the realignment of the A1. It would be instructive to chart the chronology of this destruction in order to understand the degree and reasons for the failure to protect or in the very least to ensure rescue recording of the evidence.

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A significant area about 400m wide along the south eastern side of the Brox burn does survive within the landscape park of Broxburn House. This area could be of very high importance in determining the detail of location of the critical initial action of the battle, when Cromwell secured the crossing of the burn and then defeated Leslie’s right wing of cavalry. Detailed survey in this area may enable both the pattern of attack and provide some guide as to what may have been destroyed by the mineral extraction.

2.8 CURRENT DESIGNATIONS
The designed landscape of Broxburn House encompasses the surviving part of the north eastern end of the battlefield. Its management and that of this area of the battlefield could usefully reinforce each other. There are several small scheduled areas on and immediately north of Doon Hill. There are several listed buildings in the battlefield area but none of the structures appear directly related to the action itself.

2.9 POTENTIAL
Dunbar is one of the most important and well documented of battles in Scotland, being one of only a handful in 17th century Britain to have a contemporary ‘plan’ of the action. It was a battle which turned critically on the exploitation of terrain, yet it appears that no study has as yet attempted an effective reconstruction of the historic terrain.

The destruction through quarrying, without archaeological record, of at least part of the key area on the Scottish right wing, where the decisive action was fought, is a major loss. However it is unclear how much has been lost as it is not known how much of the critical action took place in the destroyed area. A substantial part of the battlefield, almost certainly containing the whole of the Scottish centre and left, as well as the key areas on either side of the Brox Burn (from west of the crossing of the burn through to the coast) where the first English bridgehead was achieved, remains as farmland or parkland. In these areas, constituting the majority of the battlefield, both the battle archaeology and historic terrain evidence should remain reasonably well preserved. Given the nature of the weapons of the period and the character of the action, it is likely that tens of thousands of lead bullets will remain on the battlefield, indicative of the distribution, character and intensity of the action. There is thus high potential for a detailed, systematic metal detecting survey. On the eastern side of the battlefield past losses mean that even the smallest of areas not so far disturbed could have a very high potential to enable the accurate placing of the action on this side of the field. Any further threats to the archaeology should be given the highest priority for evaluation, conservation or, failing that, then detailed investigation.

Reconstruction of the historic terrain using a combination of documentary and archaeological evidence should assist greatly in the accurate placing of the documented battle evidence, thus providing an important element in the definition and interpretation of the battlefield. It may even be possible to recover detail of the relief of the now quarried area using sophisticated computerised analysis of the 1940s vertical aerial photography, if sufficient controls survive. Such reconstruction of the historic terrain should also enable the identification of surviving historic features in the present landscape which were significant in the battle, thus enabling their conservation.

Sufficient of the battlefield seems to survive to enable interpretation of the battlefield to the visitor although a fully effective interpretive scheme cannot be defined until a detailed study of the battlefield has been undertaken.
2.10 **THREATS**

Mineral extraction continues on the eastern edge of the battlefield, without apparently any investigation to determine if battle archaeology extends this far to the east. The potential for destruction of archaeological evidence relevant to the reconstruction of the historic terrain of the battlefield should also be considered. Such evidence may not extend this far from the core of the action, but even so it would be important to demonstrate negative evidence.

There are likely to be large quantities of lead bullets on the battlefield and thus there is the potential for extensive loss to treasure hunting and poorly recorded metal detecting survey.

Given the losses already incurred as a result of mineral extraction, road and rail construction, it is particularly important that a detailed assessment is made of future threats and appropriate evaluation and mitigation measures taken to secure the surviving evidence. Particular focus should be given to the small areas of survival on the Scottish right wing. Even the smallest of areas of surviving battle archaeology in an area as severely damaged as the eastern part of Dunbar battlefield, could prove of great value in pinning down elements of the crucial attack on the Leslie’s right wing of cavalry. (There is a current planning proposal affecting this area within Broxmouth Garden.\(^\text{17}\) It mainly involves conversion of existing buildings and so other than any new services trenching to be undertaken it may prove to have a very limited impact on any surviving battle archaeology, but it should ideally be assessed).

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1 SUMMARY

1.1 CONTEXT
In 1327 Edward II of England was deposed and replaced by the young Edward III, but with Roger Mortimer as the effective ruler. Robert the Bruce, the Scottish King, took this opportunity to raid into England. The ineffective English response was the disastrous Weardale Campaign of 1327 where a large English army failed to bring the Scottish forces to battle. This led Mortimer to agree, in the Treaty of Northampton, to the English crown renouncing all claims to Scotland. Though in return the Scots were to pay compensation to the various lords for the lands they had lost, these ‘dispossessed’ still sought the return of their estates in Scotland.

In 1329 Robert the Bruce died and was succeeded by his young son. Now was the opportunity for the dispossessed and for Edward Balliol, who claimed the crown of Scotland by the right of his father King John Balliol, who had reigned in Scotland until 1296. They gained the tacit support of Edward III of England for a ‘private’ invasion of Scotland. Henry Beaumont was the driving force behind the campaign, together with various other dispossessed lords. In 1332 Balliol’s army sailed for Scotland with an expeditionary force comprising largely English troops and some mercenaries. Balliol’s intention was to supplant as king of Scotland. This was in effect the first stage of the Second Scottish War of Independence, key elements of which would be fought on English soil.

They landed on 6th August at Kinghorn (Fife), where they skirmished with and drove off local militia forces. They then marched to Dunfermline to replenish supplies and thence north towards Perth, where the Earl of Mar had mustered the northern Scottish forces in response. Balliol’s objective was to engage Mar before he could united with the Earl of March, who was advancing from the south with another army. (1) (2) (10).

1.2 ACTION
The Scottish forces were camped two leagues from Perth and the men at arms held the bridge over the river Earn. The two armies were well aware of each other’s positions the day before the battle but in the night the English crossed the river by a nearby ford and attacked a Scottish camp near Gask. The English then took up a position to the left of the Scots holding the Moor (2) (10).

The Scots drew up in either two or three divisions. The English, in an attempt to counterbalance the fact that they were heavily outnumbered, drew up behind a narrow passage which gave frontage of just 200 yards. They may have deployed in three lines with the archers on the flanks, and with the infantry in the centre perhaps 4 deep, with
dismounted men-at-arms in the front three ranks and spearmen in the rear rank. Behind this they maintained a small, mounted cavalry reserve of about 40 German mercenaries. The lessons of Bannockburn, with its destruction of massed English cavalry by schiltrons of spears, had clearly been heeded by Beaumont. But the borrowing of Scottish tactics, with the use of spears, was not new. Harcla, another commander of the northern English Marches, had already applied similar tactics to great effect at Boroughbridge in 1322.

As in so many key battles of the following hundred years, the English forces took a defensive position and it was the Scots who advanced to the attack. They moved forward to engage in a wedge formation, led by Robert Bruce’s battalion, in what seems to have been a somewhat disordered attack. The Scots may not have been adequately armoured, for the arrowstorm from the English archers had a significant impact causing many wounds in the faces of the Scots front divisions. Despite this, Bruce’s schiltron came to close quarters and began to push back the English infantry, some 20 – 30 yards.

The English counterattacked at pushed of spear and with continuing action by the archers [check this sentence] This forced Mar to commit his rearguard battalion, seconding Bruce’s vanguard. But this was done in a disordered fashion, pressing behind them in the confined space rather than relieving them. Combined with the English push of spears and the continuing flights of arrows, Bruce’s battalion was squeezed between the enemy and their own reserve. Many of the Scots fell over in the crush. While the English maintained their battle line, the Scottish formation broke. Many of the Scots who had fallen in the crush, if not already suffocated, were now dispatched by the English infantry. Meanwhile the mounted men-at-arms drove forward in pursuit of the rear ranks of Scots, who had begun to retreat or rout. The combined losses to suffocation and the English swords were, according to various sources, exceptionally high. (1) (2)

Though several primary sources say that the battle lasted from sunrise through most of the day, this would be very exceptional as most battles seem to have lasted no more than three hours, some far less.

**Figure 14: Dupplin Moor - battlefield plan**

### 1.3 TROOPS

Beaumont was the driving force in Balliol’s army, a highly capable commander with good combat experience including the battles of Falkirk and Bannockburn, while the army of the disposessed was clearly highly motivated and experienced. The Scottish army was considerably larger than the English, and fairly well equipped, though the losses to English archery may suggest that a considerable number of the Scottish troops lacked adequate head/face protection. The troops and commanders however lacked battle experience comparable to that of the enemy (2) (12). Rogers argues that the English sources probably fairly accurately record the English troop numbers and the Scottish losses, but that they vastly inflate the Scottish army (10).

**Numbers:**
**English:** 500 men at arms, 1000 infantry/archers (1); primary sources range from 500 (3) to 3300 (4), (2); 2076-2500 (10)

**Scots:** largely infantry, but primary sources vary wildly between 4000–24,000 and so modern authors do not suggest Scottish troop numbers (2);

**Losses:**

**Scots:** 1200 men-at-arms; 800 horse; 58 knights; 18 bannerettes; many common soldiers (1, quoting Bridlington). The Scottish losses, numbered in thousands, were exceptional (2).

**English:** slight (1); 2 knights, 33 soldiers but no archers (2);

### 1.4 COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION

The Dupplin Cross, a 9th century Pictish cross, stood on the traditional site of the battle. The Historic Scotland website indicates that it is now in St Serf’s church in Dunning village (5). It could possibly have been moved to the battle site as a memorial or, perhaps more likely, the battle has simply become associated with a pre-existing cross that lay on or near the battlefield.

### 2 ASSESSMENT

#### 2.1 LOCATION

The exact route followed by the English army is not clear from the secondary works consulted, but if the primary sources enable its accurate identification then this may assist in the interpretation of the exact location of the English army’s crossing of the Earn, for the Bridge of Earn is more than 8 km to the east of Dupplin Moor and so it needs to be clarified whether this is the bridge meant. Brown suggests that Balliol’s army camped at ‘Miller’s Acre’ near the hamlet of Forteviot, immediately opposite Dupplin (12). This in turn is likely to assist in the location and orientation of the principal deployments. If Balliol did march first to Dunfermline then the route taken is likely to have been the road recorded in 1776, via Kinross. (5)

According to Wyntoun, the English deployed between the Scots army and the river (2). The Brut describes Bruce advancing to the attack over ‘Gaskmoor’ meeting the enemy ‘on a downward slope of the moor in a narrow passage’(10), which would broadly agree with Wyntoun. Brown suggests that the English had deployed, on a front of as little as 300 yards, at the head of a narrow glen. If this were correct then only the Upper Den, where Dupplin Castle now sites, would seem to fit, but Brown’s interpretation demands careful reassessment of the primary accounts (12). However the location of Gaskmoor requires further work, but it is likely to be distinct from and further west than Dupplin Moor, though it may be that action spread across both moors, or that, as Roy’s mapping suggests, was a continuous area of moorland. All the primary sources need to be consulted to establish if further specific topographical detail exists to assist in the accurate placing of the action for without it there is a major problem in the locating of the battlefield and especially of the principal deployments and the action.

The location given by the Ordnance Survey 2nd edition map of 1900 is described as the ‘supposed site of the battle of Dupplin’, and is associated with the Dupplin Cross. The problem with this location is that it sits on the sloping ground on the edge of the fields
shown by Roy, with the presumed moor immediately to the north. This is however the
traditional site of the battle, for Stobie in 1783 records the site as immediately at the top
of the scarp of the Earn valley, with the Dupplin Den 500m to the north east (7). This is
the edge of the area of the moor as depicted by Roy in 1755. But there is no obvious
topographical feature that might have created the narrow pass that appears to have
played a key role in the action, though some hedged or similar features might have
existed. Knox’s map of 1850 depicts two battle locations, one as on Stobie and the other
immediately north of Carnie, raising further uncertainties of location, for this location
lies immediately adjacent to the moorland in Gask (13).

2.2 PRIMARY SOURCES
Dupplin Moor is well documented for a medieval battle and includes sources from both
the Scottish as well as the English perspective. Strickland provides useful referencing to
many of the primary sources, while DeVries provides a fuller list of primary sources
and quotes extensively from them. Extracts in translation of several sources are given by
Rogers (10).

2.3 SECONDARY WORKS
Given the importance of the battle in tactical developments, it is inexplicable that
Dupplin Moor is omitted by most of the UK and Scottish battlefield books and that
there has been no detailed individual study of the battle. It is however discussed in some
detail by Strickland, with detailed referencing to primary sources, and DeVries provides
even more information, comparing the evidence from different sources in developing
his interpretation of the battle. However, none of the works consulted have hazarded a
map showing the location of deployments or action. Oman’s account, based initially on
Morris (1897), includes quotes from Bridlington, Lanercost and Knighton, in the
original Latin. It provides a useful outline of the action with some topographical
information (11). Brown’s work is wholly un referenced, although he does provide a
brief review of primary and secondary works for the whole of the Second War of
Independence (12).

2.4 BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY
One contemporary source says that the dead were buried in a large deep ditch (2). It is
also reported that several ‘ancient weapons' were found six feet below the surface in
Dupplin Parks and presented to Perth Museum in 1814, though whether this has any
relevance to the battle is unclear (6).

2.5 BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN
The Roy map of 1755 shows an extensive area of non agricultural land on the higher
ground, to the north of a narrow strip of fields on the northern slopes of the Earn valley,
but by that date the Dupplin House landscape park had already been laid out across
much of this moor and field land (7). Stobie records the Mill of Moor close to where the
Dupplin Den is now crossed by the A9 and this may be recognition of the location of
Dupplin Moor prior to its conversion into a landscape park. In the open ground on the
Ordnance Survey mapping of 1900 there are various moor names relating to adjacent
settlements (9).
2.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE

The immediate political outcome was dramatic but in the medium term effects were limited. Immediately after the battle Balliol was able to fortify Perth as a base of operations (12) and in the succeeding months the success at Dupplin Moor enabled Edward Balliol to depose Bruce, being crowned king of Scotland on 24th September 1332. However he was soon forced to flee to England, on the 17th December, by the forces under the Earl of Moray. Edward III then gave support to Balliol, raising forces to besiege Berwick, then in Scottish hands, leading directly to the battle of Halidon Hill.

Dupplin Moor was a long and bloody battle, with a much smaller English army causing substantial Scottish losses. It showed in dramatic fashion that the schiltron, which had been so effective against massed cavalry at Bannockburn, was extremely vulnerable to a combination of massed longbow and dismounted men-at-arms, harking back to the English tactics and success in the 1138 battle of Northallerton. Dupplin Moor is thus of the highest importance in military terms because it was the battle which ushered in the dramatic late medieval military supremacy of the English longbow, making English armies a dominant force in Western European warfare for more than a century with victories such as Crecy and Agincourt.

2.7 CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT

Given the uncertainties of location of the battlefield, it is difficult to define its exact state of development. The A9 crosses the area, though perhaps to the north west of the battlefield. Otherwise the area remains a largely undisturbed designed landscape associated with Dupplin Castle. This post medieval design has dramatically altered the character of the landscape from that of the 14th century, while the landscaping works themselves and the Castle together with its ancillary buildings may have caused substantial damage to any battle archaeology in specific areas, depending on the exact location of the action.

2.8 CURRENT DESIGNATIONS

The only scheduled monument in the area is the ruined remnant of Dupplin Church, which is also listed. Dupplin Cross, a 9th century cross that has become associated with the battle, is also listed. All the other listed buildings in the area are of 18th century or later date and are associated with the Castle and its park. The landscape park itself is not however included on the Inventory of historic gardens and designed landscapes. Dupplin Lakes and the associated woodland, all to the north west of the A9, are an SSSI.

2.9 POTENTIAL

It is essential that further research is undertaken on the historic terrain of the Dupplin area, combined with a re-analysis of all the primary accounts, in an attempt to accurately locate this important battlefield. Given the likelihood that the site lies wholly or partly within the Dupplin parkland, it may prove to be a relatively well preserved site, especially if a large part of the land has remained under pasture.

2.10 THREATS

None have been identified.
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Falkirk I

1 SUMMARY

1.1 CONTEXT
In March 1298, following the English defeat at Stirling Bridge, William Wallace led a punitive raid into Northumberland. In response, later in 1298, Edward I assembled an army of 15,000, including veterans from his campaigns in France as well as Welsh and Irish troops. In the campaign that followed Wallace was outnumbered and forced to employ hit and run tactics, avoiding open battle, and implementing a policy of clearing or destroying resources in the path of the English army in order to weaken its ability to fight. In response Edward, who had mustered his army at Roxburgh, organised seaborne supplies to support his forces as they marched north to Edinburgh. Wallace planned a night time attack on Edward’s army near Kirkliston, just to the north west of Edinburgh, but was betrayed by two Scottish nobles, who resented Wallace’s rise to power. Wallace now had little alternative but to face Edward in open battle before he reached Stirling with its strategically important castle. He chose Falkirk as the location.

1.2 ACTION
Though outnumbered, Wallace was forced to engage the English, choosing terrain in which he could use an area of marshy ground to protect his deployment. His infantry were organised in four schiltrons (‘great circles’) of spearmen, with the archers between these and with the cavalry to the rear.(1) The English deployed in three battles: the vanguard under Norfolk & Hereford, the rearward battle under the Bishop of Durham and the main battle under Edward I. The vanguard moved to the right and the main battle to the left of the marsh, the first cavalry attack having become bogged down. This second English charge caused the Scottish cavalry to flee and then carried on to ride down the Scottish archers, but were halted by the schiltrons.(2) But then the English archers advanced and opened up the schiltron lines with hails of shot, providing openings which the English cavalry then exploited, destroying the schiltrons and defeating Wallace’s army, which was then destroyed in the pursuit.(2)(3)(4)

Figure 15: Falkirk I (1298) - battlefield plan

1.3 TROOPS
See Prestwich references quoted in Strickland and Hardy for higher English troops numbers.

Numbers:
The contemporary chronicles give impossibly large numbers up to 80,000 or more; (3) 12,500 infantry; 2500 cavalry; (2) about 18,000. (4) Including 8000 archers; 3000 armoured infantry; 200 heavy cavalry (knights). (4)

Outnumbered: Improbable medieval numbers: 30,000; 1000 archers; small cavalry reserve (3). 14,000; mainly infantry militia spearmen; about 180 cavalry (4). 5-6000 (1).

Losses: uncertain

1.4 COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION

No monument or interpretation has been identified.

2 ASSESSMENT

2.1 LOCATION

The location of the battlefield is contentious, with two main sites being identified in the secondary works. The traditional site is that on the north side of the medieval town of Falkirk, which is where it is positioned by the NMRS. Most recent authors, including Smurthwaite, Seymour, Matthews and the most recent study by Armstrong, place the action to the south of Falkirk. They show the Scottish army deployed on high ground immediately to the south of Callendar Wood, looking south across valley of the Glen Burn. Reid provides a concise summary of the case for the two sites (3). The primary accounts merely state that the battle was ‘On hard ground and on the side of a hillock, next to Falkirk’ (5), ‘on the side of Falkirk’ (6) and on ‘the plain which is called Falkirk’ (7).

Pont’s 16th century map shows woodland along the valley below the Callendar site, while the woodland of Callendar itself, if extant in 1298, would have provided an improbable backing for the army, not allowing easy retreat (2).

The site is also well away from the later, and probably also the 13th century, main road from Edinburgh to Stirling, which was Edward’s objective. However this need not be a major problem with the Callendar site because the 18th century battle of Falkirk, which was fought under similar strategic imperatives, was also fought well to the south of the major road.

There is nothing in the geological mapping on the Callendar site which would seem to accord with the marshy ground referred to in the primary accounts, the whole area being boulder clay. In contrast the traditional site is on a limited area of sand and gravels surrounded by extensive areas of silts & clays. The latter might accord with the reference to the Scottish army standing on ‘hard ground’ and with marsh areas affecting the English attack.

2.2 PRIMARY SOURCES

A detailed account is provided by Walter of Guisborough which is internally consistent and can be checked against other sources. Gray’s Scalacronica and the Lanercost Chronicle both provide short accounts. Other accounts follow Guisborough word for word (8).
2.3 **SECONDARY WORKS**
The main modern work is that by Armstrong (8).

2.4 **BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY**
None has been identified in the research for this report.

2.5 **BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN**
The geological evidence on the traditional site suggests a combination of dry ground on sands and gravels where as the clay/silt areas might, in this low lying situation, have included marsh in some parts. On the Callendar site there is no geological evidence to support the existence of a marsh in the areas suggested by Seymour, but more detailed examination of soils data may reveal relevant evidence.

The major road between Edinburgh and Stirling appears likely to have been that running in the post medieval through the town of Falkirk and hence closer to the northern as opposed to the southern site.

Reconstruction of the major road pattern in 1298, mapping of the extent of Falkirk town in the medieval period and more detailed archaeological and/or documentary research on the likely nature of 13th century land use in the area, may assist in the more secure locating of the battlefield.

2.6 **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE**
Falkirk is a battle of international significance involving major military commanders of the period. It saw the Scottish army destroyed, leaving Edward I in control of south east Scotland, which he held with a few garrisons. Thereafter during the reign of Edward I another Scottish army could not be raised capable of challenging the English in the field.

2.7 **CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT**
The traditional site is wholly built over with practically no open ground. The Callendar site is partly built over by modern development but substantial areas remain undeveloped farm land.

2.8 **CURRENT DESIGNATIONS**
*Callendar site:*
Callendar wood is managed by the Forestry Commission. Woodend Farm is listed. The canal running across the southern part of the site is scheduled. Callendar Park and wood are clearly a designed landscape but are not identified on the digital data set provided for the current project by Historic Scotland.

*Traditional site:*
There are a number of listed buildings.

2.9 **POTENTIAL**
The limited topographical evidence in the primary accounts, especially the reference to an area of marsh, may be just enough to enable the correct area to be determined from the two alternative sites if an adequate reconstruction of the historic terrain of the two contending locations can be prepared.
If the Callendar site is not dismissed as a result then it would be possible to test this area for surviving battle archaeology. The use of archery on both sides, and its decisive role in the English victory, means that there will have been large numbers of arrows deposited on the battlefield, many of them not being recovered, especially where the action passed over the arrow fall and smashed them. Thus if the soil conditions and post battle land uses were conducive to preservation of iron then there may be extensive evidence of the arrowstorm. The Callendar site is almost wholly boulder clay, but it has not been determined in the present research whether this has produced a high or low soil pH and hence the potential for preservation of unstratified iron objects has not been established.

If the traditional, northern site appears to be the correct one, after terrain reconstruction and reanalysis of the primary accounts, then this cannot be tested archaeologically as it is wholly built over. The only potential here for confirmation through archaeological evidence would be the improbable situation of a mass grave being discovered by chance in redevelopment, but had such existed it might have been expected to have been reported when the site was first developed.

If the southern site is confirmed then the battlefield could prove of considerable importance. There is disagreement about the exact battle formation of both sides in the battle, something that is partly linked to the uncertainties about battle formations and tactics generally in the medieval period. It is important that well preserved battlefields with good potential for the survival of battle archaeology are identified throughout the medieval period in order to examine the battle archaeology to improve our understanding of the changing detail of military action in the period.

2.10 THREATS

It appears likely that the Callendar site will could come under threat from continuing development and so determining which the correct site for the battle is is particularly important. If it is the Callendar site then there is probably need for urgent action. In the absence of definitive evidence for either site, it would be appropriate to undertake evaluation on the Callendar site in response to any substantial development threat.

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FALKIRK II

1 SUMMARY

1.1 CONTEXT
After their devastating victory at Prestonpans, the Jacobite army had marched into England. However, when the expected French invasion and English Jacobite uprising failed to materialise they retreated back into Scotland, fighting a rearguard action on Clifton Moor in Lancashire. At the same time the siege of the government forces in Stirling Castle continued. In response a government army under Lt General Hawley marched north and assembled his forces at Edinburgh, then moving north west to relieve Stirling. Lord George Murray’s Jacobite army blocked Hawley’s path at Falkirk.

1.2 ACTION

Hawley was caught out by the speed of the Jacobite manoeuvres. Murray took the initiative and deployed on commanding ground to the south west of Falkirk, on Falkirk Muir, which the Jacobites approached from the west. The ground was ideal for the Highland charge and had good flank protection. The government army responded, marching on to the Muir from the east but in such a hurry that the artillery was never brought up before the battle began. The two forces deployed roughly north-south, with a steep scarp defining the battlefield on the north side and marshy ground to the south. On the north a steep ravine separated the armies but in the centre and south it was open sloping ground.

The Jacobite army, under Murray, comprised a combination of Highland clan forces, which would depend on the Highland charge, together with Lowland infantry including a small body of professional French troops, trained according to contemporary European military practice. The Highlanders were placed in the front line and the Lowland infantry as support in the second line, together with a small infantry and a cavalry reserve. But the Highland charge that was so successful at Prestonpans had been against troops that had never seen action. At Falkirk the government army was made up largely of veterans trained to form up 3 deep and volley fire muskets at about 2 rounds a minute. Hawley believed this tactic, when employed by battle hardened troops, would be effective against the Highland charge. He therefore deployed in two lines of infantry, with the dragoons on the front left. He placed his inexperienced troops, the militias which were well trained but had no combat experience, as a left rear flank guard and on the slopes on the right.

The first engagement was with a left flank government dragoons attack on the Jacobite right, but this failed and some of the fleeing dragoons disordered government infantry regiments on the left, including the militia. These infantry were unable to reform in time to fire the intended volley before the Highlanders came in to hand to hand combat. Indeed Reid suggests that the government infantry were still advancing up hill when they where hit by the Highland charge. The Highlanders had supposedly attacked contrary to their commanders’ intentions, forcing him to send the second line Lowland
infantry forward in support. Under this pressure the government regiments broke, carrying the militia reserve with them. Highlanders then rushed on in pursuit. Though it was important to keep the broken government troops from reforming, the success on the Jacobite right ought to have led to a flank attack on the hard pressed government right. Instead all the Highlanders pursued the government forces and pillaged their camp.

Meanwhile the regiments of the government right, which had not been disordered and had the added protection of a steep ravine to preclude enemy attack on the far right, held their line against the Jacobites. Just as Hawley had expected from all his infantry, the intense musket fire caused the Jacobite left to recoil and some fled. There is then some disagreement between several of the secondary accounts as to the detail of the action on the Jacobite left, but it would appear that the lack of effective command and control within the Jacobite forces put them at a severe disadvantage. The failing light and bad weather precluded a government offensive at such a late stage, even though so many of the Jacobite forces were disordered or had left the field, and Hawley therefore retreated back to his camp and than back towards Edinburgh.

The battle was relatively short and saw the Jacobites effectively left in command of the field but in reality the victory, though of important propaganda value, was a hollow one. The government forces certainly did not see Falkirk as a defeat. The Jacobites in contrast had seen their weaknesses exposed, having failed, particularly though ineffective command and control during the action, to capitalise fully on their initial success. Then, faced by the difficulties of a winter campaign, the Jacobites abandoned the Stirling siege and marched north, the Highlanders dispersing until a new muster in the spring. (1) (2) (4) (7).

Figure 16: Falkirk II (1746) - battlefield plan

Figure 17: Falkirk II conservation boundary suggested by Martin (red line)

1.3 TROOPS

Numbers:
Reid provides a detailed breakdown of the regiments and battalions (7)

Government:
Total: c.9000 (1); 8000 (4); 7800 (7)
6500 regulars including 700 dragoons (1).
1600 militia plus 2000 Highlanders, of which 1000 had been left to hold Edinburgh (4)
5488 regulars; 1500 militia (7)
Cavalry: 819 (7)
Artillery (not engaged)

Jacobite:
Total: c.8000 (1); c.6000
Infantry: c. 4000 Highlanders; c. 4000 Lowland militia (1); c.3800 Highlanders; c.2000 others (7)
Cavalry: several hundred (1); 360 (7)
Losses:
*Government*: 400 (1); 300 killed; 300 captured (4); 70 killed, many of them officers (7)
*Jacobite*: 50 killed; 80 wounded (4); 50 killed; 60-80 wounded (7).

1.4 **COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION**

There is a monument on the northern side of the battlefield at the southern end of the ravine.

2 **ASSESSMENT**

2.1 **LOCATION**

All authors are in agreement as to the general location of the battlefield. However there are significant problems with the exact placing of the forces (2). The action was fought on Falkirk Muir and the extent of this area of moorland should be relatively easy to map for the mid 18th century. The ravine on the north, in front of the Jacobite left wing, and the marsh on the Jacobite right flank should then enable accurate positioning of the deployments. Smurthwaite is exceptional in showing the deployments further eastward than all others, with the ravine identified as an improbably small feature 300m eastward of the accepted location (4).

Unfortunately all the secondary works examined fail to adequately fix the location and extent of the key topographical features and hence to securely place the initial deployments and action. In particular most deployments, though using the clear ravine on the north to position the two armies, do not locate the marsh on the south, and most importantly almost all fail to position the armies so that the ground falls from a lightly wooded hill behind the Jacobite left to the south eastwards and then rises again behind the government left to an open hill, as the contemporary battle plan and accounts make clear (3). This is priority for resolution, using the contemporary plans and accounts of the battle, geological and detailed relief mapping and historic maps. Initial assessment suggests the possibility that the actual Jacobite deployment may have been some 300m or more to the west than is usually shown, while the geological evidence for the marsh might even indicate a location almost 1km to the north west.

The area defined by Martin for conservation covers most of the surviving undeveloped areas of the battlefield. However its exclusion of smaller undeveloped areas on the eastern side of the battlefield, within the housing development, may be excluding land where some battle archaeology survives, though the value of any such evidence remains uncertain. His boundary on the western side may prove to have been far too tightly defined. (5)

2.2 **PRIMARY SOURCES**

There are possibly as many as six separate plans of the battle, including plans from both sides, though some may prove to be identical or derivative when examined together. There are also large number of written accounts and related documents including accounts from both sides.

2.3 **SECONDARY WORKS**

Most of the main battlefields studies include Falkirk II, but there is just one modern study devoted solely to this battle, although several others from earlier in the 20th
century. The most useful and accessible short account of the battle is that by Reid, who includes various extracts from the primary accounts, though he places a somewhat different perspective on the outcome than some other authors. According to Reid the best modern study is that by Bailey, as it includes much local knowledge (6).

2.4 **BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY**

There are local reports of burials in the area, but an association with the battle has not been verified (5).

2.5 **BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN**

The battle is also named Falkirk Muir, from the fact that it was fought on moor land to the south west of Falkirk. The moor has been enclosed subsequent to the battle. A steep scarp defines a boundary to the north, while to the south the ground sloped more gently to a marshy area somewhere along the Glen Burn, which was perhaps significant in precluding a government outflanking move on the Jacobite right wing.

Understanding the terrain as it was in 1746 is important both for the significant influence it had on the outcome of the action and to allow exact placing of the action. The geological evidence might indicate that the marsh in question was considerably further to the west than is usually suggested, but without further work it is impossible to determine whether there was also significant marsh, not clearly identified in the geological mapping, along the course of the burn on the left flank of the standard deployments. The accurate definition of the moorland should also be possible.

2.6 **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE**

Falkirk II was the second of the Jacobite victories during the 1745-6 campaign. Unlike Prestonpans, where untested government troops had broken in the face of the Highland charge, here it was well trained veteran troops under an experienced commander. This was arguably the high point of the Jacobite campaign, but it was not the devastating victory that might have been achieved. It was a propaganda success but in reality it had revealed the great weaknesses of the Jacobite forces.

2.7 **CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT**

Modern development has encroached on the eastern part of the battlefield, though the true extent of loss depends on the exact placing of the deployments and action. The area of the pursuit is certainly built over. On the north the canal skirts the northern edge of the scarp while on the north west, probably but not certainly beyond the area of action, there has been extensive mineral extraction. The majority of the battlefield appears however to remain as enclosed agricultural fields with limited areas of woodland.

2.8 **CURRENT DESIGNATIONS**

The battlefield monument is listed. The canal on the north and eastern periphery of the battlefield is scheduled, as is the Roman fort on the north western edge of the battlefield.

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18 What is the significance of ‘Tom Carr’ marked on the Pont Map of 1783-96? (NLS Adv.MS.70.2.9 (Pont 32)).
2.9 **POTENTIAL**

The exact positioning of the initial deployments of the two armies is critical to the interpretation of the battle and for the definition of the conservation and any recording priorities for the battlefield. The detailed accounts and maps with their identification of distinct topographical features, not just the marsh and the ravine but also including buildings and enclosures, should enable this to be achieved with high accuracy.

A substantial part of the battlefield remains as open ground that has not been disturbed, especially if the action has to be repositioned westward from the usually identified location. Only if it is moved a substantial distance to the west would the former quarrying have affected the battlefield. There is therefore the potential for battle archaeology in the form of large numbers of unstratified lead bullets, the patterning reflecting the varying distribution and character of the action.

There would also seem to be a high potential for the interpretation of the battlefield on the ground as the topographical framework is very distinctive and played a key role in the location and course of the action. Enough of the battlefield seems to survive at present but it would appear to require active conservation to protect it from further destruction. If it is not to be conserved then detailed archaeological recording of the battle archaeology should be required. Any relevant archaeological evidence for the historic terrain, where this cannot be established from documentary records, should also be investigated.

A detailed study of the battlefield based on the documentary record of the battle and of the historic terrain is an essential precursor to conservation and interpretation of the battlefield. The hypotheses based on the analysis of the documentary evidence should be tested on the ground through sampling of the battle archaeology to confirm locations. Such sampling is also essential to establish the likely state of survival of the battle archaeology. Any such assessment should also include investigation as to what metal detecting has taken place on the site to date, attempting to compile a record of such material as has been recovered and from where. Only with such information can an effective conservation, or if necessary, intensive recording scheme be defined.

The documentary record for both the event and its terrain context may prove to be so good that the archaeology of the battle and of the battlefield terrain may have only a limited role to play in furthering understanding of the action. The archaeology is however likely to be essential for the confirmation of the interpretations based on the documentary record. In addition, given the quality of the documentary record, it may be that the detailed investigation of the battle archaeology at Falkirk will enable significant advances in the methodology of battlefield studies, particularly with regard to the interpretation of the signature of different types of action, such as the fighting retreat made by the government forces on the right compared to the rout of those on the left.

2.10 **THREATS**

The site is in close proximity to areas of recent development and may thus be under threat from development, part of the battlefield having already been lost in very recent times without archaeological record.

Although no artillery were apparently employed in the action, there was intense musket fire. This will have laid down large numbers of lead bullets, representing a battle
archaeology resource highly vulnerable to treasure hunting and poorly recorded metal detecting survey.

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SP 54/27/28 Lord Justice Clerk Fletcher to Secretary Newcastle. On Gen Huske’s approach to Falkirk, and the possibility of an engagement with the rebel army 1746 Jan 16

SP 54/27/29A Gen Hawley to Secretary Newcastle. Blaming his defeat at Falkirk on bad weather and the behavior of the dragoons “no sooner were the troops engaged .. but some of the dragoons took a most shameful flight and was followed by a great part of the infantry”;and reporting his retreat to Linlithgow 1746 Jan 17

SP 54/27/29B Gen Hawley to HRH Duke of Cumberland. Reporting the defeat of his men at Falkirk: “such a scandalous cowardice I never saw before. The whole second line of foot ran away, without firing a shot” [1746 Jan 17]

SP 54/27/31 Lord Justice Clerk Fletcher to the Duke of [Newcastle]. Reporting that following the news of the defeat at Falkirk, people have tried “to raise the spirits of the soldiers and keep them warm by furnishing them with great quantities of blankets and treating them with meat and drink” 1746 Jan 18

SP 54/27/32A Gen Hawley, reporting his retreat to Edinburgh where his replacements more than make up for the losses at Falkirk, “and the men promise their officers to redeem their credit at the first occaision” 1746 Jan 19

SP 54/27/32C [Gen Hawley]: “journal of what hath passed in the army in Scotland since Jan 10 1745/6” ending with the defeat at the battle of Falkirk [1746 Jan]
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SP 54/27/35 Gen Hawley, reporting that Capt Cunningham, due to face a court martial for running away with the horses after Falkirk, has “opened his arteries of his arms” and must shortly die; also on the deaths of Sir Robert Munro and Col Whitney; and concerning his army officers retaken from the rebels 1746 Jan 20

SP 54/27/38A Gen Hawley, on a report that the rebel dead at Falkirk numbered 500; also asking if the articles of war made for Flanders could be put into force in Scotland, or whether he could have an indemnity for all his actions contrary to law, as he is assured Wade and Argyll have 1746 Jan 21

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SP 54/27/41C Tho[mas] Jack: intelligence report on the condition of the Jacobite forces in the aftermath of the battle of Falkirk, giving their number as 5,000 1746 Jan 22

SP 54/27/41D James Hill: memorial from Stirling, concerning the rebels’ lack of progress, their losses at Falkirk and the great numbers of desertions; also reporting that Charles Edward visited his men only once, and immediately returned to Bannockburn 1746 Jan 22
SP 54/27/42 Secretary Newcastle to Lord Justice Clerk Fletcher. On the state of the army after Falkirk and reporting that the Duke of Cumberland is to take command 1746 Jan 24

SP 54/27/43 Secretary Newcastle to Robert Dundas. Giving permission for his resignation as Solicitor-General, and reporting the king’s satisfaction with his conduct of the office; also concerning the battle of Falkirk 1746 Jan 24

SP 54/27/51A Gen Hawley to Secretary Newcastle. On this gratitude that the king does not blame him for the failure at Falkirk; reporting that his troops will be ready to march when Cumberland arrives; and on Blakeney’s continued success in holding off the rebel attack on Stirling Castle 1746 Jan 28

SP 54/27/55B Capt Masterton, on the battle of Falkirk 1746 Jan 21

SP 54/27/58 Memorial from [Stirling]: on rebel activity; and mentioning the shooting of Glengarry in Falkirk undated

SP 54/28/1B Cumberland to Lord Justice Clerk Fletcher. On his march to Falkirk; and reporting that the rebels’ have retreated from Stirling, leaving their artillery and blowing up their powder, stored in St Ninian’s church [1746 Feb 1]

SP 54/45/25 Note on the recommendation by Lord Chief Baron Ord, of John Atcheson as minister of Falkirk, Stirlingshire: also on the Duke of Argyll’s recommendation of Patrick Wallace as Clerk of the Wardrobe 1757 Apr 21

SP 87/20/46 To Harrington from [Colonel] John Stewart: embarkation continues despite strong winds and heavy sea. Three regiments are now aboard. Report that Hawley has been beaten by the rebels near Stirling [Falkirk]. Dated at Willemstad. PS. that evening that a fourth regiment has been embarked.

British Library:

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Harlaw

1 SUMMARY

1.1 CONTEXT
In origin the battle of Harlaw was a feudal dispute but must be viewed in the context of growing conflict between Highland and Lowland. The situation was also complicated by the fact that King James I was imprisoned in England and thus royal authority was weak. Donald, Lord of the Isles, having fought for control of Ross, now planned to strike south east into Moray, towards Aberdeen. But there was substantial warning of the impending campaign and so defensive preparations were put in hand by the Earl of Mar in the spring and early summer of 1411.

In the medieval period the main road from Inverness to Aberdeen probably followed broadly the route of the A96. It appears that it was along this route that the Highland forces approached Moray. As soon as he was aware of the approach of the Highland forces, Mar marshalled his troops at Inverurie, which controlled the route. The exact line of the road to the north of Inverurie ran on the north side of the river Urie and it was 2km north west of the bridge over the river, just north of Inverurie, that the Highland forces camped on the night of the 23rd July, on high ground near Harlaw. On the morning of the 24th the Earl of Mar marched out of Inverurie to engage the Highland army.

1.2 ACTION
Mar approach from the south east. The action seems to have been fought on foot and with each army probably deployed in three ‘battles’, the infantry arranged in ‘schiltrons’, closely ordered ranks of spearmen. There is no reference to significant numbers of archers and it seems that Mar kept his knights as a cavalry reserve. It appears to have been an intense and close run fight but the sources provide little detail and there is even conflict over the outcome, with both sides claiming victory. What is clear is that Aberdeen was successfully defended and the Highland forces departed without causing significant destruction in the region.

Figure 18: Harlaw (1411) - battlefield plan

Figure 19: Harlaw conservation boundary suggested by Martin (red line)
1.3 **TROOPS**

**Numbers:**
- **Highland:** 10,000 according to the ballads but probably far less.
- **Lowland:** several thousand including significant numbers of armoured knights.

**Losses:**
The ballads claim 900 Highland and 600 Lowland losses.

1.4 **COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION**

A grave marker commemorating Sir Gilbert de Greenlaw, who was killed in the battle, is in the churchyard at Kinkell, to the south east of Inverurie. A substantial monument was erected on the battle field, unveiled in 1914. There are also cairns on the battlefield (Drum’s and Provost Davidson’s cairns) which are said to be associated with the battle, while two now lost standing stones also gained association with the battle: Liggars Stane and Donalds Tomb. All are marked on the Ordnance Survey 1st edition 6inch mapping, but it is unclear which if any have a genuine association with the battle.

2 **ASSESSMENT**

2.1 **LOCATION**
The general location of the battle is well established at the traditional site, but the primary sources provide very little detail as to the exact context, so accurately placing the troops and the action is not currently possible. Marren has made a reasonable interpretation based on the relief and the probable approximate alignment of the major medieval road from Inverness to Aberdeen, but the actual deployments shown are highly conjectural.

2.2 **PRIMARY SOURCES**
Harlaw is a poorly documented action for which much of the evidence is in the form of ballads, embroidered with legend. There are no significant contemporary chronicle accounts. Major’s work of 1527 may have had oral tradition to draw upon but is very late. The primary sources are discussed by Marren, 1990 (p.212-3).

2.3 **SECONDARY WORKS**
The most modern account is that provided by Marren, 1990, which also reviews the other main secondary works (p.212-3).

2.4 **BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY**
Human remains were found in 1837 to the north east of Mid Harlaw, the location marked on the 1st edition 6inch Ordnance Survey mapping. Though these need not actually relate to the action, if they did then they might give a more accurate indication of the centre of the action, for mass graves are frequently found to concentrate in the area of initial and most intense fighting. Artefacts including a battle axe have also been found on the battlefield.
2.5 **BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN**

The ballads give a picture of the battlefield as featureless moorland, but the area today is arable fields. Though not specifically referred to in the primary accounts, the action appears to have been fought on the line of the major road from Aberdeen to Inverness. Despite its importance for the understanding of the action, no reconstruction of the historic terrain, including the road network and the extent of moorland, has apparently been attempted.

2.6 **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE**

The battle represented a stage in the escalation of Highland / Lowland conflict during the early 15th century, but it saw the successful defence of the Aberdeen area.

2.7 **CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT**

The whole battlefield remains as agricultural fields. There is no modern development or evidence of mineral extraction or other modern disturbance.

2.8 **CURRENT DESIGNATIONS**

Balhalgardy House and Harlaw House are both listed, as is the battle monument. There are no other designations.

The area defined by Martin for battlefield conservation seems to be too tightly defined, given the many uncertainties about the exact location of the action. It even excludes the location where the human remains have been found. (2)

2.9 **POTENTIAL**

The potential of the battlefield is largely undetermined, because of the paucity of the documentary record.

The geology of the battlefield is wholly boulder clay but the pH of the derivative soils have not been established in the present research, so it is not possible to indicate as to whether there is a good potential for preservation of ferrous artefacts. There is no indication in the primary sources that archery played a significant role in the action and so there may not have been significant numbers of projectiles deposited which could yield shot fall patterning, but this cannot be established for certain without archaeological survey. However, given the likely intensity of the hand to hand fighting it is probable that significant numbers of non ferrous artefacts will have been deposited during the action. Thus the site may be amenable to investigation through intensive metal detecting survey, which has been shown at Towton to be an effective approach to the exploration of late medieval battlefields.

The most practical approach to advance the understanding of the battlefield, as an essential prerequisite for effective conservation and interpretation, would be to reconstruct the historic terrain, including road network, land use and plan form. Then, in the light of this evidence and the detail of relief, the existing hypotheses as to the location and extent of the action can be refined. This could then be tested by metal detecting for surviving battle archaeology.

2.10 **THREATS**

There is the potential for damage to unstratified battle archaeology through treasure hunting or unrecorded/poorly recorded metal detecting survey.
Modern agricultural practices, including application of chemicals may also represent a substantial threat to the long term survival of unstratified metal artefacts, particularly if the longer term land use history was one of primarily pastoral use which will have protected the artefacts from mechanical damage.

3 REFERENCES


4 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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1 SUMMARY

1.1 CONTEXT
In the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England the catholic James VII(II) was ousted and replaced by William of Orange and Queen Mary. In 1689 the Scottish parliament voted to give the crown of Scotland to William & Mary. In response Viscount Dundee raised mainly Highland forces under the standard of James VII(II) in the first Jacobite rebellion against the newly installed monarch. They were supported by a small force of Irish troops. A Scottish government army was raised to counter the rebellion. This army comprised Lowland Scottish, English and Dutch forces, under General Mackay. On 27th July 1689 they intercepted the rebels just to the north west of the Killiecrankie Pass, on the key strategic communications route into the Highlands from Perth to Inverness.

1.2 ACTION
The Jacobites gained the advantage of the high ground but Mackay took up a suitable position to meet a charge, on a terrace just to the north east of the then main road. Regimental positions in the deployment are listed in various secondary works (3) (6). Having doubled his files to provide a wider frontage and enable salvo fire from his whole force, the government army waited. After a period of desultory firing Dundee attacked late in the evening. The rebel force had limited numbers of muskets, the main weapon being sword, but the disordered Highland charge suffered substantial losses to the single musket volley. Despite perhaps as many as 600 being killed, the charge carried. Mackay’s men had little time to reload or insert their plug bayonets before the rebels closed. In hand to hand fighting the Jacobites had considerable success against the extended government line. Mackay responded with a cavalry charge but this was countered by Dundee’s horse. Though the Jacobites had the better of the action and various government regiments were routed, the firepower of the government right wing regiments allowed them to withdraw in good order, mortally wounding Dundee during one of the cavalry charges. The Highlanders pursued the retreating government forces but then contented themselves with the spoils of the baggage train. The government army had been severely mauled, losing a large numbers of troops killed or captured. However the Jacobites had lost their leader, a massive blow, and failed to follow through their success.(1) (2) (5).

Figure 20: Killiecrankie (1689) - battlefield plan

Figure 21: Killiecrankie conservation boundary suggested by Martin (red line)

1.3 TROOPS
Numbers:
Government: 5000, also 9 small artillery pieces (5)
Jacobite: 2500 foot; 1 troop of horse (5)

Losses:
Government: 1200 (5)
Jacobite: 1250 (5)

1.4 COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION
The ‘Claverhouse Stone’ lies on the south west edge of the battlefield and is said to be where John Graham of Claverhouse, Viscount Dundee, was killed. This is actually a prehistoric standing stone and the only association with the battle is through local tradition.
There is a plaque to the fallen on the Mount Clavers, the supposed mass grave site.(7) Kinross refers to a Balfour stone and a monument in the centre of the battlefield but both identifications seem to be in error.(3).

2 ASSESSMENT
2.1 LOCATION
The battle is fairly closely located. However there are differences in the various secondary accounts as to the exact width and position of the frontages. Most secondary works indicate a north-west/south-east alignment of troops. This fits well with the physical terrain of the battle, with two distinct slopes divided by a terrace, on which the main action appears to have occurred. Smurthwaite’s depiction of troops at right angles across the valley is an exception and is difficult to reconcile with the physical terrain.
The areas identified by Martin for conservation is inexplicably restricted in extent to the north west, excluding a substantial area which most sources place within the battlefield. It also includes a significant area beyond the Girnaig stream, though the latter may be to encompass a presumed area of the Government baggage train, which no secondary work appears to locate.
The search area defined here is securely bounded on the south west by the river. To the north east the steep slopes provide a less definite boundary. To east and west the extent of deployment and action is far less certain, while the baggage train and any attack upon it is wholly unlocated.

2.2 PRIMARY SOURCES
There are a number of primary accounts by eye witnesses to the battle.

2.3 SECONDARY WORKS
One of the most accessible modern works providing a good overview of the battle is Pollard & Oliver (2003), particularly valuable for its account of the archaeological investigation, though the latter aspect will soon be superseded by the detailed archaeological report.

2.4 BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY
Archaeological investigation failed to locate a mass grave in the area close to the Tomb Clavers where human remains had been reported in the late 18th century. However systematic metal detecting survey did recover a significant numbers of battle artefacts across the battlefield including lead bullets, buttons and a grenade fragment. This
evidence appears to have tied down the action with far more certainty than ever before, but until a plan is published showing the distribution, type and density of the finds and the intensity of the survey it is difficult to assess results. What is has clearly demonstrated is the enormous potential on this site for a comprehensive battlefield survey.(6)

2.5 BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN
The Historic Land Use mapping available from RCAHMS shows mainly 18th-19th century rectilinear fields with limited areas of woodland and designed landscape. No detailed reconstruction of the historic terrain of 1689 has been located during the research for this report.

2.6 SIGNIFICANCE
This was the first and most significant of the battles of the first Jacobite rebellion. Although it was an important victory for the Jacobites, it also resulted in the death of the rebel leader, Viscount Dundee, a major factor in the subsequent collapse of the uprising.

This was also the first battle in Britain where the plug bayonet was used in place of pike, with all the infantry carrying muskets; the inability to fire the musket with the bayonet in place proved a contributory factor in the government defeat. A small number of grenadiers, carrying grenades as well as muskets were also present.

2.7 CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT
The majority of the battlefield is agricultural fields with a limited area under woodland. The A9 bypass and a rail line, running close to the old road, both cross the battlefield. There is apparently no other substantial disturbance of the site, although according to Martin some land (unspecified) to the south of the A9 has been subjected to landfill and is now planted with trees. (4).

2.8 CURRENT DESIGNATIONS
The monument to Viscount Dundee is scheduled, as is the Tomb Clavers. The National Trust for Scotland owns property on the south east periphery of the battlefield, including the Soldier’s Leap, where there is a Visitor Centre. This appears to be in the area of the retreat / rout but not in the centre of the battlefield itself.

There is said to be limited on site interpretation but access to the battlefield is restricted (4).

2.9 POTENTIAL
The site appears to be largely in a good state of preservation although the scale of the impact of the new route of the A9 needs to be assessed in terms of impact on the battle archaeology of the main action.

Limited archaeological investigation has demonstrated a high potential for the study of battle archaeology.

2.10 THREATS
No development threats have been reported or seem likely.
The presence of extensive non ferrous battle archaeology, particularly lead bullets, but also examples of other munitions and equipment renders the site particularly vulnerable to treasure hunting and unrecorded/poorly recorded metal detecting.

3 REFERENCES
(7) NMRS

4 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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4.2 SECONDARY SOURCES


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KILSYTH

1 SUMMARY

1.1 CONTEXT
The Covenanter government of Scotland had entered into alliance with the English parliament and had entered the war in England in early 1644, the Scottish army having a dramatic impact in the campaign for the north of England. In response, following the royalists’ dramatic defeat at Marston Moor, the King appointed the Marquis of Montrose as his military commander in Scotland. On 28th August 1644 Montrose raised the royal standard and with little more than 2000 troops fought a campaign in which he had won a series of dramatic successes in the Highlands against the Covenanter forces. Heavily outnumbered, he effectively exploited the terrain to outmanoeuvre the Covenanter army in the campaign and in the actions. Having won victories at Tippermuir, Aberdeen, Fyvie, Inverlochy, Auldearn and Alford he now attempted to break into the Lowlands. This was the only positive news for the embattled Charles I, whose cause was now heading for destruction in England, having just lost the battles of Naseby (Northamptonshire) and of Langport (Somerset). The king’s strategy now moved towards the uniting of Scottish and English royalist forces in a final desperate attempt to salvage the war.

From Alford, Montrose headed south along the east coast making for Glasgow; two Covenanter forces, under Argyll and Baillie, in pursuit. Montrose turned to engage them at Kilsyth, where the route from Stirling to Glasgow skirts south of the Campsie Fells.

1.2 ACTION

Montrose deployed in a high meadow. Part of the battlefield was one of fields divided by ‘dykes’. Baillie advanced against the royalists, deploying on a reverse slope out of sight of the royalists, somewhere to the north of the main road. Here impassable ground precluded any further advance towards the enemy and also meant neither side would be able to make a viable attack. According to Reid the Covenanter forces may have been facing the royalist left flank. After assessing the situation Baillie made a move to outflank the royalists by taking higher ground on his right wing. This led to a skirmish for control of a groups of buildings and ‘dykes’, suggested by Reid as Auchinrivoch farm. Having failed to gain the high ground Baillie moved his troops from line of march into battle array once more. The royalist main infantry force then engaged, fighting through the enclosures. Meanwhile Baillie launched a cavalry attack against the royalist left, an attack which was only finally halted by the royalist cavalry reserve. The Covenanter cavalry were broken and fled, exposing Baillie’s right wing of infantry. The royalists in the centre then carried the enclosure dykes and the main Covenanter infantry line broke, as did their reserve. A final attempt to rally the fleeing troops at a brook failed. Although some escaped the field, the last substantial Covenanter army in Scotland had been destroyed.
1.3 **TROOPS**

Numbers:
- Montrose: c.3000 foot; c.600 horse (3)
- Baillie: c.3500 foot; 360 horse (3)

Losses:
uncertain

1.4 **COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION**

No on site commemoration or interpretation relating to the battle has been identified in this review.

2 **ASSESSMENT**

2.1 **LOCATION**

The general location of the battle is well established. However within this broad area the exact location of the preliminary deployments and thus the exact position and direction of the Covenanter flanking move, the initial deployments and the attacks is not determined. Substantial differences of view are seen between secondary works, such as those by Seymour, Bennett, Warner or Reid, as to the location and orientation of the deployments. None provides a wholly satisfactory interpretation.

There are a number of potentially battle related place names present on the 1st edition 6 inch Ordnance Survey mapping: Baggage Knowe, Slaughter Howe and, Bullet Knowe, which might provide limited assistance in placing the events.

2.2 **PRIMARY SOURCES**

Kilsyth is a well documented battle, thanks particularly to the dossier prepared by Baillie as part of the inquest into the disastrous Covenanter defeat.

2.3 **SECONDARY WORKS**

The campaign is discussed by Reid 2003 which, although a largely identical text to that in Reid 2004, also includes a tabulation of the composition of the two armies and a plan showing an interpretation of the location of the main action. No single study devoted solely to the battle has been identified in the present review. The most recent examination is in Reid 2004, who exploits some of the primary sources to provide a reinterpretation of the detail of the action. However his study lacks the historic terrain reconstruction essential to resolving key issues of interpretation. There is also a substantial difference of view between the secondary sources as to the exact deployment of the forces, the viability of and reasons for Baillie’s outflanking move and indeed the sequence and nature of the whole action.
2.4 **BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY**
A traditional site of Covenanter burial lies on the western side of the battlefield but, in the absence of firm evidence of association with the battle, the attribution appears improbable as it seems to lie too far to the west.

2.5 **BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN**
The historic terrain played an important part in Montrose’s choice of battlefield, with walled fields and buildings being effectively exploited to achieve his victory. There are topographical details in the primary accounts which should enable the accurate placing of the deployments and action if a detailed reconstruction of the historic terrain can be achieved: for example the deployment of the royalists in a high meadow and the Covenanter flanking move to take the high ground on their right.

2.6 **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE**
Kilsyth was the high point of the royalist campaign in Scotland. Montrose had destroyed the last Covenanter army in Scotland and if he could now raise sufficient Lowland forces then control of Scotland for the king was a genuine possibility. However Montrose failed to capitalise effectively on this opportunity and by early September his army began to disintegrate. The defeat at Kilsyth forced the Covenanters to order detachments of the now battle hardened Scottish army in England to return home to counter Montrose. This in itself was a success, but it came far too late to rescue the king’s cause in England, because Charles’s last English field army had already been destroyed at Langport in July. Thus Kilsyth was a dramatic victory with substantial potential implications that were never realised.

2.7 **CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT**
A significant part of the battlefield, as interpreted by most authors, appears to lie beneath the Banton Loch reservoir, however Reid seems to place most of the action to the north east and east of the reservoir. Given the uncertainties about the exact location of the deployments and action it is therefore unclear how much of the battlefield has actually been lost beneath the reservoir.

The 6 inch 1st edition Ordnance Survey mapping shows coal and ironstone mines and several limestone quarries across particularly the western part of the battlefield. However without a detailed assessment of mapped and aerial data it is not possible to establish the exact extent or percentage of the area where the historic terrain or battle archaeology will have been destroyed or buried by these activities. It should be noted however that the geological mapping does not show any substantial areas of made ground which might be expected if the destruction was extensive. A small area of the battlefield has also been covered by the industrial village of Low Banton.

2.8 **CURRENT DESIGNATIONS**
On the battlefield there is one small scheduled area, an unrelated motte. There are no other designations.

2.9 **POTENTIAL**
Given the apparent quality of the documentary record, together with the importance that terrain played in the location and outcome of the action, there is a high priority for the reconstruction of the historic terrain, accompanied by a re-assessment of the battle detail
in all the primary accounts. To achieve this, in addition to any documentary evidence, it might prove necessary to include some archaeological investigation of the battlefield terrain, if relevant evidence survives. Having placed the events as accurately as possible in relation to the historic terrain, the re-interpretation should then ideally be tested by sampling any remaining battle archaeology, particularly the distribution of unstratified lead bullets.

Such work could contribute significantly to the positioning and understanding of the action. Without this it is impossible to make an informed assessment as to the survival or research potential of the battlefield, in terms of battle archaeology and battlefield terrain or indeed its interpretive potential for the public. Without such basic information neither can there be effective conservation of that part of the battlefield which does survive, as it is not known which features in the modern landscape, if any, survive from the time of the battle or which areas may contain battle archaeology.

The better understanding of the historic terrain and the way in which the action was played out within it, in this and other battles of 1644-5, would enable a far more informed assessment of Montrose’s campaign. It may help to explain his successes, despite being often outnumbered by Covenanter forces, even where the latter included regular troops under very able commanders.

2.10 THREATS
The presence of extensive non ferrous battle archaeology renders any remaining unflooded parts of the site particularly vulnerable to treasure hunting and unrecorded/poorly recorded metal detecting.

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LARGS

1 SUMMARY

1.1 CONTEXT
Despite the Scots victory at Renfrew in 1164 and several campaigns by Scottish kings to conquer the territory, the Norse had retained control of the Isles and Argyll. There they maintained their rule in a semi-autonomous fashion under the overlordship of the kings of Norway. In response to the continued pressure from the Scots, the king of Norway mounted a pre-emptive attack to secure Norse control of the territory. In July 1263 King Haco is said to have sailed from Bergen with 200 ships. In the Hebrides he was joined by the King of Man with additional forces. From there they sailed down the coast of Scotland raiding the mainland. Initial negotiations were opened but this time was used by the Scots to buy time to raise their forces. Then in a storm some of the Norse ships were beached at Largs and an armed engagement began, forcing Haco to land his main force in disadvantageous circumstances on a difficult coast. (1).

1.2 ACTION
Little is known of the detail of the action, which soon escalated into full battle, but it seems that the Norse were never able to form up fully in battle array before they were engaged. The arrival of Scottish reinforcements may finally have turned the tide of the action, forcing the Norse army to break. It is said that they were then pursued with great slaughter, with most fleeing to their boats. (1).

1.3 TROOPS
Numbers:
Scots: 1500 mounted men at arms, according to the Norse accounts, though this is dubious (1).
Norse: uncertain

Losses:
Claims of 25,000 Norse dead are spurious (1).

1.4 COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION
The monument to the battle stands on Far Bowen Craigs, overlooking the sea immediately to the south of Largs. There are also several standing stones and cairns which have, by tradition, become associated with the battle. The site of a standing stone in the southern part of Largs (4) is said to mark the spot where Haco was killed, though in the accounts he is said to have escaped the field. A cairn on The Holm, on the north...
east side of Great Cumbrae Island (2km across the sea to the west of Largs), is said to be the site of burial of other of Haco’s men, while a standing stone towards the centre of the island is said to be a memorial to the fallen Norse soldiers. (2).

2 ASSESSMENT

2.1 LOCATION
The traditional site of the battle is recorded on Armstrong’s map of Ayrshire in 1775, which shows the town of Largs wholly north of the Gogo Water and the site of the battle of Largs immediately to the south of that river. The location is repeated by the Ordnance Survey in 1857. (4). However there does not appear to be sufficient detail within the primary accounts to accurately locate the battlefield, while the potential for battle archaeology which might otherwise resolve the matter is uncertain for battlefields of this period and character of warfare.

The locational uncertainties are so great that it was not felt appropriate to attempt to define a ‘search area’ for the battle of Largs at this stage.

2.2 PRIMARY SOURCES
The primary accounts appear to provide very limited information on the action.

2.3 SECONDARY WORKS
No modern study of the battle has been identified in the research for this project.

2.4 BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY
Human remains, said to be associated with the battle, are reported in Largs on the north side of Gogo Water, though there is no confirmation of the association. (3). The site of a cairn said to have contained a coffin and sword handles is reported by the Ordnance Survey in 1857 close to the centre of the traditional site, but again no confirmation of the association with the battle has been identified (4). If the artefacts themselves or drawings of them can be traced it is conceivable that secure dating could be achieved which might determine the potential for genuine association with the battle.

2.5 BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN

2.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE
Largs was a major victory for the Scots which had great political significance. It led the defeated king of Man to swear allegiance to the king of Scotland; a punitive expedition also followed in the Hebrides, forcing their allegiance also to the Scottish king; then, three years later, the king of Norway signed a treaty relinquishing all claim over Man and the Hebrides. (1).

2.7 CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT
While the settlement of Largs in the 18th century appears to have been wholly to the north of the river, by the 1850s it had begun to expand southward across the battlefield. Today almost the whole of the plain to the south of the river is developed. There are a few small areas of undeveloped land within the area. The latter might prove of significance as it might contain some battle archaeology. However as there is no exact information as to the location and extent of the action, the present location apparently
resting largely on tradition, there is some uncertainty as to whether any part of the actual battlefield might survive undeveloped.

2.8 CURRENT DESIGNATIONS

The battle monument is listed. There are also several listed buildings within the urban area. A scheduled cairn lies on the eastern side of the battlefield and the designed landscape of Kelburn Castle lies to the south.

Martin defines a tiny area of land for conservation. This represents the largest piece of open ground at the centre of the traditional site of the battle, but if there are any potentials for conservation of the site then assessment should also be undertaken of the other areas of open ground closer to the beach.

2.9 POTENTIAL

The location and extent of the battlefield are not securely established. It is possible that a detailed study of the primary accounts and reconstruction of the historic terrain might enable some improvement in understanding, though given the early date of the battle this may not be practicable, other than for any crude geological changes to the extent of land on the seaward side and identification of previous presence of marsh or of burial such as by colluvium/alluvium.

Despite the great national significance of the battle, given the difficulties of recovering battle archaeology from medieval actions and the state of the development of the traditional site, there would not seem to be a high priority for such investigation compared to that seen on some other potentially better preserved and located battlefields of the medieval period. In particular it is unclear what role, if any, archery played in the battle but, even if arrows were deposited, there is a high probability that any unstratified ferrous items like this will have decayed over the almost 750 years since the action, unless exceptional preservation conditions can be demonstrated (e.g. soil pH, land use, alluvial or colluvial burial). Other non-ferrous artefacts may however have been deposited during the hand to hand fighting and be recoverable, but no intensive survey has yet been undertaken on a securely located site of such an early date to demonstrate such survival. Mass graves may also exist but they are most likely to have already been identified in the 19th and 20th century development of the area. Further such discoveries are unlikely, although watching briefs on any substantial developments/redevelopments in the area might be justified. Any development in close proximity to the reported burial sites, unless those sites can be shown to be unassociated with the battle, should be a priority, as locating a securely associated mass grave with clear trauma, as at Towton, would be of high archaeological importance both in its own right but also for the locating of the battlefield. Any development threats that arise on the few small areas of land not previously developed within the traditional site of the battle should probably be subject to archaeological survey, including intensive metal detecting, prior to and during development. It would be appropriate to review the priorities regarding this battle once at least one better preserved battlefield from the 11th – 14th centuries has been surveyed and the nature of the battle archaeology is determined.

2.10 THREATS

Given the intensively developed character of the site the threats are likely to be very few, restricted to redevelopment of the known burial sites, major redevelopment
schemes, and any encroachment upon the undeveloped fragments of the traditional battlefield site.

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**Philiphaugh**

1 SUMMAR

1.1 CONTEXT

After the success of Kilsyth, Montrose intended to recruit his army before attempting to complete his military control in Scotland. But his Highland troops were disaffected when their plundering of Glasgow was heavily punished and within a few days many had deserted. Aboyne also left with most of the cavalry when Montrose appointed the Earl of Crawford as commander of the horse, while some 800 were sent north to protect their lands, reducing the army to little more than the 500 Irish troops and a few cavalry. Marching east through the Lowlands he was unable to raise significant numbers of new recruits. Not only was much of the area strongly Covenanter, the Highland and Irish troops may also have been unwelcome in the region because of the long trail of plundering and disorder that they had wreaked across Scotland over the preceding year, at places as far apart as Glasgow and Aberdeen.

Montrose marched into the Borders to disrupt the mustering of the Covenanter levies and then, turning south from Kelso to Jedburgh and then west to Selkirk, he camped on the 12th September at Philiphaugh. However he suffered from poor intelligence from his scouts, for he was unaware that, on the 6th September, Sir David Leslie had marched north from England with a large army. On the 11th Leslie had rendezvoused with Lothian forces at Gladsmuir (west of Haddington), and then again unbeknown to Montrose, marched south, approaching Selkirk on the night of the 12th (1) (6) (2).

1.2 ACTION

In the night Leslie sent out parties to fall onto the royalist quarters, with the main skirmish said to have been at Sunderland. Though several royalists escaped to Selkirk, their report of Leslie’s army being at hand was foolishly dismissed (14). Leslie’s forces spent the night in a wooded valley, suggested by the Philiphaugh Ballad as in the area of Linglie Burn or perhaps further north east towards Minglie Hill (18) (16). In the morning when the royalist scouts were sent out they failed to locate the Covenanter army. Early morning mist may provide a partial justification, but this was another fundamental failing on the royalist side. Another serious tactical mistake by Montrose was that while the infantry were at Philiphaugh, he and many of his officers and some cavalry were quartered across the river in Selkirk that night. Thus the officers were more than a kilometre away across the river, and many failed to get to their units before the action began. According to local tradition, recorded in a house name in the late 19th century, Montrose himself stayed in a house close to the West Port of Selkirk (2).

In the morning, shrouded in mist, the Covenanter forces advanced. The alarm was not raised until they were within half a mile of the rebel army. Montrose rushed to his army from Selkirk but when he arrived he found his forces at the rendezvous point in disorder and, in the absence of many officers, had difficulty deploying all his forces effectively.
Indeed, many of the royalist cavalry never came into the action, with perhaps as few as 80 troopers being initially deployed on the right wing, while only about 500 foot were deployed in the hedged enclosures (15). But Montrose had at least deployed in a very advantageous position: ‘on one hand an unpassable ditch, and on the other Dikes and Hedges, and where these were not strong enough, they further fortified them by casting up ditches, and lined their Hedges with Musketeers.’ (6). Reid, quoting Wishart and Gordon, suggests that there were just 200 Irish foot and 100 cavalry (14).

Reid claims that the Ballad, which is followed by Robson and several other secondary works, is wrong in suggesting a detachment of Leslie’s army marched around to the north to attack from the hills. Instead, quoting Wishart, he indicates that the outflanking move was across the river to the south. The Covenanter forces advancing directly across the haugh, charged Montrose’s right wing and were twice repulsed. Royalist musketeers inexplicably advanced from the enclosures but were driven back. Then a rebel cavalry counter-attack broke through but, having crossed the ditch, they had to continue on away from the field northward, unable to play a further part in the action. Still unable to break the royalist horse, Leslie himself led forward an attack on the left flank of the royal forces and broke their foot. In the meantime the party of some 2000 Covenanter horse sent across the river had outflanked Montrose and, crossing back, attacked the flank and rear of the rebel horse. Assailed on all sides, and galled by musket fire from a distance, the horse now retreated and fled. The foot however could not withdraw, presumably because they dare not abandon the security of the enclosures for the open ground to the west, and so some of them stood and fought a little longer, but finally surrendered (15) (4).

The initial deployment and action began around 10:00 and took up to an hour, while the main action lasted another 1 hour (15). Though Reid remarks upon the length of the action, suggesting that it unusual given the disparity of numbers and may suggest that other battles were somewhat longer than has previously been believed. However it must be remembered that this action was largely one of a cavalry assault against infantry that were securely deployed in enclosures. This meant that the cavalry were at a severe disadvantage and may well explain why the action lasted far longer than the disparity of numbers would lead one to suspect.

Though some accounts suggest less than 20 foot and about 200 royalist horse escaped, others indicate that perhaps as many as 250 later rejoined Montrose at Peebles that night (15). But, though Montrose and some of his foot and horse had escaped, his army was effectively destroyed, with most of the Irish troops either killed in the action or executed after they surrendered, together with some of the camp followers. (3) (6) (13).

Figure 26: Philiphaugh (1645) - battlefield plan

1.3 TROOPS
Montrose had perhaps 1500 infantry and a few cavalry but, faced by a cavalry attack by at least five regiments, consisting of some 4000 troops. The Covenanter force not only outnumbered the royalists, but it comprised a large proportion of seasoned troops. Like their highly experienced and capable commander, David Leslie, many had seen service in the war in England and had probably fought in several major actions, most notably
Marston Moor. There is unusually detailed and accurate information on the Covenanter regiments present and their strengths, thanks to detailed pay records (14).

**Numbers:**

*Royalist:* 2000 foot, 800-1000 horse (3); 500 Irish foot, 1120 horse (14).
*Covenanter:* 4500 horse and some dragoons (1); 5000-6000 (2); 700 foot, 400 dragoons, 2940 horse in 6 regiments (14).

**Losses:**

*Royalist:* 1400 foot, some of which were captured but most killed (5); perhaps 250 foot and just a few horse killed (14)
*Covenanter:* only 15 common soldiers and 1 captain killed (6)

### 1.4 COMMENORATION & INTERPRETATION

There is a monument commemorating the Covenanters who fought at Philiphaugh. It is a stone-cobbled cairn which is about 20 foot high and 18 yards around the base (16). It stands close to Harehead Wood (NT 4399 2779), on an earthwork which some have associated with the battle. Associated with it are two 13th century moulded bases, parts of a 17th century tombstone, and an armorial panel bearing the arms of Sir John Murray, who erected the monument in 1848 (11) (7) (8). An illustration and transcript of the inscription is given by Robson (2).

### 2 ASSESSMENT

#### 2.1 LOCATION

Various sources indicate that the battle was fought in Tividale (3) at Philiphaugh (1). The ballad suggests that Leslie’s forces approached the battlefield along the Tweed valley and then south-west up the Etterick, crossing Linglie Burn (16). This implies a Covenanter approach along the north side of the Etterick and an attack from the north east.

In 1897 Robson suggests that the action took place in the area of Lauriston Villa and the Cricket Field (345850 628310). He also locates action in the area of the Covenanter memorial, which had been erected in 1848, presumably in the belief that this marked the main area of the action and the earthwork part of the defence thrown up by the royalists. Craig-Brown also identifies Leslie Cottage, near Beechwood and Thirladean (344630 627840) as lying within the action (2). Such interpretations may derive from the ballad of Philiphaugh which says that the battle began at Philiphaugh but ended at Harehead Wood, 2km to the west (16).

The presence of enclosures on Roy’s map of the mid 18th century gives an approximate location for the action, which accords well with the traditional location for the battle recorded on Mitchell’s map of Selkirkshire in 1851. The last stand of the Irish is said in some secondary accounts to have been at Philiphaugh Farm, though this is not in the primary accounts consulted, while the camp followers (in some secondary accounts the Irish soldiers) are said to have been marched to Newark Castle and dispatched in the adjacent Slain Mens Lea. The latter are however some 3km to the north west along the Yarrow valley from Philiphaugh and, unless there was a long rout and pursuit to this
location, or it was the site of the royalist camp or baggage train, it seems too great a long distance from the main action.

Though the general area of the principal deployments seem clear from the enclosures on the Roy map, the detail of the deployments is far from certain. Reid suggests the Irish foot were deployed facing northward but with the flank of the army on the Philhope Burn, and the cavalry covering the right flank between the river and the enclosures. It is difficult to match such a disposition within the detail of topography indicated by Roy (14). What is clear is that the royalist foot were deployed in the centre in enclosures, that the cavalry were all on the right wing adjacent to the river and that there was no cavalry on the royalist left wing. There appear two possible orientations for these deployments, one with the royalist forces facing north, the other with them facing east. The latter seems more likely as it is easier to relate to the terrain from Roy, while it also makes more sensible the traditions of action, presumably the rout and pursuit, extending westward into the valley of the Yarrow to Harehead Wood and beyond to Newark Castle.

2.2 PRIMARY SOURCES
There are a good series of primary accounts of the battle, representing both sides of the conflict, and providing significant topographical detail. Of these, Campbell provides only a list of prisoners taken. Wishart is reprinted in Robson. Wishart was Montrose’s chaplain and was present at the battle and this is likely to be a reliable witness on many details (14). The official Covenanter report, the so called Haddington report, is reprinted in Elliot and, together with Thompson, is also available online from Early English Books Online. Gordon (sometimes described as Ruthven) provides another detailed account of the action (not consulted here). The Ballad of Philiphaugh is used by various authors to provide detail that is missing from the other accounts, but it must be treated with care as it must have been compiled long after 1650, and grossly distorts the troop numbers while various other details such as the references to Dunbar and Solway Moss are clearly in error (16).

2.3 SECONDARY WORKS
According to Reid, the best secondary account is by Elliot, but by far the most useful and detailed modern account of the battle is that by Reid himself. He also provides a discussion of the preceding and succeeding events of the campaign (14). Robson’s work is largely un referenced but he does provide some significant supporting notes. The accounts by Seymour, Kinross and Warner are of little value, the latter being the only secondary work to provide a plan of the battle, but a plan which shows Leslie attacking form the south west not the north or north east, which seems to be the broad consensus of other authors. None of the more extensive and detailed battle accounts hazard a plan of the battle.

2.4 BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY
None of the archaeological finds that have been associated with the battle can be securely related to the battle. Firstly there are the human remains recorded in 1810, when a school was being built at Slain Mens Lea (NT 424 288), said to be the remains of some of Montrose's army who fought at Philiphaugh (1) (11). Then there is the low linear earthwork recorded within Philiphaugh park on the Ordnance survey map of 1863.
(at NT 4399 2776 - NT 4399 2782), consisting of a bank about 20ft wide with a ditch of similar width along its W side, running from the bank of the Yarrow northward across the valley bottom. It has been identified by some as the earthwork thrown up by the royalists prior to the battle. Robson states it was more extensive but many years before 1897 having been largely levelled by ploughing [grammar?] (2) (12). The identification seem unlikely, not only because it is more than 1km from the Philiphaugh enclosures, but also because the earthwork formerly extended on the other side of the Yarrow (12).

Several years before 1897 ‘in a hollow piece of ground near Harehead Wood, in ‘Leslie’s Field’, ‘a quantity of silver plate’ was found. Robson associates this with the battle (2, 112). Silver coins of the period were also reported as having been found in the 19th century on a haugh of the Tinnis (Tinnis Farm lies upstream along the Yarrow) and given to Sir Walter Scott. More likely to be associated with the battle may be other finds of contemporary silver coins in the general area of the battlefield (2). A flintlock gun, also said to be associated with the battle, was in 1897 in Philiphaugh House (2, 112), but today artefacts from the battlefield are in Haliwell House Museum, Selkirk (17).

2.5 **BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN**

Philiphaugh is a farm or hamlet that lies on the north-west side of the River Ettrick, 1.5km across the river from the town of Selkirk, where a bridge took the Selkirk to Edinburgh road across the river. It lies on a narrow plain between the river and the hills to the north, extending about 3km from the confluence with the Yarrow stream on the south west to what was in the mid 18th century the site of the bridge, 1km to the north east of the present bridge, where the Linglie hills extend right up to the river. In the 18th century the main road from Edinburgh and the north approached along the Tweed valley and then, from Sunderland, along the Etterick, crossing the river into Selkirk downstream of the present bridge (13).

In the mid 18th century Roy shows a very narrow, fragmentary stretch of meadow beside the river. At that time most of the plain was unenclosed field land, with open and apparently uncultivated ground on the slopes and hills to the north. In just one location, round an isolated farm immediately south west of Philiphaugh Farm, there was a significant area of enclosed fields. These stretched almost the whole way across the plain from meadow on the south to the lower slopes of the hills to the north (7). There were no other enclosed fields in the surrounding area at that time and thus probably also in 1645, hence these enclosures would seem to accord with the hedges used by the royalists for their principal deployment.

On the battlefield map presented here the enclosures from Roy have been crudely plotted, but far more accurate mapping is required to securely place these enclosures, which are critical to the accurate placing of the battle.

2.6 **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE**

There is some argument as to whether the defeat at Philiphaugh did succeed in completely destroying Montrose’s army. However, even if he did manage to salvage the core of an army about which he could potential recruit a new force, the defeat had shattered his aura of invincibility. This was perhaps more than anything else the most important outcome of the battle. After Philiphaugh he found it impossible to build
another army capable of challenging the Covenanters in open battle; all he could do was to maintain a guerrilla war through the winter. Hence Philiphaugh was thus the decisive battle of the Civil War in Scotland, and marked the end of the end of any slight chance that Charles I still had, in the autumn of 1645, of salvaging something by force of arms in the Civil War anywhere in his three kingdoms.

2.7 CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT
There has been piecemeal development across the battlefield since the end of the 19th century, but the vast majority of the land still remains undeveloped, with intensive development restricted to the north east side of the A707, beside the bridge. It appears likely that the latter has only affected the area of Leslie’s advance, in battle array, rather than any part of the action, though this needs confirmation. A late 18th or 19th century realignment of the mill leat, the modern fish farm and earthmoving associated with the construction of the sports ground have also caused damage, while Martin reports rubble being dumped on a field behind the site of the mill (17). Depending on the exact location of the enclosures depicted by Roy, and the exact position of deployments, it may be that the leat, fish farm and houses have caused substantial if restricted damage in a critical area of the battlefield, where the cavalry action was focussed, but this cannot be confirmed at present.

2.8 CURRENT DESIGNATIONS
The earthwork bank and ditch adjacent to the Covenanter monument is scheduled but, despite various claims to the contrary, it seems unlikely that it is in any way related to the battle. The Covenanter monument is listed, as is an adjacent fragment of a late 18th century bridge and the sawmill on the western part of the battlefield, but all these post date the battle. Newark Castle, which by tradition is associated with the battle, is both scheduled and listed and is the one building which pre-dates the battle. Bowhill, on the west side of the Yarrow and thus beyond the battlefield, is included on the Inventory of historic gardens and designed landscapes, but Philiphaugh Park, which encompasses part of the battlefield, is not on the Inventory. The River Etterick itself, which forms the southern boundary of the battlefield, is an SSSI, but although downstream small areas of floodplain are also included, none of the adjacent land is included in the designation in the area of the battlefield.

2.9 POTENTIAL
The crude analysis of the historic terrain presented here suggests that it should be possible to accurately locate the principal deployments and the action. Of particular importance for this is the terrain evidence from Roy.

The interpretation could then be tested with survey of the battle archaeology, for there is a high potential for the survival of good battle archaeology, particularly in terms of unstratified bullet distributions, as long as there has not been intensive, unsystematic and unrecorded metal detecting across the area. The cavalry action may be expected to be represented by a concentration of pistol and carbine bullets, while the infantry versus dragoon/infantry should be marked by mainly musket bullets, or a mixture of all types where cavalry were also involved in the assaults on the enclosures, as in Leslie’s flanking attack. The pattern, when taken with a detailed reconstruction of the terrain should enable resolution of the conflict between the secondary interpretations as to the
orientation of the deployments and direction of the attacks. An intensive survey of the battle archaeology should make it possible to establish the degree to which, if at all, the later action extended westward from Philiphaugh towards Slain Mens Lea (near Newark Castle), where human remains have been found, suggested as related to the execution of the routed royalist infantry or of camp followers.

Since the mid 18th century a substantial area has been emparked in a newly created landscape park around the newly constructed Philiphaugh House. This involved extensive planting of trees in an area where no woodland previously existed. Some if not all of the mid 18th century enclosures have been removed or replanned, and the major (and possibly the minor) road system has been realigned, most notably with the moving of the bridge over the Etterick. The course of the river itself seems to have been significantly altered, as have the mill leats. This all makes very difficult the accurate location let alone accurate mapping of the enclosures shown by Roy. However, given that these and the associated stream and river courses are critical to the accurate location of the principal deployments and main action, they require accurate reconstruction through detailed historic map regression, complemented with existing evidence from landscape archaeology, including use of early vertical aerial photography and field inspection. This would also enable any features, particularly the critical hedgerows, that survive from 1645, to be identified and included in a conservation strategy for the battlefield.

2.10 **THREATS**
No major threats have been identified, but there is the potential for development and other land use change in and around the various existing 20th century building and other facilities, such as cricket field and fish farm, scattered across particularly the south eastern part of the battlefield.

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**PINKIE**

1  **SUMMARY**

1.1  **CONTEXT**
Attempts by the English to link the two kingdoms, of England and Scotland, through the marriage of the young queen Mary of Scotland and prince Edward (later Edward VI) of England collapsed into open conflict in 1544-5. This was halted by the treaty of 1546, but the Duke of Somerset, now effectively ruling England during the minority of Edward VI, simply used the cessation to prepare for war. This time he planned a major land campaign to secure territory, not simply a major raid for these had always previously failed to achieve any long term success for either side. When the last two English strongholds north of the border were reduced by French naval intervention, Somerset’s plans were not disturbed. The army was mustered at Berwick and from there, in early September, it crossed the border, marching north on the main east coast route, supported and supplied by the English fleet. At the same time, as a diversionary tactic, a smaller force of about 2500 had been assembled at Carlisle, feigning a major west coast invasion. In response the Earl of Arran mustered northern Scottish forces at Edinburgh and the troops from the south at Falla, about 15 miles to the south east of the capital. From there he could respond to either a cross country or a coastal advance by the English army. Once aware of the English route, Arran marched north to block their approach at the crossing of the Esk near the coast at Musselburgh. The Scottish horse skirmished with Somerset’s army as they advanced past Dunbar then, riding along the hills to the south, they flanked his advance.(6)

1.2  **ACTION**
The Scottish camp was established on the west side of the river Esk, controlling the bridge by which the coast road to Edinburgh crossed the Esk, immediately west of Musselburgh. A turf defence was constructed to protect the camp from artillery fire from the English fleet, which sat immediately off the coast in support of Somerset’s army. The right, southern flank of the camp was protected by marshland with the river Esk itself to the east. On the 9th September the English approached from the east and camped at Prestonpans. A detachment of cavalry were sent out to dislodge the Scottish horse from Falside Hill to the south west, which overlooked the coastal plain at Musselburgh. The Scots were driven off and, in a pursuit for several miles, up to 800 were taken. This severely weakened a Scottish army already short of cavalry, whereas the English lost as few as 100. Now, with control of Falside Hill, Somerset had a commanding view of the whole Scottish position and potential battlefield.

The hill upon which Inveresk church lay, close to the river, provided an ideal artillery position for Somerset to bombard the Scottish camp. But as the English forces advanced the Scots countered by crossing the Esk. Caldwell has their main battle crossing south of Inveresk with other troops using the bridge on the main road to the north. Scottish artillery were mounted by the church to command the battlefield and the three Scottish
battles deployed side by side to the south east, though they were severely weakened in cavalry which should ideally have supported both wings.

The three English battles advanced with archers on the left and hagbutters on the right of each. (The hagbut was a type of arquebus, a precursor of the musket). The baggage train was taken around to the south to the safety of Falside Hill and a large detachment of cavalry sent forward to delay the Scottish advance while the rest of the army deployed. It is suggested that the English forces may not have had time to fully deploy their three battles in battle array before the armies engaged, but this was not to affect the outcome.

As the main action began, the English cavalry attack was driven off by the Scottish pike formations, tending to contradict Caldwell’s assessment that the Scots were ineffective in their use of pike because they were not a well trained professional army. At the same time the ordnance with both armies began an artillery exchange. In response the English artillery not deployed within the battle array were attacked by a detachment of the few remaining Scottish cavalry, but successfully drove them off. Then, as the Scottish battle array advanced to within bowshot, they were met by artillery fire from pieces deployed within the main battle and by small arms fire from a forlorn hope. This forlorn hope comprised the professional hagbutters, who had been deployed forward of the three English battles. Under this fire, and before the two sides came to hand to hand fighting, most of the Scottish formations appear to have disintegrated. Though some troops may have retained their battle array and made a fighting retreat, the majority fled back towards Dalkeith, to the south west, with the English in pursuit. The Scottish army was severely mauled in the pursuit and ‘execution’.

Figure 27: Pinkie (1547) - battlefield plan

Figure 28: Pinkie geology

Figure 29: Pinkie threats

1.3 TROOPS

The English infantry were equipped with bills and pikes, the latter now probably dominant in the English army; the shot was probably mainly longbows but with a significant number of infantry carrying firearms (‘hagbutts’), the latter possibly mainly foreign mercenaries. The cavalry would have been mainly armed with lance and sword. The Scottish infantry was equipped with pikes, supported by a few thousand archers but with few if any troops with firearms. Both armies were organised in the standard three ‘battles’. Caldwell gives a detailed discussion of the army composition and troop numbers. (6) 

Numbers:
(Unless otherwise specified the numbers are from Caldwell).

English: 15,000 – 19,000. Patten states 18,200 troops.
Cavalry: 2000 light horse; 3000 men at arms; 200 Spanish mounted ‘hagbutters’
Infantry: 11,000 English; 600 mercenary ‘hagbutters’; 1400 pioneers
Artillery: 15 field pieces

Scots: probably circa 22-23,000 (according to Huntley, a Scottish commander); Patten claims 31,500;
Infantry: including 4000 highland archers
Cavalry: possibly 1500 light horse
Artillery: 25-30 field pieces

Losses:
Scottish: Claims of up to 15,000 Scots killed seem (5). Huntley’s figure of 6,000 is more reasonable but still high. 500-2000 captured.
English: possibly 500-600.

1.4 COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION
No on site commemoration or interpretation relating to the battle has been identified in this review

2 ASSESSMENT

2.1 LOCATION
There is reasonable consistency between secondary sources in the general location of the initial deployments and of the action but there significant uncertainty about the exact placing of events. Caldwell shows the main action south east of Howe Mire but the frontages are far too small, compared to other secondary studies while this location does not accord with the discovery of apparent battle archaeology to the east of the former mire. Thus considerable uncertainties remain as to exactly where on the plain to the south of Musselburgh each particular element of the action took place.

The battlefield can be crudely defined with a secure boundary of the Esk on the west, to the south east Falside Hill provides a boundary, while Musselburgh gives a northern boundary. However here we have defined a wider search area for landscape reconstruction.

In the light of the development threats it should be noted that, as with the plans accompanying all the level I reports, the deployments shown on the battle plan accompanying this report are only intended to be broadly indicative. They should not be taken as an attempt to accurately locate deployments and action which requires detailed analysis of historic terrain and primary sources.

2.2 PRIMARY SOURCES
A number of primary accounts are listed by Phillips, while Caldwell provides an excellent brief assessment of, and references to, the sources. Of these Patten’s account of 1548, written by someone present with the English army, is the most comprehensive; another by Berteville who was also present with the army; one by an unnamed Englishman probably present is preserved in the British Library; a French report in
Latin written after 1549 draws heavily upon Patten. There are also several lesser reports, including one of importance because it draws upon the views of the Scottish commander. There are also assessments by various 16th century historians.

The surviving contemporary sequence of battle prospects are probably the earliest surviving detailed battle ‘plans’ from Britain. The main set is in the Bodleian Library, first reported upon by Oman. One of these five phase plans is reproduced in (4) and phase four of the sequence in (6). These drawings are the source of a probable 16th century print in the National Army Museum, published in (9). Another copy of the latter may be that in the British Library, which their catalogue dates to very soon after the battle. A third plan is that from Patten’s report, also reproduced in (6). There are only a handful of British battles with similar detail of deployment and action in graphic form, all for later battles. Pinkie is very unusual in having three separate versions, two of them apparently quite independent.

2.3 SECONDARY WORKS
According to Caldwell the best earlier accounts are by Sir Charles Oman, Sir James Fergusson and W.K. Jordan. The two short modern studies of the battle by Phillips and by Caldwell have superseded these. The latter is one of the best short discussions of any Scottish battle, well referenced and making extensive use of primary sources. It is the essential starting point for any study of the battle. A detailed interpretation of the action is also provided by Caldwell in the form of ‘block’ plans, based especially on the contemporary graphic representations. He also places the events closely within the landscape, though far more supporting evidence is needed for this, while the battle formations shown seem far too small for the numbers of troops engaged, so further weakening the analysis. Indeed, the fact that most of the Scottish troops are said to have fled towards Dalkieith might indicate that his depiction of the alignments of the battle arrays when engaged is not correct. Phillips also provides a coherent account, referencing primary sources, though he locates action onto Falside Hill in later stages of the battle. However he provides no terrain context mapping or reconstruction and does not present copies of the primary sources (5).

2.4 BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY
A mid 19th century record by the Ordnance Survey locates burial and weaponry finds, comprising large quantities of human bones, pieces of spears, swords, horse-shoes and officers' epaulettes, said to have been found on the eastern side of Howe Mire (7).

2.5 BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN
The marsh identified on Patten’s plan, though initially appearing to lie towards Dalkeith, in reality must lie immediately to the west of Inveresk church on the west side of the Esk, for it also lies fairly close to the Scottish camp on the plan. It seems to be identifiable from an extensive area of alluvium adjacent to the river on Shire Haugh on the BGS mapping. There is no other similar expanse of alluvium upstream towards Dalkieith. Patten also shows the bridge over the Esk, westward of Musselburgh town. A marsh in the centre of the plain to the south of Musselburgh can be identified from another isolated expanse of alluvium, in the area named as Howe Mire on modern OS Explorer mapping. The latter may prove to have been a significant feature in the battlefield terrain but comprehensive reconstruction of the historic terrain is required to enable effective analysis. Other man made topographical features recorded in the
accounts have not been securely located, though Caldwell does suggest the location of both the ditch and the lane, though without providing detailed justification.

2.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE
Pinkie was the last great battle between the two kingdoms before they became united under the rule of a single monarch. It was a dramatic Scottish defeat but instead of leading to English domination of the military and political situation it resulted in a strengthening of the Franco-Scottish alliance. Somerset failed to capitalise immediately upon the destruction of much of the Scottish army, and failed to reduce the major Scottish garrisons or establish the major forts that he needed to secure the border territories. On the contrary, the defeat led to queen Mary’s departure for France and her marriage to the Dauphin to secure the French Alliance, which resulted, in the summer of the following year, in the arrival of a French army. That combined with the pressure of a French assault on Bolougne led the English to finally withdraw and to settle in a treaty of 1550. Thus the battle had long term political significance, but contrary to the successes on the field.

This is likely to have been one of the largest battles fought on Scottish soil, with at least 40,000 troops involved. It is also particularly noteworthy in representing the first effective integrated application in Britain of the key military innovations of the 16th century: the combined use of pike and shot, together with artillery and cavalry. Battlefields of this key transitional period in military practice are very rare in Britain.

2.7 CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT
On the northern part of the area there is substantial development, as well as a former colliery site that has now been redeveloped extending south from Musselburgh and encompassing Inveresk. On the north east development is also extending from Pinkie Brae and Wallyford. However the majority of the core of the battlefield and all of the area to the south west, remains as fields. Although this is traversed by the mainline railway, has a sewage works on it, and the southern part of the area is cut through by the A1 bypass, there is still enormous potential in the site as the latter disturbances are relatively restricted in extent.

2.8 CURRENT DESIGNATIONS
The undeveloped land on the western part of the area, around Inveresk Church and along the east bank of the Esk, are partly scheduled and partly within a Conservation Area. The National Trust for Scotland also own a small area of gardens (open to the public) within Inveresk. The southern edge of the battlefield is partly encompassed within the designed landscape of Carberry, as is the area to the south west, associated with Dalkeith House, though that may not have seen any significant action. Another designed landscape lies on the northern side around Pinkie House, now encompassed by the built up area of Musselburgh. A smaller scheduled area lies on Falside Hill. There is also an extensive area of SSSI on the coast but this was all below high watermark and thus presumably well outside the battlefield.

2.9 POTENTIAL
Pinkie battlefield offers exceptional potential because of the rarity of battlefield of this period in the UK. It has enormous potential to contribute to battlefield studies generally, despite the limited damage caused by development of various kinds.
There is the opportunity to recovery evidence of artillery fire, particularly if case shot comprising lead or iron bullets or fragments was in use in the close quarter action. There is also the potential for intense fire-fight bullet evidence from the well documented use of ‘hagbutts’. If the soil conditions (soil pH) and land use history are not so aggressive as to have destroyed the iron artefacts, this site may allow us to better understand how well iron arrows survive compared to bullets and how well they represent the nature and location of the action compared to the evidence provided by lead bullets. This could be exceptionally important in terms of the study of battle archaeology. Because Pinkie is one of the few battles in the UK where the two were in extensive use together, thus it may provide a way of ‘calibrating’ the evidence of archery found on earlier battlefields in England.

A detailed study of the battle is clearly needed if the excellent topographical detail in the accounts and illustrations are to be effectively exploited to place the action securely in the landscape. With this there is an exceptional potential for accurate reconstruction of the events in an integration of primary battle history, battle archaeology and battlefield terrain. The battle archaeology that is revealed, if an intensive survey is successful, would be particularly important given the exceptional documentation for the battle as it ought to be possible to correlate the shot-fall in particular with particular formations and elements of the action. Few other sites in the UK offer such a good opportunity for the investigation of battle archaeology and its relationship to the documentary record.

The other exceptional potential that needs to be tested on this battlefield is the possibility of exceptional protection of battle archaeology in the former Howe Mire. Whether in the form of waterlogged deposits or as a burial of a battlefield surface beneath later alluviation or colluviation, there could be unusual preservation. If the latter then it may not be immediately revealed by metal detecting survey and might only be revealed by the disappearance of an adjacent scatter or artefacts when it reaches the alluvial area.

The investigation of the battlefield is clearly urgently required to confirm its potential and to ensure that sufficient accurate information is available to enable the conservation and, where necessary, intensive recording of the battle archaeology and terrain archaeology before it is destroyed by any further development. Such a study requires:

- High quality copies of all the graphic representations of the battle to be made easily accessible as they are an essential resource yet are only generally reproduced in part and at small size.
- All primary sources brought together and a commentary provided to each.
- Detailed historic terrain reconstruction to current best practice
- Mapping of the deployments and action, based on the exceptional sequence of contemporary plans and the written accounts, in relation to that terrain;
- The battle archaeology should be sampled using a systematic methodology that draws upon the lessons of ongoing work at Edgehill, on smaller scale investigations elsewhere in the UK and on battlefield surveys in the USA and elsewhere. As part of any study of the battlefield an early element of the archaeological study should be an assessment as to what metal detecting has already been undertaken in the area and an attempt made to collaborate with
metal detectorists who have worked on the site, if any, to recover as complete a picture as possible of the distribution of the finds.

### 2.10 THREATS

Given the importance of firearms and artillery in this action, and hence the potential for large quantities of bullets deposited on the field, there is a high potential for severe damage to the battle archaeology by treasure hunting or other unrecorded metal detecting.

Of even greater concern, a substantial part of the undeveloped land on the battlefield is under major threat from development from surrounding built up areas in Wallyford, Pinkie Brae and Inveresk. There are active planning applications for large blocks of land within the heart of the potential battlefield. Some areas already have consent and development has started on a small scale. A significant area will have been developed by the end of 2005. Whether it be small scale, piecemeal development or large scale development, it will have a dramatic impact on the battlefield. Any development proposal on the potential battlefield, if not to be immediately refused, should be evaluated. It is of great concern that evaluation has already been conducted on the major block of land at the Barbachlaw Farm site and has failed to find any battle archaeology. It is highly likely that this failure to recover evidence of the battle is a result of the difficulties of battle archaeology rather than the absence of evidence. It is essential that as a matter of urgency the full report of the evaluation be assessed to consider its adequacy in terms of battlefield study. This is not a criticism of the organisation undertaking the work or the curator, but rather a reflection of the failure to date to adequately develop and disseminate the techniques of battle archaeology to the profession. It must also be recognised that because of the nature of battle archaeology, any evaluation of battle archaeology can only be truly effective if conducted with the context of a more extensive study of the whole battlefield, and is carried out to the highest modern standards of battlefield studies.

There is clearly urgent need for detailed support to the planning archaeologist to secure the protection of this battlefield. If requests for refusal of development proposals fail, even if the initial archaeological work may have revealed no battle archaeology, then it is essential that detailed recording requirements are imposed. These are needed to ensure that the battle archaeology, both the unstratified and any potentially stratified evidence, is recorded to the very best modern practice before destruction, or where it is absent then the genuine absence of evidence is securely demonstrated to ensure no doubts in the future. Any such work on the battlefield must be recognised as likely to need to push the boundaries of battlefield study and to be conducted with the highest level of battlefield expertise.

**If one takes the combined importance, potential and level of threat to this site it seems likely that Pinkie is the battlefield in Scotland with the greatest need of urgent action on a large scale.**

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(2) Bodleian Library:

Set of 5 manuscript plans of battle phases.

(3) National Army Museum:

Print, probably same as (1) above

(4) Published source:

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4.2 SECONDARY SOURCES

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**PRESTONPANS**

1 **SUMMARY**

1.1 **CONTEXT**

The last Jacobite rising was initially intended to support a French led invasion of Britain in 1744, which it was hoped would lead English Jacobites to rise up in support, but this invasion was aborted. Finally, on the 25th July 1745, Charles Edward Stuart, the Young Pretender, landed in Scotland to launch a Jacobite rebellion which proved to be wholly based in Scotland. As with many earlier campaigns fought in Scotland, the rising was able to exploit the weakness caused by the British (and in earlier centuries English) government army being stretched by a continental war with France; in this case the action was part of the War of the Austrian Succession. Mainly Highland forces were raised under the Jacobite colours and this army marched south to occupy Edinburgh. The government army in Scotland, under Sir John Cope, comprised just 3000 men. Having failed to intercept the Jacobites in their march south, Cope transported his troops south by sea from Aberdeen to Dunbar. Edinburgh fell to the Jacobites, without any fighting, and they then marched eastward along the coast to confront Cope.

1.2 **ACTION**

Cope’s army landed at Dunbar on 17th & 18th September, then marched on the 19th to camp west of Haddington. On the 20th, on news of Jacobite army approach from the west, they marched to counter them, deploying in a cornfield immediately west of Seton, thus controlling the main coastal route running east from Edinburgh. Rather than attempt a frontal assault on such a well deployed enemy, the Jacobites marched around southward. They thus advanced to deploy on a hill to the west of Tranent. This forced the government army to redeploy, closer to Preston and facing south(1). But the Jacobites found a marsh (Tranent meadow) lay between the two armies, thus engaging would have been difficult if not impossible (2). A Jacobite detachment marched to the west and deployed beside Tranent church. Cope responded with redeployment and fired several roundshot at them. The Jacobites then sent detachments to secure their route of retreat westward and to cut Cope’s route eastward.

To force the battle on their terms, early on the morning of the 21st September, the Jacobites descended the hill and marched east and then north, negotiating the marsh. They appeared in three columns immediately to the west of Seton at about 5.00am and deployed in two lines. But Cope had already been warned of the advance by his scouts. Cope deployed once more to counter them, leaving his army facing eastward. But in the early morning mist the Jacobites deployed too far to the north and also left a wide gap in their frontage (6) which also resulted in both armies outflanking the left of the other(1).

The government artillery pieces each had time to fire just one round, against the left of the Jacobite deployment. The government right attempted an attack on the left flank of the Jacobites but were repulsed and carried with them the artillermen in their flight (2). Indeed significant numbers of the largely untested government troops on both flanks
broke and fled, even before they came to hand to hand fighting, and in so doing they disordered some of their reserves. Though some of the Jacobite forces pursued the fleeing troops the majority seem to have turned on the government infantry’s now exposed right flank. The Jacobites in their attack, after receiving a volley from the whole government army, came on, fired their muskets which they then threw down and drew swords and ran forward in attack. The government battle formation was immediately broken, with just a few units offering any further resistance. Within 7 or 8 minutes the Jacobites were in control of the field and had captured both the royal baggage and artillery. While Cope managed to retreat with some of his infantry, by a lane beside Bankton House, large numbers of his army were captured. Cope reached Berwick with only about 450 troops. (1) (6).

Figure 30: Prestonpans (1745) - battlefield plan

Figure 31: Prestonpans conservation boundary suggested by Martin (red line)

1.4 TROOPS

The Jacobite campaign was compromised by problems within their high command, between experienced and inexperienced commanders. In the government army the problem was the large number of raw recruits that lacked the experience and training to effectively implement the otherwise very effective contemporary European infantry tactics. The composition of the armies and the deployments are summarised in (6).

Numbers:

*Government*: 2500-2800 foot and dragoons, plus volunteers and reserve, probably 4000 total (1); 2300 (2);

- 1234 foot, 567 horse; artillery: 6 small pieces and 4 small mortars (6)

*Jacobite*: circa 1500 – 2000 of which only circa 1000 engaged (1); 2500 (2);

- more than 2200 foot, 36 horse (6).

Losses:

*Jacobite*: 30 killed; 70-80 wounded;

*Government*: 300 killed; 1400 captured (1).

1.4 COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION

There is one monument on the southern edge of the battlefield. Another to the south west commemorates the government Colonel Gardiner, said to have been killed in his own gardens during the rout (6).

2 ASSESSMENT

2.1 LOCATION

The general area of the battlefield is located with a high degree of accuracy. Surprisingly however, Martin’s proposal for conservation appears to exclude most of
the area of deployment and initial engagement (4). Smurthwaite (2), followed by various authors, shows a deployment and action which seems to cover far too wide an area to the north, given the detail in the contemporary plans. The latter show the sequence of deployments by the government forces in response to the manoeuvres of the Jacobite army(1). Of the modern plans consulted, Reid shows what appears to be the most accurate deployment (6). However calculations of likely frontages based on known troop numbers and methods of deployment of the period provided by Chandler (3), as well as the deployments as shown on the contemporary plans (5), suggest a frontage of little over a quarter of a mile (circa 500m), which is what is depicted on the plan in this report.

2.2 PRIMARY SOURCES
This is a very well documented battle including a number of contemporary plans showing the deployment of the armies, the earlier manoeuvres and the contemporary terrain. It should be possible, with detailed research, to place such detail very accurately onto a modern digital map base, within its contemporary terrain.

2.3 SECONDARY WORKS
Although a substantial number of secondary works deal with Prestonpans, there does not appear to be a substantial modern study of the battle. A concise modern overview is given by Reid, who recommends Duffy (2003) as the most detailed study(6).

2.4 BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY
Graves relating to the battle are recorded in the area of the Thorntree Field, apparently a short distance behind the royal army initial deployment, discovered at the end of the 18th century, when this field was being drained. The reports refer to a number of bodies with well-preserved clothing, a little NE of the farm steading at Thorntree Mains (8).

2.5 BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN
The action appears to have been fought in open ground, which appears from the primary accounts to have been an extensive area of open field arable about a mile square. Such open ground, normally considered idea for cavalry, was also considered ideal for the typical Highland charge. It may have lain between two areas of marshy ground, on north and south, though contemporary plans of the battle only show a small area of marsh to the south. Unfortunately there is no evidence on the geological mapping to enable accurate mapping of the marsh, although the Ordnance Survey 1st edition 1:10,560 mapping does indicate the location of an extensive marshy area on the south and a much smaller area on the north. There were also settlements (Preston and Seton) to the east and west, through, or by, which the main road passed, as shown on the contemporary battle plans (1). These marsh and settlement areas provided boundaries to the battlefield. In particular on the west the boundary of enclosed land appears to have proven a substantial barrier to the routed government troops and may, in part, account for why there were so many killed or captured in the rout and pursuit.

2.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE
This was the first battle of the 1745 uprising and was a dramatic victory for the Jacobite army, though it was far from deciding the war. It was a dramatic demonstration of the effectiveness of a Highland charge in the face of well equipped troops using the current
best military practice, but it was not lost on the commanders who faced the Jacobites in subsequent battles that the government forces at Prestonpans had been inexperienced and wholly untested in battle. The victory gave considerable momentum to the Jacobite cause and carried them forward with more confidence to their next military challenge, though important lessons were not learnt, particularly regarding the limitations within the high command.

2.7 CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT
There is extensive modern development to the north and to the south of the battlefield, while on the west development has extended over part of the area of the rout. Though there were some industrial installations in the area already by 1745, these have been extensively developed in later centuries. A large industrial area comprising a Coal Store has encroached on the battlefield, together with a rail line which serves the store, though it may have affected only a very small part of the area of the action. An extensive swathe of landscape has been destroyed by mineral extraction immediately to the south and south east, removing part of the probable area of the 1745 marsh, which lay on the southern edge of the field. A realignment of the 1745 east-west road and a more recent north south road cut across the heart of the action, while the A1 bypass lies a short distance to the south, crossing the areas of first Jacobite deployment and flank march. The mainline railway follows the southern edge of the battlefield. Remarkably, despite its location within such a heavily altered landscape, the core of the battlefield remains largely as agricultural fields and may have been little disturbed, depending on exactly where the frontage of the government army lay.

2.8 CURRENT DESIGNATIONS
There is one listed building on the battlefield but it post dates and thus is not relevant to the battle. The Colonel Gardiner monument to the west of the battlefield, in the area of the rout and pursuit, is listed as is Bankton House itself. A significant area of the battlefield is scheduled, because of the presence of much earlier cropmark enclosures, and so incidentally offers protection to a part of the battlefield which may prove to cover half of the main area of the initial government deployment and clash, although the exact location of the deployments is not yet confirmed. The conservation area in Preston encompasses the large garden which was one of the key areas of enclosures on the north side of the road impeding the government troops’ flight.

2.9 POTENTIAL
Martin’s assessment that there is little to save on the Prestonpans battlefield other than the two monuments would appear to be quite wrong. It is true that much of the landscape over which the preliminary manoeuvres took place has been dramatically altered by development and mineral extraction and so there may be relatively limited potential for the interpretation of the wider manoeuvres to the visitor. Even the centre of the battlefield, though it appears far better preserved, may not perhaps be easily interpreted for the public, given the loss of the surrounding topographical framework. However these conclusions would need to be confirmed by field examination.

Surprisingly the majority of the core of the battlefield appears to survive relatively undisturbed, compared to the surrounding landscape. There may be expected to be good survival of lead bullet distributions which should closely relate to the nature and extent of the action. A limited area of the rout, on the north side of the modern road, also
probably remains under fields. A detached area, comprising the grounds of Bankton House and an area of former garden on the north side of the road, separated from the field by modern development, may yield further evidence of the rout, where government troops were funnelled through the narrow gap of the road between the boundaries of gardens on both sides. In this general area, as well as in the area of the initial engagement, where burials have been reported, there is the potential for mass graves.

A small area on the south side of the B1361 may yield limited surviving physical evidence for the extent of the marsh, which would be of value if the documentary record is insufficient to enable its accurately mapping. The same is true on the north east side of the battlefield, where a more extensive area of potential former marsh is identified on the OS 6” 1st edition mapping but not accurately defined.

Given the high quality of the primary sources for this battle there is the potential to place the action with the landscape to a high degree of accuracy. It is important that such reconstruction work based on the documentary record is undertaken in order both to enable effective conservation and to more clearly define any issues which could only be resolved, if at all, by recourse to the archaeological record. It is at present unclear whether the documentary record is so good, that detailed archaeological investigation of the battlefield will add relatively little to the understanding of the battle itself, other than perhaps confirming the width and exact location of the frontage of the government army. Even if this does prove to be the case, the potential for detailed comparison of the documented evidence with the archaeological evidence of the action may be expected to yield valuable understanding which will enable the more effective interpretation of the archaeology of less well documented battles of the 17th & 18th centuries.

2.10 THREATS

The site lies completely encircled by modern development, mineral extraction, road and rail routes and appears to be a landscape under severe pressure. Major development schemes are already in progress in Preston, on the north west limit of the battlefield, which might include some evidence of the action, especially if the northern extent of the action is not correctly defined or if some routed troops were pursued in this direction. Prestonpans is potentially one of the more severely threatened battlefields in Scotland, though detailed discussion with the local authority is needed to more clearly define the timescale and nature of the threats.

There are likely to be large quantities of lead bullets on the battlefield and thus there is the potential for extensive loss to treasure hunting and poorly recorded metal detecting survey.

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SP 36/68 Sir John Cope, at Lauder, to the marquis of Tweeddale, with details of the failed engagement between his troops and the Highlanders, which took place on a field near Prestonpans. Folio 209 1745 Sept. 21


SP 36/68 Sir John Cope, at Berwick on Tweed to marquis of Tweeddale enclosing a list of officers in the various regiments under his command killed, wounded or taken prisoner by the rebels, with an account of the defeat of his forces by the rebels at Prestonpans. Advises that La Roque’s regiment of 600 Dutch troops are due to be landed there the next day to supplement to 460 dragoons he has with him already. 1745 Sept. 22

SP 36/68 Dr. John Waugh, Chancellor of the diocese of Carlisle to Mr. Robinson, enclosing a copy of an account, dated 21 Sept., of the battle between H.M. forces and the rebels at Prestonpans as witnessed by one of two merchants of Dumfries who went to Sir John Cope’s camp at Tranent for intelligence of the situation. 1745 Sept. 23

SP 36/68 Earl of Derby, at Knowsley, to [Newcastle], enclosing a letter from [Provost] George Bell of Dumfries, dated 21 Sept. informing him of the progress of the rebel Highland army; with a postscript that battle had taken place early that morning between General Cope’s army (consisting of 2,300 regular foot soldiers and 500 Highlanders, together with 2 regiments of dragoons, Hamilton’s and Gardiner’s and 7,000 Highlanders near the village of Cockenzie near Prestonpans, and that Cope’s army had been beaten. 1745 Sept. 23

SP 36/68 John Waugh, Chancellor of Carlisle, to Newcastle, enclosing 3 accounts of the battle between Sir John Cope’s forces and the rebels near Prestonpan all dated 21 Sept., the first 2 sent to him by Mr. Goldie of Dumfries, the third by the Provost of Annan: 1) an account by one of 2 merchants of Dumfries sent to Cope’s camp to gain intelligence of the situation. 1745 Sept. 23

SP 36/69 John Nocks, Postmaster at Preston, to the Postmaster General, in London, with an account of the defeat of Sir John Cope’s forces, near Prestonpans by 7,000 of the rebels, and advising that Lord Derby, the Lord Lieutenant, and Lord Strange are expected to arrive in the town shortly to organise its defence. 1745 Sept. 25

SP 36/69 [Major-General] James Oglethorpe to Newcastle, informing him that the Lord Lieutenant and archbishop had successfully raised 41 companies and £20,000 by their association in the county, and enclosing: 1) letter from General Guest, at Edinburgh Castle, to Major Brown, dated 24 Sept. 1745 Sept. 28

SP 36/70 George Shelvocke, at the General Post Office, to Andrew Stone, esq., enclosing: 1) a letter found near Poole from J.W. to Squire Welde (a member of a notorious papist family) in Purbeck, dated 22 Sept. 2) a letter from John McMillan, postmaster of Lancaster, to the Postmaster General, dated ?31 Sept. 1745 Oct. 4

SP 36/70 John Nocks, Postmaster of Preston to the Postmaster General, with a description and further debaits of 2 officers from the battle of Prestonpans who had been interviewed there after travelling post. Folio 158 1745 Oct. 5
SP 36/70 Major Mountague Farrer, at Carlisle, to Mr. Vere, reporting on the latest estimates of the numbers of the rebel Highland army, with details of which clans had recently joined it. Encloses a plan [missing] of the battle near Prestonpans Folio 236 1745 Oct. 7

SP 36/71 Thomas Pattinson, mayor of Carlisle, to [Newcastle], enclosing a list of soldiers that had entered the town after fleeing from Edinburgh, [after the battle at Prestonpans]. Requests instructions on how to deal with them, and to whom to apply to for theirsubsistence. 1745 Oct. 9-17

SP 54/8/71 Alexander Ogilvie of Prestonpans, on the movement of troops and arms about that area: with note from Sir Hugh Dalrymple reporting that Winton’s men are instructed to meet at Pinkie to receive arms and ammunition 1715 Sept 16

SP 54/15/4B Commissioners of Customs, concerning the pirate ship at Stranraer, and reporting the boarding of the ship John and Marion of Prestonpans, Alexander Hogg master, by two Customs sloops 1725 Feb 11

SP 54/26/24 Lord Advocate Craigie, reporting the flight of the dragoons from their camp outside Edinburgh, when the Jacobite army approached the city; on his attempt to catch the soldiers and his meeting with Brig Fowkes at Musselburgh; following the news of Cope’s arrival at Dunbar, the dragoons intend to march to Prestonpans. 1745 Sept 16

SP 54/26/32 [Charles Edward Stuart to James Stuart] 1) Reflecting on his successful campaign and his subjects: “I have got their hearts to a degree not to be easily conceived by those who do not see it”; on his enjoyment of the highland life; reporting his men’s insistence that he put a price on King George’s head; wishing that the Earl Marischal was with him; and regretting that his family has made an enemy of the Duke of Argyll. undated

SP 54/26/35 Lord Advocate Craigie to Secretary Tweeddale. Reporting that, on his arrival in Berwick, he found Sir John Cope there with 450 dragoons: Cope and Lord Mark Kerr are disputing the command. Concerning the problems caused by the defeat at Prestonpans; and on the need to secure Edinburgh Castle, which contains large amounts of money and ammunition, but only has provisions enough to withstand a month’s siege 1745 Sept 23

SP 54/26/39 Unsigned letter concerning the consequences of the defeat at Prestonpans; on the possibility of invasion from overseas; also reporting that Sir James Stewart [of Goodtrees] seems to be trusted by the Jacobites 1745 Sept 27

SP 54/26/54 Robert Bewey of Prestonpans: declaration concerning the numbers enlisting with the Jacobites in Edinburgh [1745 Oct 4]

SP 54/26/71 Prestonpans: plan of the battle, 21 Sept 1745 [1745]

SP 54/26/185 Government officers taken prisoner at Prestonpans: petition on behalf of Robert Taylor, imprisoned at Carlisle; reporting the assistance he gave them during their captivity c 1746

SP 54/27/37 Parole taken by army officers after their capture at Prestonpans, dated 28 Sept 1745 at Holyrood House. With Viscount Strathallan’s permission for Col Charles
Whitefoord to go to Lesley House, Fifeshire and remain there under the terms of his parole, dated 12 Dec 1745

T 1/321/32 [Lord George Murray] to Charles Edward, the Young Pretender, concerning the battle of Prestonpans. 1745 Sept. 21

British Library:
Add. 36595 ff. 66, 68, 70, 71

Extracts from the ‘Caledonian Mercury’ rel. to the battle of Prestonpans 1745.

Printed:
A true and full account of the late bloody and desperate battle fought at Gladsmuir, betwixt the army under the command of His Royal Highness Charles Prince of Wales, &c. and that commanded by Lieutenant General Cope, on Saturday the 21st September, 1745. To which is prefix’d occasional reflections on the amazing happy success ... And hereto is added complete lists of prisoners and the killed and wounded. 1745.


4.2 SECONDARY SOURCES

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Ascanius ... in which is given a particular account of the battle of Prestonpans, and the death of Col. Gardiner. Edinburgh: Martin, 1804.
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Tomasson Katherine, and Buist Francis. *Battles of the Forty-five,* 1962.


1 SUMMARY

1.1 CONTEXT

In 1707 the two kingdoms of Scotland and England had been united, a highly unpopular move across much of Scottish society. The Jacobites sought to exploit this not simply to reverse the union, but to gain the crown of both England and Scotland. An abortive rising took place in 1708. Then, in 1714, when the Elector of Hanover succeeded Queen Anne to the throne he alienated a range of former supporters of Anne. One of these, the Earl of Mar, threw in his lot with the Jacobites and in September began to raise forces to march south to join with English Jacobites, in an attempt to return a Stuart to the throne. To counter the uprising the government dispatched a combination of Scottish and English regiments under the command of the Duke of Argyll. During October there were various manoeuvres, including against Edinburgh. Then on the 10th November the Jacobite army marched south from Perth, reaching Kinbuick, just north east of Dunblane on the 12th. Argyll had marched north and was already at Dunblane, intending to intercept the Jacobite force. The government army may have been outnumbered by about 2:1, but it was made up of regulars fighting under an experienced commander.

1.2 ACTION

The Jacobites drew up in battle formation on Kinbuick Muir, presumably in order to control the road north from Dunblane, but had to move more than two kilometres south east from here on to Sheriff Muir, to the east of Dunblane, to engage the government force. The manoeuvre proved difficult for the inexperienced Jacobite troops, disrupting their intended battle formation and putting them at a disadvantage in the coming action. Argyll’s forces ascended the hill from the direction of Dunblane, but the Jacobites were on the field first and could choose their ground. The Jacobite forces deployed with boggy ground on their left flank; though Reid suggests this was unintentional and caused further disruption to the Jacobite deployment. However, it may be that they intentionally exploited this ground, unsuitable for cavalry action, to anchor their flank and enable the massing of their inexperienced cavalry on the right flank, giving them at least some advantage in numbers against their far more experienced adversaries.

Both armies outflanked each other on their right wings, frequently intentionally the stronger of the two cavalry wings in historic battles. The Jacobite attacks were somewhat disordered, but on the right they were successful and drove off the Hanoverian left who had still not fully deployed and seem to have been caught in the flank by the Highlanders’ charge. These Jacobite forces of the right then continued in pursuit of the routed forces, thus losing the opportunity to attack the exposed flank of the remaining forces of the government centre.

On the Jacobite left the Lowland forces also attacked but were met by well deployed government troops, who held the Jacobite attack. The frozen marsh seems to have
enabled government foot though not cavalary to manouevre on the Jacobite left flank. The Jacobites were driven back in a fighting retreat as far as the River Allen east of Kinbuck, during which many were probably killed, particularly at the crossing of the Allen.

The returning troops from the Jacobite right seem to have stood on Kippendaive Hill but were not brought back into the action. Argyle, with perhaps 1000 troops of his right wing, comprising men returning from the pursuit towards the Allen, drew up in enclosures and mud walls for protection. Thus the original location of the action was largely abandoned and the forces in the final phase may have approached from almost opposite directions to where they originally deployed. The final Jacobite advance faltered within musket range and they withdrew as dusk approached. Though neither side could claim a genuine victory, the momentum of the rebellion had been broken and it soon then petered out. (2)(4)(5).

Figure 32: Sheriffmuir (1715) - battlefield plan

Figure 33: Sheriffmuir conservation boundary suggested by Martin (red line)

1.3 TROOPS
The Highland forces of the Jacobites had a great advantage in numbers, but Mar was not an experienced military commander and needed James Stuart to join the army to take command. In contrast the government army, comprising both Scottish and English forces, were mainly well trained and experienced troops. Reid gives a summary of the composition of each army.

Numbers:
Government: 960 dragoons, 2200 infantry; (5)
Jacobite: 807 horse, 6290 foot (5).

Losses:
Government casualties: 700 (2).
Jacobite casualties 250 (2).
About 600 killed in all (5).

1.4 COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION
An obelisk monument to the Clan Macrae, erected 1915, stands on the battlefield (3). The Gathering Stone is a block of grit, since 1840 enclosed in an iron cage, where the standard of the Scottish clans is said to have been placed. It is in reality a much earlier standing stone but one which has gained traditional association with the battle (6).

2 ASSESSMENT

2.1 LOCATION
Secondary accounts generally place the initial deployments and action about 1 mile to the SW of the Ordnance Survey and NMRS records for the battlefield. Unlike most
other secondary accounts, Reid has the deployment east-west. The deployments shown by Smurthwaite appear far too extensive for the size of armies, while Seymour shows the deployments considerably further to the east than other authors, though still well to the west of the OS site.

With such a well documented battle, which includes contemporary plans as well as many written accounts, it should be possible to remove the confusion through a modern reworking from accounts once a detailed reconstruction of the historic terrain has been completed. For example, the presence, according to the accounts, of boggy ground on the left flank of the Jacobite force should enable the secure location of their deployments (4). There are also other key topographical details, such as the reference to the enclosures used by the government forces towards the end of the battle.

The ‘area of search’ defined here for the battlefield is in two parts: firstly the core area, intended to encompass the initial action; secondly a wider area intended to cover the prior manoeuvres and subsequent pursuits as well as take account of the current uncertainties over the exact positioning of the main action.

2.2 PRIMARY SOURCES
This is a well documented battle. There are a large number of contemporary written accounts of the action, with information including eye witness accounts and from both sides. There are also several graphic depictions of the battle. A painting shows the armies deployed, though with little terrain detail, and this is reproduced in (5). A printed plan of the battle is in the National Library of Scotland. This gives the contemporary terrain, distinguishing field from open pastures, and shows the original rebel deployment the previous night and their advance to the battlefield. However the critical eastern half of the plan, showing the main battlefield with deployments and action, is apparently missing from the copy in the National Library of Scotland.

2.3 SECONDARY WORKS
There are several late 19th/early 20th century studies, which make extensive use of primary sources, but there is no detailed modern study of the battle. Reid considers the study by Baynes (1970) to be the best modern military discussion but criticises it as superficial where it deals with the battle. Reid’s own work is a short but concise and useful account. The important difference between his and most other descriptions of the battle is in his placing of the deployments on an east-west rather than north-south orientation.

2.4 BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY
None has been identified in the research for this report.

2.5 BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN
In this high moorland situation the geological mapping has proven of little assistance in determining the probable location of the boggy ground. NMRS records refer to the J Lesslie plan of Sheriffmuir, 1766. This has not been consulted for the present assessment.
2.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE
Sheriffmuir was the key battle of the 1715 Jacobite rebellion. Though Mar might claim that he held the field, in reality it was a defeat and caused his forces to retreat back to Perth. Even the arrival of James Stuart in late December failed to enable a recovery of the momentum of the uprising.

2.7 CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT
The greater part of the battlefield is covered by forestry plantations. It is uncertain what damage afforestation and associated management works may have done to the battle archaeology. In contrast, the area of the pursuits extends across agricultural land, highways and down to the river Allen. In the absence of information as to the exact location of this subsidiary action it is difficult to assess survival and condition.

2.8 CURRENT DESIGNATIONS
There is a scheduled area to the north east of the battlefield and scheduled standing stones to east and northwest. A listed building lies on the eastern edge of battlefield. The clan monument on the battlefield is also listed.

The area suggested for battlefield conservation by Martin is inexplicably restricted in extent (3).

2.9 POTENTIAL
The extensive contemporary accounts together with the pictorial representations of the battle and its preceding manoeuvres should allow for a more accurate and detailed mapping of the initial deployments and distribution of the action. This is essential to enable more effective management of the site. Soil pH needs to be assessed to determine likely survival of artefacts, but as lead bullets were the main projectile type so reasonable survival of these may be expected whatever the soil conditions.

The specific nature of the documentary evidence for the advance and the routs may mean that these areas will prove of research value, allowing detailed validation of the interpretation of battle archaeology. It may be possible to compare the character and density of the main action with that in the pursuits and in the potential concentration of action where the routed Jacobites reached the River Allan. It has not been established whether any comparable action related to the routed Government troops which should be considered to the south west of the battlefield.

2.10 THREATS
The site is unlikely to be threatened by extensive development, but there are current proposals for a wind farm which may have a significant visual and limited archaeological impact on the site. The site is also potentially threatened by the Beauly – Denny power-line proposal. The intrusion of pylons would have a significant visual impact as well as being a potential threat to battle and terrain archaeology. The potential also needs to be assessed for damage through future woodland management (machinery movement, road construction etc) and perhaps even any potential for the reduction of soil pH by the long term presence of the plantation woodland. For the area of the pursuits other threats may exist, though again there are no obvious development threats, but they cannot be adequately assessed unless the location of that element of the action is more accurately defined.
A level II assessment would be required to enable an effective assessment of the impact on the battlefield of the current development proposals.

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(6) NMRS

4 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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*National Library of Scotland:*

Map of battle: 3 identical left hand part of a printed plan showing the contemporary terrain, distinguishing field from open pastures, and showing the original rebel deployment the previous night and their advance to the battlefield. The critical eastern half showing the main battlefield with deployments and action is missing. A brief description of the action is provided in the key.

*National Archives:*

SP 54/10/45A Mar to the Governor of Perth. Giving an account of the events of the battle of Sheriffmuir: they attacked the enemy at noon and “carry’d the day entirely”. Also with a list of prisoners, including those wounded, and reporting the death of Strathmore and Macdonald of Clanranald 1715 Nov 13

SP 54/10/45B Account of the battle of Sheriffmuir by the Jacobite side undated

SP 54/10/47 Provost of Edinburgh, sending an account of the battle of Sheriffmuir 1715 Nov 14

SP 54/10/48 Argyll to Secretary Townshend. On the battle of Sheriffmuir, giving losses and prisoners; also asking when the Dutch reinforcements will arrive 1715 Nov 14

SP 54/10/49 Postmaster Anderson, on Sheriffmuir, “wherein bless’d be God we had the better, and hope soon to hear, that what remain of the rebels are intirely routed” 1715 Nov 14

SP 54/10/50 Rothes, reporting that Sheriffmuir was a considerable victory for government forces 1715 Nov 15

SP 54/10/51 Argyll to Secretary Townshend. On Sheriffmuir: inquiring into the retreat of some of the army; on those officers who deserve recognition for their actions; and reporting that the rebels are in the position they held before the advance, and are gathering their forces for another attack 1715 Nov 15

SP 54/10/95 Lord Torphichen: account of the battle of Sheriffmuir [1715 Nov]
SP 54/10/96C Andr[ew] Hume to Pringle. On the news from Edinburgh; desertions from the Jacobite army since Sheriffmuir and rumours of an offer of surrender; the ill health of Tweeddale and the hopes of Forfar’s recovery; also on the plight of a rebel prisoner 1715 Nov 29

SP 54/10/97 Gen Wightman, giving his account of the action at Sheriffmuir, and contradicting the report of the bad behaviour of Lord Stair’s regiment under the command of Major Otway during the battle; also recommending Col Lawrence, formerly a prisoner at Perth 1715 Dec 1

SP 54/10/104 Pollock, reporting that the clans are sending men to ensure the return of those men who deserted after Sheriffmuir, and he is in no position to stop them 1715 Dec 2

SP 54/10/115B Argyll to Secretary Townshend. Giving thanks for being granted leave; reporting that there is no news of the Pretender’s landing; and giving an account of the behaviour of the left wing of his forces at Sheriffmuir, some of whom did not do their duty 1715 Dec 6

SP 54/11/72A Sutherland, on the difficulties he faces and the lack of support he is given; he has spent all the money he has got or could borrow, in the king’s service; also recommending clemency for Sir Robert Gordon, who left the rebels before Sheriffmuir 1716 Jan 30

Printed sources:

Account of the battle of Sheriffmuir : in a letter from a gentleman in Stirling to a friend in Edinburgh. [S.l.: s.n.]

An account of the engagement near Dunblain yesterday the 13th instant, betwixt the King's Army under the command of his Grace the Duke of Argyll, and the rebels commanded by Mar. Edinburgh: Printed by the heirs and successors of Andrew Anderson, 1715.

A true and particular account of the battle at Sheriff-Muir : with an exact list of all the nobility, general officers, chiefs of clans, and number of private men, in the King’s army in Scotland; under the command of the Duke of Mar. To which is added, a form of prayer and thanksgiving us'd on Thursday, January 26, 1716, for the King’s safe and happy landing. 1716.

Meston, William. To the memory of the Right Honourable John Earl of Strathmore : who was kill’d at the battle of Sheriffmuir, near Dunblain, November 13th, 1715, 1715.

Wightman, Major General. Notes of a Lecture after the Victory over the Rebels, and on the return of the honorable Major General Wightman, with the troops under his command, from the Highlands to Inverness, upon the 20th June, 1719. Edinburgh: James McEuen and Company, 1719.

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WALLACE/TIEKO. *LE CHANT DES TERRES 1 - SHERIFFMUIR*, 2002.

STIRLING BRIDGE

1 SUMMARY

1.1 CONTEXT

With the failure of the House of Canmore in Scotland, Edward I of England supported the installation of John Balliol as a vassal king of Scotland. In 1295 there was a rebellion, leading to an English campaign involving the sack of Berwick and the defeat of a Scottish army at Dunbar. Balliol then sued for peace and accepted an English occupation but, in 1297 under the leadership of Sir William Wallace and Sir William Morray, there was a major Scottish revolt. This was at a time when the English were engaged in war with France and, as so often, the Scottish forces chose this time to challenge their enemy, when they were more vulnerable because fighting on two fronts. By August 1297 Morray and Wallace controlled almost all of Scotland north of the Forth, except for Dundee. As Edward I was fighting on the continent, the English governor, the Earl of Surrey, marched north with an army from Berwick to relieve Dundee.

1.2 ACTION

It was at the crossing of the River Forth at Stirling that the Scottish army chose to meet the challenge. They deployed on the north east side of the Forth, here deep and impassable except by bridge, though a ford existed two miles upstream. The Scottish commanders are believed to have surveyed the battlefield from Abbey Craig, the high ground 1.5km from the bridge where the Wallace monument now stands. The Craig is named after the adjacent monastery of Cambuskenneth which also provided an alternative name for the battle.

A Scottish knight in the English army offered to take a force across the ford, to attack the enemy from the rear, but this option was not exploited. Instead Surrey chose only to advance across the bridge. An English detachment was sent forward over the bridge, wide enough for only 2 horses, to cover the crossing of the main English force. Wallace waited until a substantial number of the troops had crossed (possibly just 2000 (5)) and then attacked. The Scottish schiltron fended off a charge by the English heavy cavalry and in the counter attack engaged the English infantry. They gained control of the east side of the bridge, cutting off the opportunity for English reinforcements to cross. Caught on the low lying ground in the loop of the river with no chance of relief or of retreat, most of the outnumbered English on the east side seem to have been killed, at most a few hundred escaping by swimming across the river. Following this decisive Scottish victory, the English army retreated to Berwick, most English garrisons surrendered and Wallace was installed as Guardian of Scotland.(3) (4) (5).

Number:

1.3 TROOPS

Numbers:
There is good contemporary evidence for the composition of the English army but far less certainty for the Scottish.

*English*: in July 10,000 infantry claimed but by September possibly just 6000 foot, 300 horse (5)

*Scottish*: 5-6000 foot, 180 horse (5)

**Losses:**
Uncertain but substantial numbers of English killed; the medieval chronicles quote wholly unbelievable numbers of Scots killed (5).

1.4 **COMMEMORATION & INTERPRETATION**
The Wallace Monument is an impressive 19th century tower standing on Abbey Craig, in the general area from which Wallace is believed to have surveyed the battlefield prior to the action.

2 **ASSESSMENT**

2.1 **LOCATION**
In the 19th and early 20th century the location of the bridge was open to considerable dispute, with a suggestion that it stood at Kildean, more than a kilometre to the north west of the present bridge. Of modern authors only Kinross places the bridge on this site (1). In 1906 Cook suggested the currently favoured site, which is the only location at Stirling for which there is documentary or archaeological evidence for a medieval crossing of the Forth. Only a ford is known to have existed at Kildean, in the post medieval period, and this was therefore considered likely to be the ford referred to in the battle accounts. The foundations of the early bridge have been located immediately north of the surviving Old Bridge (2). There is now broad agreement between most authors as to the location of the initial deployments and action, in the loop of the river immediately to the east of Stirling Bridge.

2.2 **PRIMARY SOURCES**
There are several original accounts for the battle, including the English account by Guisborough.

2.3 **SECONDARY WORKS**
The most recent modern study is that by Armstrong, which in addition to providing an accessible summary of the action, is well illustrated and provides a useful overview of the armies and the background to the campaign (6). Reid provides a useful but brief account. Neither however are referenced, which is a major drawback.

2.4 **BATTLE ARCHAEOLOGY**
None has been identified.

2.5 **BATTLEFIELD HISTORIC TERRAIN**
Some physical remains of the 13th century bridge are known to survive (2). A causeway from the bridge running across the floodplain towards Abbey Craig is referred to in the secondary works.

2.6 **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE**
This was the first major Scottish victory in the Wars of Independence, which brought most of the country back under Scottish control and raised Wallace to a position of political control.

2.7 **CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT**
The vast majority of the battlefield is built over. Two rail lines and a modern major road divide up the only substantial remaining open area on the battlefield, separating the main open space from the...
site of the bridge. However the limited areas of open ground (rugby and related playing fields) lie in the presumed area of the later phases of the action, adjacent to the river. Also there is a small area immediately adjacent to the east end of the bridge. There is one other small area of open ground within the urban area (school playing field). Though Abbey Craig remains undeveloped almost the whole of the area of the probable Scottish initial deployment is developed. A tiny fragment of the land on the western bank adjacent to the end of the bridge, where the English forces approached the bridge, is also undeveloped.

2.8 CURRENT DESIGNATIONS
The Wallace Monument is listed and its immediate environs scheduled due to the presence of a much earlier fort. The slopes below the Wallace monument are an SSSI. The 15th century bridge is listed and both this and the remains of the 13th century bridge are also scheduled, hence any immediately associated surviving battle archaeology may also be protected. The surviving open ground immediately downstream of the 15th century bridge is a Conservation Area, thus encompassing a small part of the area of potential survival of battle archaeology. Martin identifies an oddly restricted area for conservation that excludes the whole area of relatively open ground in the loop of the river (7).

2.9 POTENTIAL
The majority of the battlefield is so extensively developed that there have to be serious questions as to what significance the study of any surviving battle archaeology might have for the understanding of the action. This is however a very low lying area described in the geological mapping as post glacial ‘raised beach deposits and associated marine and estuarine alluvium’ with an additional small area of reclaimed inter-tidal flats in the loop of the river on the south of the battlefield. There may thus be potential for the survival of a buried battlefield surface in the area of the playing fields and immediately adjacent to the bridge, in the loop of the river. There is also the possibility of waterlogged deposits in such a low lying area. If such conditions exist then it could mean exceptional survival of both artefacts and burials. If information is not yet available from past watching briefs (reported in the NMRS (2)) on the chronology of the stratigraphy here then it would be appropriate to seek a location where trenching might test the stratigraphic relationship between the alluvial deposits and the medieval causeway from the bridge, to establish at what depth any battlefield deposits might exist. The small undeveloped area in the school grounds, if it has not been heavily disturbed, might contain some surviving battle archaeology as it is the one area that has not been built over in the broad zone where it is suggested that the main action took place. However given the difficulty of recovering medieval battle archaeology the potential on the latter may be very low although again the evidence might prove to be buried by alluvial deposits.

It is to be expected that significant action took place in the surviving undeveloped area adjacent to the east end of the bridge while the final destructive action of the battle took place beside the river to the south. Archers were involved in the action and so significant numbers of projectiles should have been deposited in at least some parts of the field, while men at arms involved in hand to hand fighting and then the final stripping of their bodies, should have provided the potential for the loss of a range of non ferrous items similar to those recovered from the Towton battlefield. Given that this is one of relatively few major battles in such a topographical location, if burial beneath alluvium or waterlogging was demonstrated then it would be a rare survival. Demonstrating such survival might be difficult but it would be important to establish if such a potential exists as it may only be in such conditions of burial that the true nature of medieval battle archaeology can be finally established. It may then be possible to better understand the battle archaeology, or lack of it, on other medieval battlefields where deposits have been affected by more destructive chemical and mechanical damage.
Physical evidence from this area may also assist in the understanding of the nature of the terrain at the time of the battle. This would include geological evidence for the width of the river and nature of the adjacent ground. Also, because the modern and the 15th century bridge took the crossing away from the 13th century location there is surviving archaeology of the 13th century bridge which, together with any immediately adjacent evidence of the nature of the causeway, may help in the understanding the terrain.

Despite its state of development, it is argued by Martin that the terrain can still be grasped very effectively, given that the bridge, river, valley floor and Abbey Craig are such distinctive features in the landscape. This is supported by Armstrong’s description of the battlefield.

2.10 THREATS
A range of threats, particularly of a piecemeal nature, are likely on the open ground given its location within the heart of the urban area. River erosion is also reported as a potential problem (7), as might be any remedial works to deal with this erosion. Martin reports vandalism as a problem with past interpretive schemes(7).

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