

in the South you will meet with many difficulties. His Majesty before your <sup>A.D. 1640.</sup> last despatch had resolved to send for the Earl of Essex to come to his aid with all the power of the county where he is Lieutenant. And this day in the morning I sent an express to him with a letter under the Signet. But I presume his Majesty will second the same upon the Queen's and your last despatch. I was advertised of the assembly this vacation in London, three days since. His Majesty well approves of your advice. This day at four of the clock Rogers arrived here; and within a quarter of an hour the other to which your's served for a cover to the Queen's. Thus you see the posts run well; but I shall be glad to have a word from you what you do in it; for [.....] approaches, the 15th of this month will be quickly here.

*Your Honour's*

*most humble Servant,*

*Torke, 3d of Sept. two o' Clock in the Morning.*

H. VANE.

I SENT you a second despatch from Northallerton; I should be glad to know whether it came to your hand.

*An Original, endorsed by Windebank.*

*The Lord CONWAY's Narrative of his Conduct in the Action at Newburn.*

THAT the causes of the losses sustained in the North may be the better known, the Lord Conway thinks it fit to relate what the designs were in the first enterprize, as far as did fall within his cognizance.

AN army of 20,000 foot and 2000 horse was designed for the borders of Scotland near Berwick. Another of 10,000 foot and 1500 horse was to be transported out of Ireland to the town of Air in Scotland. Also 10,000 foot and 500 horse were to be sent into the North of Scotland; and a fleet of ships with some soldiers was to go into the Frith. These forces were to be ready by a certain day, as will appear by the acts of the Council at War. For which purpose there were divers sums of money levied, and the monies in certain were counted what they should do, and a state accordingly made. Why all this was not done, but that some troops of horse and divers regiments of foot were not raised at all, and the rest of the foot so late, that there was no time to exercise them, he knoweth not. Before the 2000 horse were entirely levied, the Lord Conway was sent to Newcastle, because it was doubted the Scots had a design upon that town, for the defence of it. Six thousand of the trained bands of Yorkshire were appointed to march thither; and to that end money was advanced to every regiment. And one of the regiments did march as far as Durham, 'till order came to send them back again. So that the Lord Conway was left at Newcastle with only 500 horse.

UPON view of the walls, state and situation of the place, he found the town to be very weak; which, immediately after his coming thither, he represented to the Court; and within two or three days after sent to the Deputy-Lieutenants of Northumberland and the Bishoprick of Durham. Those of Northumberland gave him a meeting at Morpeth; where he advised with them of the condition and strength of the county, and of the best

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A.D. 1640. means to get intelligence of the Scotch preparations, and to put the country upon the borders into the best posture of defence: Which they undertook to do, according to the directions then given, and to send men into Scotland to espy and keep strict watches on the borders, and to give advertisement from time to time what should happen. Also, upon discourse with some of the Gentlemen of the county, the Lord Conway propounded to the Lord General the fitness of fortifying Morpeth, and two other places, whither soldiers might retire, if they should happen to be broken; and by some one of which any army that comes out of Scotland must pass, they having been heretofore fortified. His Lordship also writ to the Lieutenant Colonel Barwick to be very careful in using all means of inquiry how the Scotch should advance in their preparations, and to give timely advertisement thereof: Who returned assurance of little appearance yet of any considerable forces they had, and that all care should be taken to observe them, and to represent their proceedings, as there should be occasion. His Lordship also by his letters to the Lord General advised that arms should be provided, especially muskets, and sent down; that those of Northumberland (who were willing to pay for them) might be furnished for their money; also, advising that they might be sold to them without gain, at easy rates; for that the getting from the country in that kind would much discontent them, and discourage them in his Majesty's service. He also propounded to the townsmen of Newcastle to furnish men for their own defence, and that the king should arm them. Which they at first denied to hearken to, fearing they should be forced to continue them as trained bands. But upon further consideration, and apprehension of their own danger, promised to find men only to use muskets and pikes. And the Lord Conway also by several letters to the Lord General and other great Ministers, did represent the fitness to have Newcastle fortified; which with a moderate charge he believed might be made of sufficient strength, at least to keep out an enemy until his Majesty's army might come to relieve it; and that there was one hill whereon a fort might be made, as well to keep out an enemy, as to bridle the town, if there should be cause. And because he found money was wanting, he propounded a way to raise the charge of it out of the business of coals; which notwithstanding was not thought fit to be done. So that there being no more forces at Newcastle but 500 horse, and it not being thought fit that his Majesty should be at any charge for fortifying the place in due time, and the townsmen being unwilling to do any thing for their own safety, the town continued in that weak estate, wherein the Lord Conway found it.

SUCH intelligence as could be gotten to Newcastle by messengers sent into Scotland, or from the garrisons of Berwick and Carlisle, or from the Deputy Lieutenants and Gentlemen upon the borders, was represented to the court from time to time. And when the Scotch forces began to be assembled and mustered in the nearer parts of Scotland, (though their numbers were but very small in those places at that time, which was about the latter end of June,) the rest of the horse were drawn from their Quarters about Beverly to Cleveland; and the Lord Conway writ for some considerable number of foot to be sent to Newcastle, and also to hasten down arms for those of the country that were willing to buy them for their own defence and safety. And upon their advertisements and intelligence, orders were sent to the Lord Conway that if the Scotch came in (as it was believed they would before his Majesty's forces could be drawn together) he should command all the ships  
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out of the river of Tine, left they should be surpris'd; and to Sir Jacob <sup>A.D. 1640.</sup> Ashley Serjeant Major General of the foot, that he should send up four or five thousand men from Selby. But Sir Jacob Ashley did not think fit to send them for the reasons among others expressed in a letter dated 9th July 1640. from him to the Lord Conway (among other things) in these words:

“ My Lord,

“ I HAD order from my Lord General to send four or five thousand men to your Lordship to Newcastle. But considering that there is not such a number yet come, and those that are come have neither colours nor halberds, and want drums, I forbear it, &c. There is some money but for seven days; and if I should send any of these troops in this case, you would be sufficiently troubled with them for want of pay, &c. Now, my Lord, I am to receive all the arch knaves of the Kingdom, and to arm them at Selby. Before I came, some 500 of them were brought to Lieutenant Colonel Ballard: They beat the officers and the boors, and broke open the prisons, &c. Two days since Col. Lunsford's regiment comes, who had by the way fought with all their officers, and as they passed abused all the country.”

AND by other letters of 13th and 18th of July Sir Jacob Ashley further intimated how impossible it would be to keep those men, that were come, together, if they should miss the seven days pay; and that they would disband and rise against their officers, or spoil the country; and that part of his own regiment raised in Berkshire came to Daventry, and there totally disbanded; and that the Lieutenant to Colonel Culpeper was basely slain by the Devonshire men; that three hundred of the Marques\* refused absolutely to go to Hull for fear of being shipped; and that he went with a hundred armed men, and took with him the Marshal with 20 of his men to send them away. Which general disorder, backwardness and disaffection to the service gave the Lord Conway apprehension that the Scots would be encouraged thereby to make an attempt upon us; although it was against his judgment that they should do so upon those collections he could make from what he had heard out of Scotland; which was only of small numbers of men that they had mustered and drawn together at Leith, Dunce and other places near the borders. But when his Lordship was advertised from Court, where there was constant intelligence from every part of Scotland, of their preparations and intentions to come with a powerful army, he had reason to alter his opinion, being assured of it by a letter from Mr. Secretary Vane dated 3d August 1640. wherein is expressed as followeth:

“ My Lord,

“ I HAVE only time to tell you, in answer to your last, and your news there inclosed, that I gave his Majesty communication thereof, who compared it with others. And it is my opinion that you will shortly, if not before this comes to your hands, hear that the Scots will march into England. I wish I may be deceived; for as his Majesty's affairs are conditioned at present, I am one of those that desire not to hear that they should be come on this side Tweed. I heard not of the order that was given for bringing of the army seven days behind in pay, and after that time fourteen, until I was advertised thereof out of the north. But, as your Lord-

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A.D. 1640. "ship says, in case of unavoidable necessity it must be born withal; and  
 "your Lordship I doubt not but laying that for the ground, will persuade  
 "the officers thereunto; though I confess it is *durus sermo*, and therefore I  
 "do not wonder at all if they were sad and melancholy, when they de-  
 "clared the same unto them. It will be a great service both to the King  
 "and State, if your Lordship by your conduct and wisdom can prevail so  
 "far with them as to keep them from mutiny until monies come down,  
 "which his Majesty and my Lords are hastening to you with all possible  
 "diligence. For it will be worse than ever to have disorders fall out either  
 "of horse or foot, now that it cannot be long expected (if at all) but that  
 "the Scots will be with you. And I heartily pray to God that, they know-  
 "ing but too much of affairs, our disagreements and disorders bring them  
 "not in upon us. The same God direct you, and give you success to act  
 "all for the best in this difficult time, &c." Which advertisement agreeing  
 with what the Lord Conway heard by one he had sent into Scotland, who  
 was newly returned, and also with the relation of Sir Henry Gibb who came  
 from thence, his Lordship writ to the Lord General the 10th of August  
 1640. as followeth:

"My Lord,

"I AM now informed thus by Sir Henry Gibb, who having some business  
 "with my Lord Haddington, went to the border and sent for him: He  
 "came and told Sir Henry that without all doubt the Scots' army will come  
 "into England within three days: He is most confident of that. He saith  
 "that their army will be 30,000. I see no help for this Town, but that it  
 "will be lost. I have written divers times that it might be made defensible,  
 "but that was not thought fit. Now it is not possible to resist it, if Cañon  
 "be brought before it. However, I will see if I can persuade the town to  
 "make some defence, if it be possible to keep it a day or two. The King  
 "commanded me to burn the suburbs; but burning them will not be of  
 "any use; the ways are all of stone; so that the wall will be of as much  
 "annoyance to the town, as if the houses were untouched. If I leave any  
 "number of men in the town, their arms will help to arm the Scots, and  
 "they are in great danger to fall into their power. If I quit the town, and  
 "leave no soldiers, I am sure it will be imputed to me as a most dishonour-  
 "able thing, when an enemy is master of the field, that night to quit to  
 "him that which cannot be kept, and in such manner as he shall receive  
 "least benefit by it. I have written to Sir Jacob Ashley to send hither the  
 "foot at Selby, if he think it counsellable to send them without money. If  
 "they come, it is to be feared they will ruin the country worse than the  
 "Scots; who I do verily believe will do no hurt for some days, but will pay  
 "for what they take, if I be not misinformed. I have written to the Vice-  
 "President to put the trained bands in readiness, and to know of him how  
 "the Country and Gentry will stand affected. From Mr. Wilmot I heard  
 "yesterday that Sir Jacob Ashley had written for, and he had sent to him,  
 "two troops of horse, your's and Captain Herbert's, because he feared a  
 "mutiny, that would undo all, if it happened. I purpose to send for the  
 "three troops out of Westmorland, if there be not invasion like to be there.  
 "I will immediately give order that all the ships go out of the river, those  
 "that cannot, to be burnt or sunk. They say that there is a means to sink  
 "them, that they may be again recovered. I do hold my purpose with the  
 "horse

"horse and what musketeers on horse-back I can get to march towards <sup>A.D. 1640.</sup> them; although there will be little to be done against so many with so few."

AND also at the same time the Lord Conway writ to the Earl of Strafford, and inclosed a copy of the before recited letter sent to the Lord General; unto which the Earl of Strafford was pleased to return an answer to the Lord Conway in the words following, dated the 15th of August, 1640.

"My Lord,

"YOUR'S of the 10th present was yesterday delivered unto me as I sat at Board; and I understand that the other to my Lord General (whereof you favoured me with a copy) gives much discourse at Court, and that with no advantage to your Lordship. It is observed that it is contrary to all that your Lordship hath formerly writ, wherein you still judged England secure of the Scots this year; and that to believe so mighty an increase of number above what you formerly mentioned, and in truth can probably be really so, upon no more ground than from the bare relation of Gibb, a known Covenanter in heart, and that too not of his own view, but on the credit and report only of the Lord Haddington, is a little wondered at. But above all, those who wish you not well, feverely interpret to your prejudice, that upon so slight an advertisement, and from a person whom you had so little cause absolutely to trust in that business, you should so suddenly pronounce the town of Newcastle lost, and so early take into thought the quitting of the place. Besides we all believe it to be but a mere northern crack, in regard we do not as yet understand any thing from the Governor of Berwick contrary to what he had formerly written in that behalf; which we conceive we should certainly have done before this day, if the Scots had been suddenly increased twenty thousand men, as Gibb reports, it seems, to you. Nevertheless I have written to the Vice-President to have all the trained bands in Yorkshire in a readiness, and will to morrow move that Colonel Goring, and another regiment of foot with all the horse, may instantly be directed to march up to you; which all together, with the trained bands of Durham and Northumberland, with the town itself, I should think would be sufficient to make good the place, 'till the rest of the army march up to your relief. But, for love of Christ, think not so early of quitting the town, burning of suburbs, or sinking of ships. For believe me, if any such thing escape you, there are those who would quickly misconstrue you therein to the King. And with all my heart I wish you had not writ that letter, it being most true Sir John Conyers mentions nothing of it; which makes me also believe Gibb's news either to be out of folly or malice mistaken or misrepresented to your Lordship, &c."

By which letter it appears the Earl of Strafford doth lay blame upon the Lord Conway, and impute it as a crime to believe the coming of the Scots with so great an army, because he was formerly of opinion they would not be ready for an invasion this year. The cause of which opinion was, that he from time to time was assured from Court, that there would be money to supply the King's first designs, and then he had reason to

A.D. 1640. judge that they would be hard put to it to defend themselves. Besides, the Lord Conway had no notice given him from Court 'till a few days before, what the Scots' Nobles and Gentlemen about the King had informed, who must of necessity have knowledge of every thing that was done in every part of that Kingdom; there being many of the best quality attending his Majesty, who had in Scotland Fathers and Mothers, Wives, Children, Brothers, Sisters, Kindred, Allies and Friends; who, as the Lord Conway hath heard, did give certain notice of all the preparations. And if the said Earl would not believe them, it could be no other in him than a wilful unbelief. And it could not be expected that the Lord Conway, though nearer, could have good intelligence of their preparations, which were made by small numbers, and in several places, until they were drawn together; for that he was a stranger there, and had no allowance for intelligence; which would have required great sums to have been well done. And it was not to be done but by employing Scots' men; wherein they had a great advantage of us, in not suffering any of our nation to come to them, and their's having free passage to us.

AND for Sir Henry Gibb, he was a man ever to be believed to be an honest gentleman, and a faithful servant to the King; neither had the Lord Conway ever heard any other of him, either at the Court, or there in the country, where he was well known to divers gentlemen his neighbours. And he had been informed of the Lord Haddington that he was as much of the King's part as he durst appear to be. And for the second part, to think that Newcastle should be lost, the Lord Conway conceiveth was no sudden or rash opinion; for he had divers times before propounded the town should be fortified, and declared that without fortification it was not tenable, as several letters written after the same was lost may witness. In one of which from the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury bearing date the 10th of September (amongst other things) these words are expressed:

"It is true that the letter you sent and the opinion you expressed, what would become of Newcastle in case the Scots came in, was censured, and not to your advantage. And so much I writ to my Lord Lieutenant since his going northward. All that you writ is found true; but that which is thought might have been more done, is, that the hill on this side might have had some defence put upon it, and that, as yourself write, more might have been done than was to hinder the passage to Newburn Ford. But if the soldiers there and men of experience be of opinion that, as things were then conditioned, you could not hinder them, and that the things which you did at first advise are now doing, (by the Scots, I think you mean,) surely you cannot be blamed for the one, but somebody else may be for the other."

AND also in another letter from Mr. Secretary Windebank dated the 23d of September 1640. these words amongst others are contained:

"My Lord of Canterbury hath abundantly cleared any thing that can be objected against you, concerning the neglecting of fortifying Newcastle; which it is evident you did propose timeously enough to have preserved it from surprisal."

NEITHER could the Lord Conway have much hope in the forces at Selby, because Sir Jacob Ashley had divers times advertised him of their want of arms and total ignorance to use them; which was such, that the Earl of Strafford himself in the great Council did openly there declare that he had  
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told his Majesty, upon the first sight of the soldiers, that it was not safe for him to hazard any thing with that army, by reason of their unskilfulness in their arms. And therefore the Lord Conway doth think it was injustice to require any other to do that, which he that requires it does not think fit to be done. And it was impossible they should be otherwise; being levied and brought together so late as in July and August, when the service was to be done; and the Scots were exercising two years together, and many of them had been in the field the year before.

Also from the trained bands in Yorkshire less good was to be expected, as appears by a letter the Lord Conway received from the Vice-President of York about 14th of August 1640. Wherein is expressed, amongst other things, as followeth:

"YESTERDAY, immediately after my return to York, (for I received not your letter 'till Wednesday morning) I sent for the directions to the Colonel of this county, or to the Lieutenant Colonels, where there are no colonels, whereof we want four at this time. And my Lord Lieutenant having been so full of other business of great importance, hath not as yet supplied their places with others, nor indeed can we find out fit persons for that employment, who stand rightly affected to this his Majesty's service; in which respect two of the four were lately discharged from their commands. I doubt extremely our forces are not now in so ready a condition as they were the last year; very many arms being lost in that expedition, and now to be bought ever since for supply of defects. A great number likewise of exercised men both of horse and foot are gone from his Majesty's service into other countries, or several parts of this; so as we cannot meet with them again, but are forced to take on new men. And although I have from time to time called upon the commanders to exercise them, yet I find that by reason of the country's great expences both this year and the last, and the damage it hath sustained by the present army, they have too much forborn that duty. But, which is worst of all, it is much to be feared by those murmurs and repinings from all their gentry's mouths in every place and upon all occasions, that they will not stir with their men further than the necessity of their own safeties shall inform them; which they think sufficiently served if they march to the confines of the country. I perceive likewise by some of them, which I doubt will prove several, that they will expect advance-money, if they stir; as was lately allowed when six of our regiments should have marched to Newcastle. I beseech God work better affections in us than yet I find; for I am persuaded, if Hannibal were at our gates, some had rather open them than keep him out. It grieves me to give your Lordship this account; and I pray God I may be mistaken therein: But in obedience to your commands touching this particular, and what hope may be expected from our forces and gentry of this country, I have truly represented to your Lordship my opinion, together with my apprehensions, and the reason of them. The country is very willing, upon my Lord Lieutenant's last letter, to trust the soldiers for 14 days; but I perceive his Lordship will have many bills presented to him when the army is gone from us. Monies we yet hear of no more than £8000. which our High Sheriff lately paid in; but I doubt some of this is already issued; and I think the Scots had better advance a good way into Northumberland without resistance, than we send this army to encounter them without pay. For then, without all  
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*A.D. 1640.* "question, they will prove more ravenous upon the country than the Scots; who for their own ends and to gain a party here, I believe will give the country all the fair quarter that may be; which our men neither can nor will do. It is time to forbear your Lordship further trouble, being ready therefore to receive your commands always, I rest, &c."

BESIDES all these at this time, the Lord Conway had advertisement from Court, that the first counsels for so many armies were so far from being pursued, as now the Lord Marquis Hamilton's expedition was wholly to be laid aside; that the Earl of Strafford's regiment were not at all to be raised; and some of the regiments in the North were not to be reduced; and that instead of 20,000 men appointed for the borders, there should be only 14 or 15 thousand; for the paying of which there was so little money, that it was not to be hoped they would be held together without mutiny. So that things standing in this state, they gave such evident proofs either of the weakness or ill pursuance of that counsel which designed so powerful an invasion, and was then forced to a defensive war, and that upon all possible disadvantage, that the Lord Conway had just reason to believe that not only Newcastle would be lost, but God knows how much of England more, if an invader would attempt, and those of the country would not defend; and therefore did foresee the town must be abandoned; quitting that which could not be kept, and leaving it in such manner, that it should give the least hope that might be to the invader that should take it: That with unfielded force and good advice resistance might be given in a convenient place, or attempts might be made to cause them to retire into Scotland. And whether that were best, or to go on headlong until we fall into the ditch, he leaves the world to judge.

THE burning of the suburbs in case of danger was an express command from the King; and therefore it was the Lord Conway's duty to give a reason why he did not think it necessary to be done. And the proposition of sinking the ships did proceed from a command which he received in these words expressed (amongst other things) in a letter of 23d June 1640. "When you hear that the Scots are approaching, your Lordship must command all the shipping out of the Tine, lest the Scots surprize them." And because it was not considered in this command whether the winds and tides would serve, the Lord Goring did propound the sinking of them to help the defect of the command, and to shew himself obedient to it, in case they could not be sent out of the river; which was a thing very reasonable and fit to be done, and therefore much mistaken by them that thought otherwise of it. This letter, and the order sent for the keeping of the town of Newcastle by fortifying it, when it was too late, made the Lord Conway lay aside all other thoughts but only the doing of that which was commanded. Therefore he sent for the Deputy Lieutenants of Northumberland and the Bishoprick; who promised to do all that was possible for his Majesty's service, and accordingly employed their best endeavours. But the country would not lend any money to pay the trained bands, or the King's army, nor to furnish any horses to mount musketeers; nor would the trained bands go on without pay; being rather desirous to stay at their homes, to look to the safety of their own goods and friends. So that the Lord Conway, having no forces but the horse to go out with into Northumberland, and having sent men of experience to view the country and the river of Coket, there being no place found where it was possible for him to give the Scots any stop,

stop, he did not think it was fit to go out to meet them; since he was not able to hinder their passage, and that he must be forced so soon as he should see them, to retire before them; not thinking it counsellable to teach his men to be afraid, or to go to meet them whom he could not meddle withal: For small parties would bring intelligence of the motions of their army. But the letter he received from the Earl of Strafford of the 15th of August, declaring what ill constructions were made of the Lord Conway's advertisement of the 10th of August did make him doubt that as ill interpretations could be made of this which he thought the best counsel, not to move against the Scots, until he had forces and places fit to encounter them. And it is most likely it would have fallen out so, for that he did understand by letters from Court, that they did think the Scots might be stayed at Alnwick, or at Morpeth, some days; two places that they came not at; and which are such, as one might as well be commanded to keep the wind out of a door with his hand, as to stop an army there. And the country likewise, although they would not contribute any thing to their own safety, yet did murmur that Northumberland was abandoned. Therefore, to avoid the danger which he doubted from the Court, and if it were possible, to keep those people of Northumberland from assisting the Scots, he went out 4 days with 1000 horse, and, without being able to do any hurt to the Scots' army, was forced to retire before them to Newcastle; whither Sir Jacob Ashley was come during the Lord Conway's absence, and had brought with him the forces from Selby that were armed, leaving 4000 behind him that wanted arms; which 4000 were after sent to Newcastle, but were turned back being without arms, there being none for them, nor money to pay them there. Sir Jacob Ashley had used all diligence to make quarter for the soldiers without the town for security of it, as well as the time would possibly admit, according to the commandment then sent for fortifying Newcastle. And also he had sent to view the river of Tyne, which was found to have many fords, and the higher up the river the fords were the larger and the shallower. And because it was believed the enemy would pass at Newburn, he had caused the engineer to cast up some works there; and in obedience to the commands from the Court, to use all means possible for the defence of the river. After one night's stay at Newcastle the Lord Conway went to Newburn with all the horse and about 2000 foot. That day, being the 27th of August 1640, the Scots came to the other side. The works that were made upon the passage were so weak that the Lord Conway would not have hazarded the troops in any such engagement, where they would be sure to have been beaten. And although Sir Jacob Ashley came the next day with 2000 men more, and increased his strength, yet the Lord Conway, not to engage the troops further than he might fairly, had resolved to make a retreat to Newcastle, if he had not at that instant received a letter from the Earl of Strafford, commanding him to fight; which follows in these words:

"My Lord,

"I PURPOSED to have been moving towards you to-morrow; but I am so very weak and sick, as the King will not permit me to stir hence till Saturday at the soonest. Your Lordship will admit me to deal plainly with you. I find all men in this place extreme ill satisfied with the guiding of the horse, and publish it infinitely to your disadvantage; that having with you 1000 horse and 500 foot you shall suffer an enemy to march so long

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*A.D. 1640.* "a way without a skirmish, nay, without once looking upon him. And it imports you most extremly by some noble action to put yourself from under the weight of ill tongues. Your last letter then certified us that the enemy is intended to pass the Tine at Hexham. If so, I shall advise that you, with all the horse and at least 800 foot, and all the cannons you have, march opposite unto them on this side the river, and be sure, what ever follow, fight with them upon the passage. Indeed, you look ill about you, if you secure not the river: If there be a bridge at Hexham, it should be broken down. Dear my Lord, take the best men, and do something worthy yourself." With a Postscript; "There was sent a man hence to visit the Scots' army, who hath been there amongst them; and he assures us that, upon his life, their horse is not considerable; which still lays it heavily upon you. Their foot is at most but 20,000. and this I am confident that you may rely upon."

WHICH letter although it is said but to be an advice, yet the Lord Conway conceived it to be a command, and, as much as it was possible for a general command and order, enforced. The last part prescribes how he shall fight; the first part directs him to break his neck upon any disadvantage. And howsoever this is said but to be an advice, if the Lord Conway had not observed it, it would have proved a command, and it is most probable that the whole miscarriage of the business would have been laid upon his not fighting, since it was endeavoured to be laid upon his fighting, disavowing that he had any order so to do, and before that, laying great blame upon him for not fighting with the Scots coming through Northumberland, and not understanding the country; maintaining that the Lord Conway with those horse he had might have gone to the Scots' army, and have counted every Colours and Cornet, and have come off at pleasure, without being touched; a thing impossible to be done, unless he had found them, as David did Saul and his army, when he took away his spear and pot of water from his head. And for the good intelligence which the Earl of Strafford assured that he had of the Scots' forces, the Lord Conway saith that he received as certain information of them as was possible to be gotten both by soldiers that put themselves into disguise and marched in their army a day or two, and by many gentlemen of the country that saw their army march. So that he had very good reason to believe their reports before any thing that could be informed to the Earl of Strafford by any single spies into the country, who had not so good means to know nor ability to judge of the strength of the Scots' army as divers that gave their information from their own view. And taking for granted that they were no more but 20,000 foot, and their horse inferior to ours, it was not wisdom to hazard a day with them with 10,000 foot and 2000 horse; and that not only for the disadvantage we had in the numbers but in the rawness and untowardness of our men. The Scots having made a battery and drawn down their army, our works were provided with men to defend them, and with others to second them. Six troops of horse were placed to charge the Scots when they came over, and six or seven more to second them. When the Scotch forces were put in readiness, and their cannon played, our works were not proof against them; the soldiers were new, unacquainted with the cannon, and therefore did not endure many shots, but quitted the works. Those that were to second them followed their example. The horse charged the Scots and drove them back into

into the river ; but their cannon beating through some of our troops, <sup>A.D. 1640.</sup> they retired, and so did the other. Those troops that were set to second, went off when they saw the place forsaken. They should have gone on the left hand, that they might have gone off with the foot ; but mistaking the direction, they went on the right hand, which carried them up to the hill, where they found some troops. Whilst they consulted what was best to be done, the Scots' horse came up in two divisions, and with them 1000 musketeers. The first charge was upon the regiment commanded by Mr. Wilmot, who was there taken prisoner, his men forsaking him, and falling foul upon some troops of my Lord Conway's regiment, disordered them. The rest being charged, did as they saw others do before them. The cause of the loss that was that day, was from the disadvantage of the ground, and the slight fortification, which the shortness of time would not afford to be better : Neither would it allow us to make any works upon the hill which we stood opposite against. And when we came to fight, the soldiers did not do their parts as they ought to do, being the most of them of the meaner sort of men about London, and unacquainted with service, and forgetting to do that which they had often been commanded and taught. After the disorder, the horse by the Lord Conway's command, went to Durham, the foot to Newcastle ; where it was consulted by the Lord Conway, Sir Jacob Ashley, and all the Colonels, what was fit to be done. By all their consents it was agreed that the town should be quitted, because it was not tenable, being altogether unfortified on the Bishoprick side ; and the fortifications which were made on the other side were very inconsiderable. To stay there would but increase the loss ; it would not save any thing ; the gaining 2 or 3 days could not make the town stronger, there being not any place which could be made defensible in that time ; and the loss of our men would greatly weaken the King's army. And this was agreeable to that which was thought fit at the Court ; for with all speed orders were despatched by several ways to command the bringing up of the army from Newcastle ; as appears by two letters from the Earl of Strafford, both dated 29th of August 1640. in these words following :

" AFTER my hearty commendations to your Lordship and the rest, This  
 " sad accident which hath befallen us upon the passage of the Scots over  
 " the Tine, will fetch all our counsels round. There is no remedy ; we  
 " must retreat ; and, as I think, to Hull. The horse at Durham I shall  
 " gather and settle the best I can, and so march up and join the rest of such  
 " horse and foot, as are left us. But how to fetch that part of our foot  
 " which are at Newcastle with you is (God knows) our greatest care and  
 " difficulty. I send you this by the way of Sunderland ; and will, before I  
 " sleep, send another by Hexham. In my opinion your best way will be, if  
 " possibly you can, to ship yourselves and ammunition for Hull ; That were  
 " the best ; but if that cannot be, then, if the town be not to be held any  
 " longer, to make the best composition for yourselves, with Honour, that  
 " you can. But therein I must wholly submit to your own better judgment,  
 " upon the place. And so in great haste I commit you to the blessed pro-  
 " tection of God," &c. And in a Postscript ; " Before I had closed this  
 " letter, his Majesty came to this town, and approved of all before written ;  
 " only adviseth that, if there be any possibility of keeping the town, then  
 " that, shipping the rest, you leave 2000 in the town to defend it."

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" My

A.D. 1640.

"My very good Lord,

"It was very good news to me here to understand by your letters, that the foot are all advanced on this side Durham; nor is there any thing to be done more than to lose no time in your retreat. For there is no thought of fighting, with a frightened army, 'till we join with the King's forces, which I trust will be 20,000. I will use all possible diligence to provide as much bread as possibly I can in this town; and have given order that £8000. shall meet us at Topcliff, to furnish the soldiers with money. Put as much life in your men as you can; and assure them there will be within a few days £80,000. in the way from London, which will give every man his own royalty; We shall want no money. I have taken the like course for baking and buying of bread here and at Northallerton, as all about the country; and I trust from York we shall have good quantity meet us on the way. I shall think the time long 'till I see you and Sir Jacob Ashley, to whom I pray you shew this letter. And I pray you leave some horsemen behind you, that may lie as a watch upon the motions of our enemies, and still bring us timely advertisements what they do. So I rest," &c.

AND although the town of Newcastle had been kept some days, yet would it not have been with any advantage to the King's service, since he had no money, and, by all guesses, no men; his choicest strength being in these men that were at Newcastle. And it would have been much for the King's disservice to have put these inevitably to have undergone base conditions, when they must compound for the town, if it had pleased the invader. Besides these reasons, though there was a good quantity of powder and lead in the town, there wanted musket-bullets, there being no moulds to make them; which want cannot be imputed to a commander, any more than if he had commanded a certain number of musketeers, and that when they came to use their muskets, they could not do service for want of scouring-sticks. If there had been moulds, bullets would not have been wanting; but bullets would not serve to keep a town that wanted fortification.

Now, upon the whole matter, it may easily be judged, whether the two actions of the retreat at Newburn, and quitting Newcastle, were the causes of our losses, or the effects of ill-grounded designs; to make a war without means, to go on with it, and to begin it at sea; thereby giving the Scots a pretext to attempt us by land, before we were able to resist them.

*Mr. Secretary WINDEBANK to his MAJESTY.*

*It may please your Majesty,*

THE last night by the ordinary post I gave your Majesty account of what passed in Council at Hampton-Court, with intention to acquaint your Majesty with the business of this day, which I shall now presume to do.

THE Earls of Bedford and Hertford have been heard this day at the Board. The Earl of Hertford was the Speaker, and made known to the Lords, that in the present common danger they have lately sent a petition to your Majesty; that they had now brought the like, desiring the Lords to join with them in it, with this protestation, that if the Lords would not join, these two Lords and the rest must wash their hands from those mischiefs that were otherwise like to fall upon the State. The petition being read, which agreed wholly